

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
WISCONSIN

William Lee Evans v. Deputy Tyler Hoerig, et al.

Evans · No. 25-CV-808 · Decided May 19, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment in William Lee Evans’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The court rejects Evans’s equal protection and Monell racial-profiling claims for lack of evidence of discriminatory purpose and effect, and holds that the deputy’s Taser deployment during the traffic stop was constitutionally reasonable. The court dismisses the case, denies the motion to strike, and denies Evans’s later motions as moot.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
WRITING FOR THE COURT	William E. Duffin
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
DECIDED	May 19, 2026
DOCKET	25-CV-808
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the excessive-force and equal-protection claims, and defendants also moved to strike one of plaintiff's response briefs.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court views reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor, but the nonmovant must produce admissible evidence sufficient to support a reasonable jury verdict. For the excessive-force claim, the Fourth Amendment objective-reasonableness standard applies; when material facts are undisputed, reasonableness is a question of law.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court decision; precedential status unknown

PARTIES

William Lee Evans v. Deputy Tyler Hoerig, Deputy Daniel Osieczanek, Fond du Lac County

TOPICS

summary judgment

section 1983

equal protection

civil rights

constitutional law

PRACTICE AREAS

civil rights

constitutional law

civil procedure

prisoner civil rights

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Evans presented sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect to create a genuine dispute on his Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claims against Deputies Hoerig and Osieczanek.
2. Whether Fond du Lac County could be liable under Monell absent an underlying constitutional violation by a county employee.
3. Whether Osieczanek's deployment of a taser during the traffic stop was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
4. Whether defendants' motion to strike Evans's response brief should be granted.

HOLDINGS

1. Evans failed to present evidence of both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect. Because the record showed a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the traffic stop and no evidence that Black motorists were treated differently from similarly situated motorists, summary judgment was proper for Hoerig and Osieczanek.
2. Fond du Lac County was entitled to summary judgment because a municipality cannot be held liable under Monell when there is no underlying constitutional violation by a municipal employee.
3. Osieczanek's deployment of the taser was constitutionally reasonable, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate on Evans's excessive-force claim.
4. The motion to strike was denied because the court construed Evans's pro se submissions liberally and determined that allowing the response would clarify his responses to multiple summary-judgment motions.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (5)

"Where opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for the purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." (8)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2025, Deputies Hoerig and Osieczanek stopped Evans after observing that his passenger-side headlamp was burned out. During the stop, officers learned that Evans had an open fleeing case and ordered him to exit the vehicle. Evans refused, and after Osieczanek warned that officers would remove him and charge him with resisting, Evans moved his hand to the gear shift and began pulling away. Osieczanek deployed a taser, after which Evans fled at high speed before being apprehended; body-camera footage showed the deployment occurred after Evans began to drive away.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court had previously allowed Evans to proceed against Deputies Hoerig and Osieczanek on equal-protection claims, against Fond du Lac County on a Monell claim, and against Osieczanek on an excessive-force claim. Defendants filed two motions for partial summary judgment, which were fully briefed. The court denied defendants' motion to strike, granted both motions for partial summary judgment, dismissed the Monell claim because the underlying constitutional claims failed, and dismissed the action because no claims remained.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978)
- Grady v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016)
- Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 2017)
- Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 954-55 (7th Cir. 2011)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)
- Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
- Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009)
- Durkin v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 2005)
- Turner v. J.V.D.B. & Associates, Inc., 330 F.3d 991, 994 (7th Cir. 2003)
- Taylor v. Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 490 (7th Cir. 2025)
- Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2001)
- Herzog v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc., 742 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014)
- Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2011)
- Dawson v. Brown, 803 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015)
- Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2020)
- Dockery v. Blackburn, 911 F.3d 458, 467 (7th Cir. 2018)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)

