

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO, WESTERN DIVISION**

Corey Jones v. Jennifer Friddell, et al.

Jones · No. 3:25-cv-2693 · Decided January 23, 2026

OPINION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION Corey Jones, Case No. 3:25-cv-2693 Plaintiff, v. MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER Jennifer Friddell, et al., Defendants. I. INTRODUCTION AND
BACKGROUND Plaintiff Corey Jones, proceeding pro se, filed an “emergency motion” for an ex
parte temporary restraining order, seeking to enjoin the Toledo, Ohio Municipal Court from
enforcing a bench warrant issued after Jones failed to appear for a probation violation hearing.

(Doc. No. 4); see also *City of Toledo v. Jones*, Case No. CRB-23-00606. I denied the motion,
concluding Jones failed to show he would suffer immediate and irreparable harm or met his
burden to show Defendants should not first be given notice. (Doc. No. 5). Jones now moves for
reconsideration of my decision. (Doc. No. 7).

For the reason stated below, I deny Jones’ motion. II. DISCUSSION Rule 54(b) provides that any
order or decision, other than a “final judgment” entered as described in the text of the Rule, “that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does
not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the
entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 54(b). “The major grounds justifying reconsideration of interlocutory orders are an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a
clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” *Reich v. Hall Holding Co.*, 990 F. Supp. 955, 965 (N.D.
Ohio 1998) (citing *Petition of U.S. Steel Corp.*, 479 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir.

1973)) (further citation omitted). See also *Mallory v. Eyrich*, 922 F.2d 1273, 1282 (6th Cir. 1991)
(“District courts have inherent power to reconsider interlocutory orders and reopen any part of a
case before entry of a final judgment.”) (citing *Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States*, 320
U.S. 1, 47-48 (1943)). Jones claims my earlier decision “contains material misstatements of fact
and mischaracterizations of constitutional harm that directly affected the Court’s analysis of
irreparable injury, likelihood of success, and the propriety of ex parte relief.” (Doc.

No. 7 at 2). But Jones has not identified a clear error or looming manifest injustice. Both his
motion for a temporary restraining order and his motion for reconsideration are based on his

assertion that he has “revoked” his consent to the jurisdiction of the Ohio courts and, therefore, he is not actually on probation and cannot be arrested for an alleged probation violation.

(Id. at 3-4). But, at the risk of being overly blunt, this simply is not how the law works. The Toledo Municipal Court has jurisdiction “within the corporate limits” of its municipal corporation, which are “the territorial boundaries of the municipal corporation and any townships that are coextensive with the municipal corporation.” Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1901.02(A) & (C)(2).

There is no principle of law which permits an individual to “exempt himself from complying with any federal, state, or local laws and ordinances....” *Taylor v. Turner-McCall*, Case No. 1:25 CV 2508, 2026 WL 35849, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2026). Jones’s motion for reconsideration lacks merit and, therefore, I deny it. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, I deny Plaintiff Corey Jones’ motion for reconsideration of my denial of his motion for an ex parte temporary restraining order.

(Doc. No. 7). So Ordered. s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick United States District Judge