

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

Villars v. Bondi

Villars · No. 25-cv-04239-RS · Decided August 1, 2025

SUMMARY

The court denied Plaintiff Janvier Villars’s motion to recuse or disqualify the court and to reconsider the prior dismissal of his complaint without prejudice. It held that disagreement with prior rulings and unsupported allegations of judicial fraud did not satisfy the standards for recusal or disqualification under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. The court also found no basis for reconsideration under the Northern District of California’s Local Rule 7-9 and noted that Plaintiff could file an amended complaint or appeal.

OPINION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA 9 JANVIER VILLARS, 10 Case No. 25-cv-04239-RS Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR 12 RECUSAL AND RECONSIDERATION PAM BONDI, et al., 13
Defendants. 14 15 Plaintiff demands things—en banc review by the full bench of this district, a
trial by a 16 “blockchain jury,” “automatic equitable relief”—that simply do not exist.

For the following 17 reasons, his motion seeking recusal of this Court and reconsideration of the
order dismissing his 18 complaint without prejudice is denied. 19 I. Recusal and Disqualification
20 Plaintiff’s demand for recusal falls short of the standard requiring referral to another 21 judge.
His arguments are based on disagreement with this Court’s previous rulings and his 22 assertions
of widespread fraud throughout the judiciary.

The standard for recusal is “whether a 23 reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
conclude that the judge's impartiality 24 might reasonably be questioned.” *Mayes v. Leipziger*,
729 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984) (quoting 25 *United States v. Nelson*, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th
Cir.1983)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 144. Such 26 prejudice must result from an extrajudicial source.

See *id.* Accordingly, a previous adverse ruling 27 is not grounds for recusal. *Id.* Plaintiff’s
additional allegations that this Court is biased by its own 1 true, would seem to disqualify the
entire federal judiciary. Plaintiff’s request for recusal and 2 reassignment to another judge or a
panel of judges is therefore bewildering as well as legally 3 insufficient.

4 Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify this Court under Title 28 § 455 is similarly deficient. This 5
portion of his motion relies on the same unsubstantiated accusations of widespread fraud. The 6

standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is the same as for voluntary recusal under § 144. See 7 *Clemens v. U.S. Dist. Ct.*, 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (“whether a reasonable person with 8 knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be 9 questioned”).

The “reasonable person” is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly 10 suspicious,” but rather is a “well-informed, thoughtful observer.” *United States v. Holland*, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Importantly, the standard is not met by “the 12 merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.” *Id.* Plaintiff’s allegations, where 13 comprehensible, are based on this Court’s previous adverse decisions and inchoate accusations of 14 fraud.

These arguments do not undermine this Court’s impartiality in the eyes of a reasonable 15 person. See *id.* 16 II. Reconsideration 17 Parties in this district must seek leave to file a motion for reconsideration. Civ. L.R. 7-9(a). 18 That said, Plaintiff’s motion will not be denied for this procedural defect. It is denied for lack of 19 merit. Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted “absent highly 20 unusual circumstances.” *Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co.*, 571 F.3d 21 873, 880 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted). Assuming leave is properly sought and granted, a party 22 may prevail on a motion for reconsideration by demonstrating at least one of the following: (1) 23 “[A] material difference in fact or law exists from that which was presented to the Court before 24 entry of the interlocutory order for which reconsideration is sought”; (2) “The emergence of new 25 material facts or a change of law occurring after the time of such order”; or (3) “A manifest failure 26 by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal arguments which were presented to the 27 Court before such interlocutory order.” Civ.

L.R. 7-9(b). Plaintiff presents none of those 1 circumstances here. Plaintiffs legal and factual assertions are identical to those raised in his 2 || Complaint and slew of motions. These arguments were duly considered by this Court and found to 3 || be unsupported by anything in the record or in Plaintiffs citations to caselaw. Plaintiff believes he 4 || is entitled to further proceedings on his original complaint solely because he disagrees with the 5 Court’s dismissal.

However, this opinion is not grounds for reconsideration. 6 Reconsideration is particularly inappropriate where leave to amend was granted. Plaintiff 7 may still file an amended complaint. Otherwise, he should seek any further relief via appeal to the 8 circuit court. Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 9 10 || ITISSO ORDERED. 11 12 Dated: August 1, 2025 RICHARD SEEBORG 14 Chief United States District Judge 15 16 17 Z 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 ORDER DENYING RECUSAL AND RECONSIDERATION CASE No. 25-cv-04239-RS

