

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
WISCONSIN

**Ryker Louis Shampo v. Oconto County, Carol Kopp, Lt. Mary
Ruechel, Sgt. David Rosenfeldt, CO Christopher Melland, Chad
Angus, Wisconsin County Mutual Company, and Oconto County Jail**

Shampo · No. 25-cv-1742-bbc · Decided February 20, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin screened Ryker Louis Shampo’s second amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint concerning alleged failure by Oconto County Jail officials to respond to his threats of self-harm. The court allowed Eighth Amendment and state-law negligence claims to proceed against David Rosenfeldt and Christopher Melland, while dismissing the claims against the remaining defendants. The court ordered service and directed the parties to await a scheduling order before beginning discovery.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Byron B. Conway
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
DECIDED	February 20, 2026
DOCKET	25-cv-1742-bbc
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Screening of a pro se prisoner's second amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) notice-pleading standard.
PARTIES	Ryker Louis Shampo v. Oconto County, Carol Kopp, Lt. Mary Ruechel, Sgt. David Rosenfeldt, CO Christopher Melland, Chad Angus, Wisconsin County Mutual Company, Oconto County Jail

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

- Whether the second amended complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Rosenfeldt and Melland for deliberate indifference to an imminent risk of self-harm.

2. Whether Shampo stated a state-law negligence claim against Rosenfeldt and Melland based on the alleged failure to respond to his threats of self-harm.
3. Whether claims against officials based on denying grievances or allegedly failing to train or supervise stated a claim.
4. Whether the Oconto County Jail was a person subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
5. Whether Oconto County and Wisconsin County Mutual Company could be liable under § 1983 absent allegations of an official policy or custom causing the alleged violation.

HOLDINGS

1. The second amended complaint stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Rosenfeldt and Melland because it alleged that they knew of an objectively serious and imminent risk of self-harm and failed to respond to Shampo's threats.
2. Shampo may proceed with a state-law negligence claim against Rosenfeldt and Melland based on their alleged failure to respond to his threats of self-harm.
3. The complaint did not state claims against Kopp, Ruechel, or Angus based on their dismissal of Shampo's grievances or alleged failure to train or supervise Rosenfeldt and Melland.
4. The Oconto County Jail was not a proper defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it was not a person subject to suit under the statute.
5. The complaint did not state a § 1983 claim against Oconto County because it did not allege that the conduct of Rosenfeldt and Melland resulted from an official policy or custom. Wisconsin County Mutual Company was also dismissed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 14, 2025, while confined at the Oconto County Jail, Shampo was placed in segregation and told Sgt. David Rosenfeldt and CO Christopher Melland that he was suicidal and needed help. He alleged that the officers knew of a prior suicide attempt, failed to search or restrain him, and ignored or failed to respond when he screamed for help while sharpening a pen on a bed frame. Shampo cut his arm for hours and was eventually found by another officer and taken to a hospital for stitches.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Shampo filed a civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning alleged failures by Oconto County Jail officials to respond to his threats of self-harm. After screening the amended complaint on January 15, 2026, the court found that it did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and granted leave to file a second amended complaint. Shampo filed the second amended complaint on February 2, 2026. The court allowed Eighth Amendment and state-law negligence claims to proceed against David Rosenfeldt and Christopher Melland, dismissed the claims against the remaining defendants, and ordered service and responsive pleadings.

OPINION

Shampo

PER CURIAM.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

RYKER LOUIS SHAMPO,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-1742-bbc

OCONTO COUNTY,

CAROL KOPP,

LT. MARY RUECHEL,

SGT DAVID ROSENFELDT,

CO CHRISTOPHER MELLAND,

CHAD ANGUS,

WISCONSIN COUNTY MUTUAL COMPANY, and

OCONTO COUNTY JAIL. Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Ryker Louis Shampo, who is currently confined at the Dodge Correctional Institution and representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights were violated while he was incarcerated at the Oconto County Jail. On January 15, 2026, the Court screened the amended complaint and after concluding that it did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, gave Shampo the opportunity to file a second amended complaint, which he did on February 2, 2026. The Court will screen the second amended complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. §1915A.

SCREENING OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

To state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, a plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff should not plead every fact supporting his claims; he only has to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). There is a reason that the rule specifies a “short and plain” statement. “Rule 8(a) requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.” *U.S. ex rel. Garst v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003). “[L]ength may make a complaint unintelligible, by scattering and concealing in a morass of irrelevancies the few allegations that matter.” *Kadamovas v. Stevens*, 706 F.3d 843, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting *U.S. ex rel. Garst*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003)). “District judges are busy, and therefore have a right to dismiss a complaint that is so long that it imposes an undue burden on the judge, to the prejudice of other litigants seeking the judge’s attention.” *Id.*

ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

According to Shampo, on October 14, 2025, he was placed in segregation while confined at the

Oconto County Jail. He states that he informed Sgt. David Rosenfeldt and CO Christopher Melland that he was suicidal and needed help. He states that he was placed in a receiving cell, but he was not searched or placed in restraints. Shampo asserts that Rosenfeldt and Melland knew to take his threats seriously because he had previously attempted suicide at the jail. He states that he later began screaming and punching the door while yelling “help me!” Shampo asserts that Rosenfeldt closed his office door and Melland ignored him. Shampo explains he found a pen in his pocket, which he began sharpening on the bed frame. He states that he cut himself for hours, eventually deep enough to pull out the fat of his arm. Shampo explains that another officer found him and saved his life. He was taken to the hospital to get stitches.

THE COURT’S ANALYSIS

Shampo was a convicted prisoner on extended supervision while at the jail, so his claims arise under the Eighth Amendment. Jail officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are aware of an objectively serious risk of harm to an inmate and knowingly or recklessly disregard it. See *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994). Notwithstanding the fact that deliberately causing harm to oneself would normally constitute a superseding or intervening cause of injury, see *Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co.*, 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888–89, 900 (E.D. Wis. 2006), the duty imposed on prison officials extends to protecting inmates from imminent threats of serious self-harm, and the “obligation to intervene covers self-destructive behaviors up to and including suicide.” *Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake*, 900 F.3d 335, 349 (7th Cir. 2018). With the foregoing in mind, Shampo states an Eighth Amendment claim against Rosenfeldt and Melland based on allegations that they failed to respond to his threats of self-harm. He may also proceed with a state law negligence claim against them. Shampo does not, however, state a claim against Carol Kopp, Mary Ruechel, or Chad Angus based on allegations that they dismissed Shampo’s grievances. “Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible . . . [and] [r]uiling against a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.” *George v. Smith*, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). Nor do Shampo’s assertions that these individuals failed to properly train or supervise Rosenfeldt and Melland state a claim. As with his prior complaints, Shampo includes no factual allegations to support his allegations. As the Court has repeatedly informed Shampo, “The pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Id.* Nor does Shampo state a claim against the Oconto County Jail, which is not a “person” under §1983, or Oconto County. Section 1983 applies to municipalities, but a municipality cannot be liable simply because its employees violate a plaintiff’s rights. “[I]n other words, a municipality cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of City of New York*, 436

U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, “[m]isbehaving employees are responsible for their own conduct,” and “units of local government are responsible only for their policies[.]” *Lewis v. City of Chicago*, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir. 2007). Nothing in the second amended complaint suggests that Rosenfeldt and Melland’s alleged responses to Shampo were pursuant to or consistent with an official policy. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Oconto County and its insurer Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Company. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Shampo fails to state a claim against Oconto County, Carol Kopp, Mary Ruechel, Chad Angus, Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Company, and the Oconto County Jail. The clerk’s office is directed to terminate them from this action. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal shall serve a copy of the second amended complaint and this order upon David Rosenfeldt and Christopher Melland pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Shampo is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. §1921(a). The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is \$8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§0.114(a)(2)–(3). Although Congress requires the Court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service precisely because in forma pauperis plaintiffs are indigent, it has not made any provision for these fees to be waived either by the Court or by the U.S. Marshals Service. The Court is not involved in the collection of the fee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Rosenfeldt and Melland shall file a responsive pleading to the second amended complaint. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties may not begin discovery until after the Court enters a scheduling order setting deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. Dated at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 20th day of February, 2026. s/ Byron B. Conway
BYRON B. CONWAY
United States District Judge