

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

People v. Michaels

28 Cal. 4th 486, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002) · No. S016924 · Decided July 18, 2002

SUMMARY

The California Supreme Court affirmed Kurt Michaels's convictions for first degree murder, robbery, and burglary, along with the death sentence and related findings. The opinion addresses the admissibility of Michaels's confession, including alleged assertions of Miranda rights, capacity to waive those rights, and police interrogation tactics. It also discusses procedural issues concerning Michaels's guilty plea.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	Supreme Court of California
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Kennard, J.; George, C.J.; Baxter, J.; Werdegarr, J.; Chin, J.; Brown, J.; Moreno, J.
JURISDICTION	California
DECIDED	July 18, 2002
DOCKET	S016924
DISPOSITION	affirmed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Automatic appeal from a judgment imposing the death penalty after a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary and found multiple special circumstances and weapon and great-bodily-injury enhancements.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed by examining the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether substantial evidence—reasonable, credible, and of solid value—supports a rational trier of fact's findings beyond a reasonable doubt. Other issues were reviewed under the applicable abuse-of-discretion, voluntariness, preservation, and constitutional standards.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	published precedential opinion
PARTIES	Kurt Michaels v. The People

TOPICS

criminal procedure

sentencing

miranda rights

right to counsel

evidence

PRACTICE AREAS

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Michaels unequivocally invoked his rights to counsel or silence during post-arrest interrogation.
2. Whether Michaels knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights despite alleged methamphetamine use and police softening-up tactics.
3. Whether the magistrate erred by refusing to accept Michaels's guilty plea before the prosecution amended the complaint to add special circumstances.
4. Whether the amendment adding special circumstances was vindictive prosecution.
5. Whether substantial evidence supported the lying-in-wait, burglary or robbery, and financial-gain special-circumstance findings.
6. Whether the trial court erred in appointing or retaining lead counsel, denying continuances, granting self-representation, or failing to address alleged ineffective assistance by advisory counsel.
7. Whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct and challenged guilt- and penalty-phase evidence required reversal.
8. Whether the court was required to instruct sua sponte on imperfect defense of others and whether the necessity instruction was prejudicial.
9. Whether the California death penalty law violated constitutional requirements concerning narrowing, burdens of proof, proportionality, aggravating factors, and vagueness.

HOLDINGS

1. Michaels's statements that he did not know whether he should speak without an attorney and that he would answer a particular question were not unequivocal requests for counsel or an unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent. A suspect may refuse to answer particular questions without requesting termination of an interrogation.
2. The claim that Michaels lacked capacity to waive his Miranda rights because he was under the influence of methamphetamine, and the claim that his waiver was involuntary because of police softening-up tactics, were not cognizable on appeal because they were not raised in the trial court.
3. The magistrate had discretion to permit the prosecution to amend the complaint to add special circumstances after Michaels offered to plead guilty, and did not abuse that discretion under the circumstances.
4. The amendment adding special circumstances was not presumptively vindictive, and Michaels failed to prove that the prosecution acted with a purpose to punish him for attempting to plead guilty.

5. Substantial evidence supported the lying-in-wait special circumstance because Michaels and Popik concealed themselves, watched and waited for an opportune time, and killed Clemons in an uninterrupted flow of events after emerging from concealment.
6. Substantial evidence supported the burglary and robbery special-circumstance findings because Michaels entered with an independent, though possibly secondary, purpose of taking Clemons's property, even if protection of Christina was also a motive.
7. Substantial evidence supported the financial-gain special circumstance even though financial gain was secondary, the insurance proceeds were not realized, and the direct beneficiary would have been Christina rather than Michaels.
8. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to replace appointed counsel, and Michaels's conditional request for self-representation became unequivocal after the court denied removal of counsel and advised him of the risks of self-representation.
9. The trial court was not required to instruct sua sponte on imperfect or unreasonable defense of others because that doctrine was not an established or commonly recognized California legal doctrine at the time of trial.
10. The trial court erred by giving an unnecessary instruction stating that necessity was not a defense to homicide, but the error was harmless because Michaels did not assert necessity and the instruction did not prevent consideration of abuse evidence for other purposes.
11. The trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the challenged penalty-phase evidence or in rejecting Michaels's constitutional challenges to California's death penalty scheme.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"A defendant may indicate an unwillingness to discuss certain subjects without manifesting a desire to terminate an interrogation already in progress." (122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 302)

"As long as the murder is immediately preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the first available opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of advantage before taking the victim by surprise." (122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 306)

"[I]f a defendant's claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law." (122 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Michaels and an accomplice waited outside JoAnn Clemons's apartment for several hours, entered using a key supplied by Clemons's daughter, and attacked and killed Clemons by stabbing her throat. The prosecution presented evidence that the killing was motivated both by protection of the daughter from alleged abuse and by a desire to obtain property and life-insurance benefits. Michaels confessed after receiving Miranda warnings, and the jury found first degree murder, robbery, burglary, four special circumstances, and weapon and great-bodily-

injury enhancements. The penalty phase included evidence of prior violent or weapon-related conduct, Michaels's background, and psychological evidence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury convicted Michaels of first degree murder, robbery, and burglary, found four special circumstances, and fixed the punishment at death. The trial court denied motions for a new trial and modification of sentence, imposed death for murder and prison terms for the robbery and burglary, and stayed the enhancement sentences. Michaels's appeal was automatic under California Penal Code section 1239, subdivision (b).

DISPOSITION

affirmed

CASES CITED

- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)
- People v. Silva, 45 Cal. 3d 604, 247 Cal. Rptr. 573, 754 P.2d 1070 (1988)
- People v. Honeycutt, 20 Cal. 3d 150, 141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050 (1977)
- People v. Kelly, 51 Cal. 3d 931, 275 Cal. Rptr. 160, 800 P.2d 516 (1990)
- People v. Reza, 152 Cal. App. 3d 647, 199 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1984)
- People v. Superior Court (Alvarado), 207 Cal. App. 3d 464, 255 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989)
- Cronk v. Municipal Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 351, 188 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1982)
- People v. Edwards, 54 Cal. 3d 787, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 (1991)
- United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1982)
- In re Bower, 38 Cal. 3d 865, 215 Cal. Rptr. 267, 700 P.2d 1269 (1985)
- People v. Morales, 48 Cal. 3d 527, 257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244 (1989)
- People v. Ceja, 4 Cal. 4th 1134, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 375, 847 P.2d 55 (1993)
- People v. Hardy, 2 Cal. 4th 86, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 825 P.2d 781 (1992)
- People v. Zapien, 4 Cal. 4th 929, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 122, 846 P.2d 704 (1993)
- People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994 (1984)
- People v. Noguera, 4 Cal. 4th 599, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160 (1992)
- People v. Edelbacher, 47 Cal. 3d 983, 254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1 (1989)
- People v. Crandell, 46 Cal. 3d 833, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423 (1988)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975)
- People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 (1979)
- People v. Phillips, 41 Cal. 3d 29, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423 (1985)
- People v. Box, 23 Cal. 4th 1153, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69, 5 P.3d 130 (2000)
- People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127 (1990)
- People v. Tuilaepa, 4 Cal. 4th 569, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 (1992)

- People v. Clair, 2 Cal. 4th 629, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564, 828 P.2d 705 (1992)
- People v. Garceau, 6 Cal. 4th 140, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 (1993)
- Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983)
- Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984)

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