

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
WISCONSIN

Marlon T. Young v. Jeannie Kramer and Alana Acker

Young v. Kramer · No. 3:25-cv-00641-wmc · Decided February 18, 2026

SUMMARY

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment medical-care case because the plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s grievances did not adequately notify prison officials of the claims or, in one instance, were not fully appealed. The claims were dismissed without prejudice, and the case was closed.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
WRITING FOR THE COURT	William M. Conley
JURISDICTION	U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin
DECIDED	February 18, 2026
DOCKET	3:25-cv-00641-wmc
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Prisoner civil-rights action alleging inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Young failed to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendants bear the burden of proving failure to exhaust, which is an affirmative defense.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court opinion; precedential status unknown
PARTIES	Marlon T. Young v. Jeannie Kramer, Alana Acker

TOPICS

- summary judgment
- prisoners rights
- civil rights
- civil procedure
- health law

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

civil rights

prisoner litigation

health law

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether defendants established on summary judgment that Young failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before filing his Eighth Amendment medical-care claims.
2. Whether Young's inmate complaints provided prison officials sufficient notice of the claims concerning discontinuation of wound care, failure to treat an open wound, and failure to ensure adequate medical care.
3. Whether dismissal for failure to exhaust should be without prejudice.

HOLDINGS

1. Young failed to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing his claims because he did not complete Wisconsin's required inmate grievance and appeal process and his grievances did not provide sufficient notice of the claims litigated in this action.
2. Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that defendants must prove, and defendants met that burden on the summary-judgment record.
3. Claims dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies must be dismissed without prejudice.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“The Prison Litigation Reform Act bars a civil action about prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”” (Opinion and Order, analysis section)

“The Seventh Circuit applies a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.”” (at 809)

“This means plaintiff can refile these claims if he can successfully exhaust them.” (at 401)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Young, a Wisconsin prisoner, alleged that health-care workers Jeannie Kramer and Alana Acker denied him adequate medical care after the amputation of his right pinky toe in May 2024. His claims concerned discontinuation of a wound-cleaning regimen, failure to treat an open wound, and failure to ensure adequate care after the wound became infected. Young filed several inmate complaints, but the court found that they either predated the litigated events, failed to provide adequate notice of the claims, or were not fully appealed through Wisconsin's inmate grievance process.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Young was granted leave to proceed on Eighth Amendment medical-care claims against Kramer and Acker. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court granted the motion, dismissed the claims without prejudice, directed entry of judgment, and closed the case.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)
- Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2005)
- Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2005)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88-89 (2006)
- Jackson v. Esser, 105 F.4th 948, 959 (7th Cir. 2024)
- Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 808-09 (7th Cir. 2006)
- Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2005)
- Davis v. Mason, 881 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 2018)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
- Perez v. Wis. Dep't of Corrs., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999)
- Farina v. Anglin, 418 F. App'x 539, 543 (7th Cir. 2011)
- Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)
- Robinson v. Lipinski, No. 25-1006, 2025 WL 2887999, at *2 (7th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025) (unpublished)
- Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004)