

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
INDIANA

Bobbie Jo Carter-Rader v. Beth Molt, Sara Scott, and Neal

No. 2:23-cv-00462-JRS-MJD · No. No. 2:23-cv-00462-JRS-MJD · Decided March 16, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in Bobbie Jo Carter-Rader's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court concluded that the defendants' decisions concerning Clonidine, anticoagulation for atrial fibrillation, transport for gastrointestinal bleeding, and post-hospital care reflected medical judgment and did not establish deliberate indifference.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
WRITING FOR THE COURT	James R. Sweeney II
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
DECIDED	March 16, 2026
DOCKET	No. 2:23-cv-00462-JRS-MJD
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that medical providers violated the Eighth Amendment by providing constitutionally inadequate medical care during her incarceration. Defendants moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff did not respond.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court views the evidence and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, does not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations, and may treat properly supported factual assertions as undisputed when the opposing party fails to respond under the applicable local rule. Even when a motion is unopposed, the movant must still demonstrate that summary judgment is proper.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court opinion

PARTIES

Bobbie Jo Carter-Rader v. Beth Molt, Sara Scott, Neal

TOPICS

prisoners rights

section 1983

cruel and unusual punishment

summary judgment

civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

civil rights

prisoner medical care

constitutional litigation

civil procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to Carter-Rader's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment by reducing her Clonidine dose.
2. Whether prescribing and managing Warfarin for atrial fibrillation constituted deliberate indifference despite Carter-Rader's later gastrointestinal bleeding.
3. Whether the delay in transporting Carter-Rader to the hospital after she reported gastrointestinal bleeding constituted deliberate indifference.
4. Whether defendants' post-hospital monitoring and treatment constituted deliberate indifference.
5. Whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Carter-Rader's § 1983 deliberate-indifference claims.

HOLDINGS

1. A court may grant summary judgment when the nonmoving party fails to respond, but the movant must still establish that judgment is proper based on the undisputed facts.
2. To prevail on an Eighth Amendment medical-care claim, a prisoner must show an objectively serious medical condition and that a state official was subjectively deliberately indifferent to it; deliberate indifference requires more than negligence, medical malpractice, or objective recklessness.
3. The reduction of Carter-Rader's Clonidine dose did not constitute deliberate indifference because the provider considered her normal blood pressure, ordered testing, continued other blood-pressure medications, and exercised professional judgment.
4. Prescribing and monitoring Warfarin for Carter-Rader's atrial fibrillation did not constitute deliberate indifference because the treatment was initiated or supported by hospital physicians, was an appropriate first-line treatment for atrial fibrillation, and the record did not show that defendants disregarded a known risk of gastrointestinal bleeding.
5. The approximately three-hour observation period before transport to the hospital did not constitute deliberate indifference because the delay was based on normal vital signs and the absence of apparent emergency symptoms, and staff ordered immediate transport after Carter-Rader vomited blood.
6. Defendants' post-hospital monitoring and treatment did not constitute deliberate indifference because they followed hospital recommendations, arranged specialist follow-up, monitored INR and other medical conditions, and treated the gastrointestinal ulcer and possible H. pylori infection.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper given the undisputed facts.” (Section I)

“The Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a patient his preferred medication or a pain-free recovery.” (Section III)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Carter-Rader was incarcerated at Rockville Correctional Facility and had multiple chronic medical conditions, including cardiac conditions, hypertension, kidney disease, and hepatitis C. Medical providers reduced her Clonidine dose, prescribed Warfarin after she developed atrial fibrillation, and monitored her blood-clotting levels. After she reported gastrointestinal bleeding, prison medical staff observed her, sent her to the hospital after she vomited blood, followed hospital recommendations concerning Warfarin and ulcer treatment, and arranged follow-up care. The court found no evidence that any defendant consciously disregarded a serious medical risk.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Carter-Rader sued medical providers arising from treatment she received at Rockville Correctional Facility. The court had previously screened the complaint and granted Nurse Graves's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted; final judgment was to issue by separate entry.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- *Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network*, 985 F.3d 565, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2021)
- *Miller v. Gonzalez*, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014)
- *Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ.*, 870 F.3d 562, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2017)
- *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)
- *Robinson v. Waterman*, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021)
- *Boyce v. Moore*, 314 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2002)
- *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)
- *Thomas v. Blackard*, 2 F.4th 716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021)
- *Johnson v. Dominguez*, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021)
- *Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.*, 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)
- *Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.*, 18 F.4th 214, 241 (7th Cir. 2021)
- *Johnson v. Doughty*, 433 F.3d 1001, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2006)
- *Petties v. Carter*, 836 F.3d 722, 728–31 (7th Cir. 2016)

- Cole v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 260 (7th Cir. 1996)
- Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)
- Stewart v. Wall, 688 F. App'x 390, 394 (7th Cir. 2017)
- Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 2015)
- Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 655 (7th Cir. 2005)
- Mathison v. Moats, 812 F.3d 594, 598 (7th Cir. 2016)
- Weightman v. O'Brien, No. 24-1543, 2025 WL 487214, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 13, 2025)
- Arce v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 75 F.4th 673, 681 (7th Cir. 2023)

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