UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

Blakelick Properties, LLC v. The Village of Glen Ellyn

No. 25-cv-04569 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2025) · No. 25-cv-04569 · Decided December 30, 2025

SUMMARY

The court granted Blakelick Properties, LLC's motion for a preliminary injunction against the Village of Glen Ellyn's short-term rental ban, limited to enforcement against Blakelick. The court concluded that Blakelick was likely to succeed on its regulatory takings claim, would suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored the injunction. The court waived the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) bond requirement and denied Blakelick's subsequent motion for a second temporary restraining order as moot.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Sharon Johnson Coleman
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division
DECIDED	December 30, 2025
DOCKET	25-cv-04569
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction barring the Village from enforcing an ordinance banning short-term rentals. Plaintiff also moved for a second temporary restraining order. The court granted the preliminary-injunction motion only as to plaintiff, waived the Rule 65(c) bond requirement, and denied the second TRO motion as moot.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show some likelihood of success on the merits, inadequate traditional legal remedies, and irreparable harm absent relief. If those requirements are met, the court balances the parties' irreparable harms and considers effects on nonparties and the public interest. At the preliminary-injunction stage, well-pleaded allegations and uncontroverted supporting affidavits are taken as true.

PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished
PARTIES	Blakelick Properties, LLC v. The Village of Glen Ellyn

TOPICS

injunctions · takings clause · municipal law · real estate · civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

constitutional law · municipal law · real estate · civil procedure · remedies

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Blakelick showed a sufficient likelihood of success on its regulatory-takings claim to support preliminary injunctive relief.
2. Whether enforcement of the short-term-rental ban would cause irreparable harm for which money damages were inadequate.
3. Whether the balance of equities and public interest favored enjoining enforcement against Blakelick.
4. Whether the injunction could extend to nonparty property owners.
5. Whether the court should waive the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) bond requirement.
6. Whether Blakelick's second motion for a temporary restraining order was moot.

HOLDINGS

1. Blakelick demonstrated a likelihood of success on at least its regulatory-takings claim because it plausibly alleged that the ordinance would eliminate the economically feasible use of the property for its intended short-term-rental purpose and interfere with its investment-backed expectations.
2. Blakelick showed likely irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law because enforcement could make its rental business infeasible, cause loss of the business and online-platform status, and create losses that would be difficult to calculate.
3. The balance of equities favored Blakelick, and the public interest would not be harmed by pausing enforcement of the ordinance against Blakelick while the litigation proceeded.
4. The preliminary injunction could not extend to nonparties because complete relief for Blakelick did not require an injunction protecting other property owners.
5. The court waived the Rule 65(c) bond requirement because Glen Ellyn would not incur damages from the injunction.

KEY QUOTATIONS

> *“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that is never awarded as a matter of right.”*

> *“the Ordinance would prevent Plaintiff from economically utilizing the Property in a feasible manner and interfere with Plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations.”* (*3)

> *"complete relief" for Blakelick does not require extending the injunction to non-parties as well."*

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Blakelick owns and operates a five-bedroom house in Glen Ellyn that it has used as a short-term rental since 2022. The property was annexed into Glen Ellyn in 2024, and the Village enacted Ordinance No. 7180-VC in April 2025, banning the operation and advertisement of rentals lasting thirty days or fewer. Blakelick alleged that longer-term rental demand for the furnished property was virtually nonexistent, so enforcement would make the property economically infeasible to operate, risk cancellation penalties and loss of platform status, and potentially force a distressed sale. The Village delayed the ordinance's effective date to January 1, 2026.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Blakelick filed suit challenging Glen Ellyn Ordinance No. 7180-VC under the Due Process Clause, Takings Clause, First Amendment, Contracts Clause, and Fair Housing Act. The court previously issued and extended a temporary restraining order preventing enforcement of the ordinance. After the Village delayed the ordinance's effective date to January 1, 2026, the court considered Blakelick's preliminary-injunction motion and granted relief limited to Blakelick for the duration of the proceedings.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 Board of Education, 858 F.3d 1034, 1044 (7th Cir. 2017)
- Valencia v. City of Springfield, 883 F.3d 959, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2018)
- Girl Scouts of Manitou Council, Inc. v. Girl Scouts of United States of America, Inc., 549 F.3d 1079, 1086, 1090, 1095–96 (7th Cir. 2008)
- Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009)
- Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 n.1 (1976)
- Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 392–93 (2017)
- Morgan v. City of Chicago, 115 F.4th 841, 847 (7th Cir. 2024)
- Concrete Pipe & Products of California, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern California, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993)
- Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 nn.6–7 (1992)
- Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California, 601 U.S. 267, 274 (2024)
- Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)
- Life Spine Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 545 (7th Cir. 2021)
- Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 588 U.S. 180, 201 (2019)
- Foodcomm International v. Barry, 328 F.3d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 2003)

- Gateway Eastern Railway Co. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 35 F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 1994)
- Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984)
- Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025)
- Habitat Education Center v. U.S. Forest Service, 607 F.3d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 2010)
- Blakelick Properties, LLC v. Village of Glen Ellyn, No. 25-CV-04569, 2025 WL 1348569 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2025)