

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
TENNESSEE, NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

Melissa (Alyssa) Rollins v. Sharon Rollins, et al.

Rollins · No. 2:25-cv-00096 · Decided December 22, 2025

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee grants the pro se plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis but dismisses her federal claims arising from state-court proceedings concerning ownership and sale of real property. The court holds that the claims seeking to block or invalidate state-court orders are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and alternatively fail to state claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. The court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, denies the temporary restraining order as moot, and directs entry of judgment.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Northeastern Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Waverly D. Crenshaw Jr.
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Northeastern Division
DECIDED	December 22, 2025
DOCKET	2:25-cv-00096
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Pro se plaintiff filed a federal complaint seeking emergency injunctive relief and damages, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion for a temporary restraining order. The district court granted in forma pauperis status, conducted screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), dismissed the federal claims, declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, and denied the TRO motion as moot.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	On initial review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss an action that is frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must assure itself of subject-matter jurisdiction.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district-court memorandum opinion and order

PARTIES

Melissa (Alyssa) Rollins v. Sharon Rollins, Michael Rollins, Gayla C. Hendrix, Mingy Kay Ball, J. Hilton Conger, Laura Kirby, DeKalb County, Tennessee, DeKalb County Title Company

TOPICS

subject matter jurisdiction

section 1983

civil rights

injunctions

civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

civil rights

constitutional law

federal jurisdiction

real estate

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims seeking to enjoin, block, or set aside DeKalb County Chancery Court orders.
2. Whether Plaintiff stated a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DeKalb County and the other defendants.
3. Whether Plaintiff stated a plausible conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and a derivative claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.
4. Whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims after dismissing all federal claims.
5. Whether Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order remained justiciable after dismissal of the action.

HOLDINGS

1. The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's § 1983 claims insofar as they sought federal review, rejection, or injunction of the state-court judgments.
2. Alternatively, Plaintiff failed to state a viable § 1983 claim because she did not allege that DeKalb County's policy or custom caused a constitutional deprivation and did not adequately allege that the other defendants were state actors.
3. Plaintiff failed to state plausible claims under §§ 1985(3) and 1986 because she did not allege that the purported conspiracy was motivated by racial or class-based animus, and § 1986 liability depends on a viable § 1985 claim.
4. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the

district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.””
(B. ANALYSIS)

“This is the final order in this action. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment.” (Conclusion)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The dispute arose from state-court proceedings concerning the parties' respective interests in property at 280 Sandgate Drive in Smithville, Tennessee. The DeKalb County Chancery Court ordered the property sold after determining that it could not otherwise be partitioned, and Plaintiff alleged that the property had been gifted to her and that state-court orders improperly caused her eviction and deprived her of sale proceeds. She sued the private parties, attorneys, county, and title company under federal civil-rights and conspiracy statutes and asserted related state-law claims, seeking to block enforcement of the state-court orders and freeze property-sale proceeds.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff challenged state-court orders concerning ownership, partition, sale, and distribution of proceeds from residential property in DeKalb County, Tennessee. After the court issued a deficiency order, Plaintiff filed a renewed IFP application. The court granted IFP status and dismissed the action on initial review, concluding that the § 1983 claims were barred by Rooker-Feldman or alternatively failed to state a claim, that the §§ 1985(3) and 1986 claims were inadequately pleaded, and that the remaining state-law claims should be dismissed without prejudice.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Foster v. Cuyahoga Department of Health and Human Services, 21 F. App'x 239, 240 (6th Cir. 2001)
- Ongori v. Hawkins, No. 16-2781, 2017 WL 6759020, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2017)
- Akno 1010 Market Street St. Louis Missouri LLC v. Pourtaghi, 43 F.4th 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2022)
- Blount v. Stanley Engineering Fastening, 55 F.4th 504, 515 (6th Cir. 2022)
- Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763-64 (2001)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)
- McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2006)
- In re Adams, 151 F.4th 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2025)
- Smith v. Meyers, 843 F. Supp. 2d 499, 507 (D. Del. 2012)
- Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803, 813 (6th Cir. 2005)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)
- Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989)

- *Hick v. Bexar County, Texas*, 973 F. Supp. 653, 682-83 (W.D. Tex. 1997), *aff'd sub nom. Hicks v. Bexar County*, 137 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1998)
- *Carl v. Muskegon County*, 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014)
- *Mathis v. Core Civic of Tennessee*, No. 1:25-CV-00256-KG-JFR, 2025 WL 3158201, at *3 (D.N.M. Nov. 12, 2025)
- *Stark v. City of Memphis*, No. 19-2396-JTF-TMP, 2020 WL 8770177, at *7 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 18, 2020)
- *Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue*, 948 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1991)
- *Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls*, 395 F.3d 291, 315 (6th Cir. 2005)
- *Weser v. Goodson*, 965 F.3d 507, 519 (6th Cir. 2020)
- *Brooks v. Rothe*, 577 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2009)

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