

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

Jane T.C. Doe v. G6 Hospitality, LLC, et al.

Doe v. G6 Hospitality · No. 2:25-cv-2580-WBS-JDP · Decided December 9, 2025

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted defendants’ unopposed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). The court concluded that neither Hilton nor G6 Hospitality was subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction in California. The dismissals were without prejudice, and G6 Hospitality’s motion to transfer was denied as moot.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
WRITING FOR THE COURT	William B. Shubb
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
DECIDED	December 9, 2025
DOCKET	2:25-cv-2580-WBS-JDP
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and also moved to dismiss for improper venue and failure to state a claim. G6 Hospitality separately moved to transfer. The plaintiff did not timely oppose the motions.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	On an unopposed Rule 12(b)(2) motion decided without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts. The court may consider affidavits and other evidence obtained during discovery.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unknown

TOPICS

- personal jurisdiction
- motions to dismiss
- venue
- civil procedure
- commercial litigation

PRACTICE AREAS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court had general personal jurisdiction over Hilton or G6 Hospitality in California.
2. Whether the court had specific personal jurisdiction over Hilton or G6 Hospitality based on their alleged contacts with California.
3. Whether the defendants' motion to transfer should be decided after dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

HOLDINGS

1. The court lacked general personal jurisdiction over Hilton and G6 Hospitality because neither corporation was at home in California and plaintiff failed to establish the exceptional circumstances necessary for general jurisdiction elsewhere.
2. The court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over Hilton and G6 Hospitality because plaintiff failed to show that her claims arose out of or resulted from defendants' California-related activities.
3. The court granted defendants' unopposed motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2), without prejudice to plaintiff's right to refile in a court having personal jurisdiction over defendants.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“But when the court acts on a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) without holding an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” (at 1)

“A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” (at 3)

“A defendant will be subject to the court's specific jurisdiction only if all three prongs of the Garcia Marquez test are met.” (at 5)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleged claims arising from events that occurred in Texas and resulted from defendants' Texas-related activities. Hilton is incorporated in Delaware, has its global headquarters and principal place of business in Virginia, and has a hotel operations center in Tennessee; approximately five percent of its worldwide operations were in California. G6 Hospitality is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Texas, and plaintiff's asserted California contact involving Motel 6, Inc. was based on an incorrect characterization of the entity's organizational status.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The action was filed in the Eastern District of California. Defendants moved to dismiss and/or transfer. The court considered the unopposed motions without oral argument, granted the Rule 12(b)(2) motions without prejudice, and denied the motion to transfer as moot because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001)
- Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)
- Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)
- Mavrix Photo, Inc., 647 F.3d at 1223
- Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004)
- International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126-27, 137, 139 n.20 (2014)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)
- Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014)
- A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc., 484 F. Supp. 3d 921, 932 (D. Or. 2020)
- Massie, 2021 WL 2142728, at *2
- Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620-25 (9th Cir. 1991)
- Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)

OPINION

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JANE T.C. DOE, an individual, No. 2:25-cv-2580-WBS-
JDP 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND/OR
TRANSFER 15 G6 HOSPITALITY, LLC, ET AL., 16 Defendants. 17 ----oo0oo---- 18 This matter
is before the court on defendants’ motions 19 to dismiss pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b) for 20 lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, failure to state a 21 claim upon which
relief can be granted.

Because plaintiff failed 22 to file timely opposition, the court takes the motions under 23
consideration without oral argument. See Local Rule 230(c). And 24 because the court finds it
lacks personal jurisdiction over any 25 of the defendants, it does not reach the motions to dismiss
for 26 improper venue or failure to state a claim. 27 Rule 12(b)(2) provides for dismissal of an
action when 28 1 the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

Fed. 2 R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). A plaintiff bears the burden of 3 establishing personal jurisdiction. See
Doe v Unocal Corp., 248 4 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001). In assessing a plaintiff’s 5 showing, the

court may consider evidence presented in affidavits 6 as well as other evidence procured during discovery. *Data Disc, 7 Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc.*, 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.

8 1977); but see *Ballard v. Savage*, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 9 1995). But when the court acts on a defendant's motion to 10 dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) without holding an evidentiary 11 hearing, the plaintiff need make only a prima facie showing of 12 jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to dismiss. 13 In the absence of an applicable federal statute 14 authorizing personal jurisdiction, the court applies the law of 15 the state in which the district court sits.

Mavrix Photo, Inc., 16 647 F.3d at 1223. In California, the state's long-arm statute is 17 coextensive with federal due process requirements. Cal. Code 18 Civ. Proc. § 410.10. Thus, the "jurisdictional analyses under 19 state law and federal due process are the same." *Mavrix Photo, 20 Inc.*, 647 F.3d at 1223 (citing *Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin 21 Motor Co.*, 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (2004)).

22 "For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a 23 nonresident defendant, that defendant must have at least 'minimum 24 contacts' with the relevant forum such that the exercise of 25 jurisdiction 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play 26 and substantial justice.'" *Schwarzenegger*, 374 F.3d at 801 27 (quoting *Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

28 Thus, a court may exercise jurisdiction over a corporate 1 defendant if it has either (A) general jurisdiction or (B) 2 specific jurisdiction over that defendant. *Daimler AG v. Bauman*, 3 571 U.S. 117, 126-27 (2014). 4 A. This court lacks general jurisdiction over defendants 5 Corporations are subject to a district court's exercise 6 of general jurisdiction "when their affiliations with the State 7 are so 'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially 8 at home in the forum State."

Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 9 S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). For corporate entities, 10 general jurisdiction typically exists where the corporation is 11 "at home." *Daimler*, 571 U.S. at 137. A corporation is "at home" 12 at its place of incorporation and principal place of business. 13 *Id.* 14 Corporate entities may also be subject to a court's 15 general jurisdiction in "exceptional case[s]" wherein the 16 corporation's affiliations or contacts with the forum are "so 17 substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at 18 home in that State."

Id.; see also *Martinez v. Aero Caribbean*, 19 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) ("Only in an 'exceptional 20 case' will general jurisdiction be available anywhere else."). 21 When evaluating whether a corporation is subject to 22 general jurisdiction, a district court's analysis must appraise 23 "the corporation's activities in their entirety, both nationwide 24 and worldwide." *Daimler*, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20. "A corporation 25 that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in 26 all of them." *A.B. v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.*, 484 F. 27 Supp. 3d 921, 932 (D.

Or. 2020) (internal citation and quotation 28 1 marks omitted). 2 This court lacks general jurisdiction over defendants 3 in this case because (1) neither Hilton nor G6 Hospitality are 4 “at home” in California and (2) plaintiff has failed to establish 5 that either defendant constitutes an “exceptional case” for 6 purposes of general jurisdiction. 7 i. Hilton 8 Hilton is incorporated in Delaware, its global 9 headquarters and principal place of business is in Virginia, and 10 its “Hotel Operations Center” is in Tennessee.

(Docket No. 10-1 11 at 2; see also Docket No. 10 at 11.) For purposes of general 12 jurisdiction, then, Hilton is “at home” in Delaware and Virginia, 13 and it is arguably “at home” in Tennessee. Hilton, together with 14 its parent company and its affiliates, brand some 8,807 15 properties globally, where Hilton manages roughly 850 of those 16 properties and franchises an estimated 7,911 properties.

(Docket 17 No. 10-1 at 2.) 18 With respect to California, “Hilton or its parent 19 company or affiliates brand 478 properties in California, 20 including 36 managed properties, and 429 franchised properties.” 21 (Id.) According to the evidence presented by Hilton, as of 22 August 31, 2025, the company’s California portfolio only makes up 23 “approximately 5% of Hilton Worldwide Holdings Inc.’s worldwide 24 operations.” (Id.)

25 In the context of the court evaluating Hilton’s 26 “activities in their entirety, both nationwide and worldwide,” 27 Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20, Hilton’s contacts with California 28 fall far short of constituting the kind of exceptional case 1 necessary to establish general jurisdiction. 2 ii. G6 Hospitality 3 Like Hilton, G6 Hospitality is also a Delaware 4 corporation, but unlike Hilton, G6 Hospitality’s principal place 5 of business is in Texas.

(Docket No. 12 at 9.) For purposes of 6 general jurisdiction, then, G6 Hospitality is “at home” in both 7 Delaware and Texas, but not California. Indeed, plaintiff 8 asserts only one point of contact between G6 Hospitality and 9 California which is more substantive than the insufficient 10 contacts cited to establish the court’s jurisdiction over Hilton: 11 According to plaintiff, “Defendant Motel 6, Inc. is subject to 12 the jurisdiction of this Court because it is a California limited 13 partnership.” (Docket No. 1-1 at 13.)

The trouble for plaintiff 14 is that she is wrong. 15 According to the evidence presented by G6 Hospitality, 16 Motel 6, Inc., is not a California limited partnership. (Docket 17 No. 12 at 9 n.4.) Rather, “[t]he franchise agreement relating to 18 th[at] property... is held by a Texas Limited Liability 19 Company, by the name of Krishna Balram, LLC.” (Id. (emphasis 20 added); see also Docket No. 12-1 at 2 (“The Property’s franchise 21 agreement is between Krishna Balram, LLC, a Texas Limited 22 Liability Company and G6 Hospitality LLC a Texas Limited 23 Liability Company.”); Docket No. 12-2 at 11—14 (showing the 24 articles of organization in Texas); id. at 16—18 (showing a 25 “Certificate of Amendment” filed with the Office of the Secretary 26 of

State of Texas in 2011 that changed the corporation's name 27 from "Dallas Motel6, L.L.C." to "Krishna Balram, L.L.C.".)

28 Beyond this, plaintiff fails to allege any other facts suggesting 1 that G6 Hospitality's contacts with California constitute an 2 "exceptional case." 3 Thus, the court lacks general jurisdiction over 4 defendants because they are non-resident corporations and because 5 plaintiff has not otherwise demonstrated sufficient contacts to 6 render defendants "at home" in California.

7 B. This court lacks specific jurisdiction over defendants 8 To establish that a defendant is subject to a court's 9 specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the 10 "defendant's activities are directed toward the forum state and 11 the defendant's liability arises out of or relates to those 12 activities." *Massie*, 2021 WL 2142728 at *2 (citing *Daimler*, 571 13 U.S. at 127); see also *Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310 14 (1945).

When evaluating whether a defendant has adequate 15 contacts to support specific jurisdiction, courts in this circuit 16 apply a three-prong test. *Massie*, 2021 WL 2142728 at *2. 17 Under the first prong, "the nonresident defendant must 18 have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting 19 activities in the forum by some affirmative act or conduct." 20 *Roth v. Garcia Marquez*, 942 F.2d 617, 620-21 (9th Cir.

1991) 21 (citing *Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines*, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th 22 Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)). To 23 satisfy the second prong, "plaintiff's claim must arise out of or 24 result from the defendant's forum-related activities." *Garcia Marquez*, 942 F.2d at 621. And to satisfy the third prong 26 "exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable."

Id. 27 A defendant will be subject to the court's specific 28 ee EE EIRENE OS NO NO 1 jurisdiction only if all three prongs of the *Garcia Marquez* test 2 are met. See *Massie*, 2021 WL 2142728 at *2; see also *Garcia Marquez*, 942 F.2d at 620-25. And where a plaintiff fails to 4 carry her burden as to either of the first two prongs, the 5 inquiry ends.

Because plaintiff fails to satisfy the second 6 prong, the court need not consider the others. In her complaint, 7 all the events alleged by plaintiff that give rise to her cause 8 of action took place in Texas and occurred because of defendants' 9 activities related to Texas and are unrelated to any of 10 | defendants' alleged contacts with California. (See Docket No. 1- 11 1.)

As a result, the court lacks specific jurisdiction over 12 defendants. 13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' unopposed 14 | motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (2) (Docket Nos. 10, 12) be, 15 and the same hereby are, GRANTED, without prejudice to 16 | plaintiff's right to refile her action in a court which has 17 | personal jurisdiction over defendants.

18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant G6 Hospitality's 19 | unopposed motion to transfer (Docket No. 12) be, and the same 20 hereby is, DENIED, as moot.. " ak. ah tle (LA. 21 Dated:

December 8, 2025 WILLIAM B. SHUBB ~~~~ CSO 22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
23 24 25 26 27 28

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