

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
INDIANA, HAMMOND DIVISION

Jordan Talley-Smith v. Kathleen Ann Sullivan, et al.

Talley-Smith · No. 2:25-CV-252-GSL-AZ · Decided December 10, 2025

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana denied Jordan Talley-Smith’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. The court held that it could screen the pro se complaint regardless of fee status and had addressed the plaintiff’s constitutional claims, including Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims, in its prior dismissal order.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division
DECIDED	December 10, 2025
DOCKET	2:25-CV-252-GSL-AZ
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Plaintiff moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment dismissing his pro se amended complaint after statutory screening. The court denied the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	A Rule 59(e) motion is an extraordinary remedy and succeeds only if the movant clearly establishes a manifest error of law or fact or newly discovered evidence that precluded entry of judgment.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court opinion; precedential status not stated
PARTIES	Jordan Talley-Smith v. Kathleen Ann Sullivan, et al.

TOPICS

- motion for reconsideration
- civil procedure
- section 1983
- procedural due process
- constitutional law

PRACTICE AREAS

- civil procedure
- civil rights
- constitutional law
- federal courts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court improperly screened and dismissed plaintiff's complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) despite plaintiff's not proceeding in forma pauperis.
2. Whether the court committed a manifest error by characterizing or failing to address plaintiff's constitutional claims, including his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims.
3. Whether the court improperly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend.
4. Whether plaintiff satisfied the requirements for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

HOLDINGS

1. The motion to alter or amend the judgment was denied because plaintiff did not establish a manifest error of law or fact or newly discovered evidence.
2. The court held that district courts may screen complaints filed by prisoners and non-prisoners alike regardless of whether the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis.
3. The court reaffirmed that the BMV employees were not liable for plaintiff's alleged procedural due process violations because public officials or employees are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity for actions related to executing a facially valid court order.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) are extraordinary remedies reserved for the exceptional case ...” (Legal Standard)

“A Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes ‘(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.’” (Legal Standard)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jordan Talley-Smith, proceeding pro se, filed an action asserting constitutional claims concerning conduct by defendants, including Bureau of Motor Vehicles employees. The court screened and dismissed his amended complaint, addressing his asserted constitutional claims, including Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process theories. Talley-Smith moved to alter or amend the judgment, largely reasserting arguments that had already been considered.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the action on June 5, 2025, and an amended complaint on July 30, 2025. After staying the answer deadline, the court screened and dismissed the amended complaint in its prior Order at docket entry 42. Plaintiff then filed a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, which the court denied.

DISPOSITION

CASES CITED

- Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008)
- Davis v. Carmel Clay Sch., 286 F.R.D. 411, 412 (S.D. Ind. 2012)
- Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990)
- Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013)
- Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)
- Vandenboom v. Indoi Agency, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190639, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2022)
- Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999)
- Morris v. Miess, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24599, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 29, 2007)
- Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986)

OPINION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION JORDAN TALLEY-SMITH, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 2:25-CV-252-GSL-AZ KATHLEEN ANN SULLIVAN, et al., Defendants. OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, [DE 44], filed on November 10, 2025.

For the following reasons, the Motion, [DE 44], is DENIED. Background Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this lawsuit on June 5, 2025. [DE 1]. He then filed an Amended Complaint at [DE 7] on July 30, 2025. Defendants filed their Motion to Stay Answering Deadline and Screen Pro Se Complaint at [DE 33], which was granted.

The Court screened and ultimately dismissed Plaintiff's pro se Amended Complaint. [DE 42]. Plaintiff now brings a Motion to Reconsider, [DE 44]. Having reviewed both that Motion and the Court's Order at [DE 42], the Court is ready to rule. Legal Standard Under Rule 59(e), a party may file a motion to reconsider within 28 days of entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e). However, "relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b) are extraordinary remedies reserved for the exceptional case ...". Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2008). These types of motions "serve a limited function, to be used 'where the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension.'" Davis v. Carmel Clay Sch., 286 F.R.D.

411, 412 (S.D. Ind. 2012) (quoting Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990)). Specifically, "[a] Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only where the

movant clearly establishes ‘(1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.’” Cincinnati Life Ins.

Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blue v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012)). Discussion In the instant Motion, Plaintiff, reasserting arguments previously made, argues that screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) was inappropriate here, where he is not proceeding in forma pauperis.

The Court disagrees. As discussed in the Court’s Order at [DE 42], district courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, regardless of fee status. *Vandenboom v. Indoi Agency*, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190639, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2022) (citing *Rowe v. Shake*, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999)). Moving to Plaintiff’s next argument, he believes the Court mischaracterized his claims as “status-based” rather than constitutional, but the Court’s Order specifically called out each of the constitutional claims that Plaintiff attempted to bring.

[DE 42, Page 5-7]. Plaintiff next argues that the Court dismissed his fourth amendment claims without addressing the record. [DE 44, Pages 3- 4]. Despite the fact that the only record Plaintiff provided this Court with was an unverified transcript, the Court did in-fact discuss it. [DE 42 at 6]. Plaintiff also argues that his fourteenth amendment claim for procedural due process was overlooked, however, the Court directs Plaintiff to [DE 42 at 5-6], where that claim is addressed and reminds him that “[a] public official or employee is entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity for all actions related to executing a facially valid court order.

Morris v. Miess, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24599, at *8 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 29, 2007) (citing *Henry v. Farmer City State Bank*, 808 F.2d 1228, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986)). The BMV employees are not liable for Plaintiff’s alleged procedural due process violations.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint was dismissed without leave to amend, despite correctable deficiencies, but as discussed in the Court’s Order, [DE 42], that’s not the case. Conclusion Plaintiff largely reasserts previously addressed arguments.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider [DE 44]. SO ORDERED. ENTERED: December 10, 2025 /s/ GRETCHEN S. LUND Judge United States District Court