

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

Greer v. United States

Greer v. United States · No. 23-CF-0389 · Decided May 14, 2026

SUMMARY

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that police seized Daiquon Greer when officers blocked his path, followed him while visibly armed and in uniform, and questioned him about a firearm. Because the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion before that seizure and the firearm was discovered afterward, the court held that the trial court erred in denying Greer's motion to suppress. The court reversed Greer's convictions and remanded for further proceedings.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	District of Columbia Court of Appeals
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Beckwith, Associate Judge; McLeese, Associate Judge; Ruiz, Senior Judge
JURISDICTION	District of Columbia Court of Appeals
DECIDED	May 14, 2026
DOCKET	23-CF-0389
DISPOSITION	reversed_and_remanded
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Greer appealed convictions entered after a stipulated trial in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, following denial of his motion to suppress firearm and ammunition evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Whether a seizure occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes is reviewed de novo, while the trial court's factual findings are upheld unless clearly erroneous.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	Published opinion of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals; subject to formal revision before publication.
PARTIES	Daiquon D. Greer v. United States

TOPICS

- fourth amendment
- search and seizure
- suppression of evidence
- criminal procedure
- appellate procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Greer was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when an officer stepped in front of him and effectively blocked his path, before the officers tackled him.
2. Whether the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the seizure at the earlier point when the officer blocked Greer's path.
3. Whether the denial of Greer's motion to suppress required reversal of his convictions.

HOLDINGS

1. Greer was seized when Officer Green circled in front of him and effectively blocked his path, even though Greer could conceivably have turned around or attempted to move around the officers.
2. The officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion before Officer Green stepped in front of Greer, and the record could not support a finding that the firearm bulge was observed before that seizure occurred.
3. The trial court erred in denying Greer's motion to suppress, and Greer's convictions must be reversed.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Because the officers found Mr. Greer’s unregistered weapon after they seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and we reverse his convictions.” (1)

“Our focus for the seizure question is on whether the defendant “would have reasonably understood the officers to be blocking his exits, not whether they were perfectly effective in doing so.” (5)

“Like in Carter, no reasonable person would have felt that they were free to continue ignoring Officer Green’s questions at the moment he circled in front of Mr. Greer.” (8)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Metropolitan Police Department officers responding to an afternoon shooting encountered Greer walking near the scene after an officer signaled that Greer might have a firearm hidden in his waistband. Officers followed Greer, approached him from behind, and one officer circled in front of him, blocking his path while another stood to his right; Greer declined to lift his shirt, after which officers tackled and handcuffed him. The officers then found an unregistered firearm in his waistband.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Police officers seized Greer while investigating a shooting and recovered an unregistered firearm from his waistband. The Superior Court denied Greer's motion to suppress, concluding that the seizure began when officers tackled him and that they then had reasonable articulable suspicion. Greer proceeded to a stipulated trial and was convicted of multiple firearm offenses. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

DISPOSITION

reversed_and_remanded

REMAND INSTRUCTIONS

Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

CASES CITED

- T.W. v. United States, 292 A.3d 790, 795, 799 (D.C. 2023)
- Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)
- Dozier v. United States, 220 A.3d 933, 940-41 (D.C. 2019)
- Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979, 985 (D.C. 2002)
- Carter v. United States, 341 A.3d 1067, 1069, 1073, 1075, 1080 (D.C. 2025)
- Jones v. United States, 154 A.3d 591, 595 (D.C. 2017)
- United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)
- Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d 1282, 1284-86 (D.C. 1990)
- Maye v. United States, 260 A.3d 638, 644 (D.C. 2021)
- Pridgen v. United States, 134 A.3d 297, 301 (D.C. 2016)
- Kinney v. United States, 286 A.3d 1027, 1038-39 (D.C. 2022)
- Williams v. United States, No. 24-CF-386, 2026 WL 958973, at *8 (D.C. Apr. 9, 2026)
- Benson v. United States, 352 A.3d 719 (D.C. 2026), rehearing en banc granted, vacated by No. 23-CF-514, 2026 WL 1098104 (D.C. Apr. 22, 2026)