

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA

**Oliver Thomas Miller v. Clark County**

No. 2:25-cv-02009-APG-NJK, United States District Court for the District of Nevada (January 5, 2026)

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OPINION

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 OLIVER THOMAS  
MILLER, Case No.: 2:25-cv-02009-APG-NJK 4 Plaintiff Order 5 v. 6 CLARK COUNTY, 7  
Defendant 8 9 Plaintiff Oliver Thomas Miller brings this civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. §  
1983 to 10 redress constitutional violations that he claims he suffered while incarcerated at Clark  
County 11 Detention Center.

ECF No. 1-1. On October 27, 2025, the magistrate judge ordered Miller to file 12 a fully complete  
application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) or pay the full \$405 filing fee for 13 a civil action  
on or before December 22, 2025. ECF No. 3.

The magistrate judge warned Miller 14 that the action could be dismissed if he failed to timely  
comply. *Id.* at 2. That deadline expired 15 without Miller paying the full filing fee or filing a  
complete IFP application. 16 District courts have the inherent power to control their dockets and  
“[i]n the exercise of 17 that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate...  
dismissal” of a case.

18 *Thompson v. Hous. Auth. of City of L.A.*, 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may 19  
dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to obey a court order or comply with local rules. See  
20 *Carey v. King*, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440–41 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal for failure to  
comply 21 with local rule requiring pro se plaintiffs to keep court apprised of address); *Malone v.*  
U.S. 22 *Postal Serv.*, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir.

1987) (affirming dismissal for failure to comply with 23 court order). In determining whether to  
dismiss an action on one of these grounds, I must 1 consider: (1) the public’s interest in  
expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 2 manage its docket; (3) the risk of  
prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 3 disposition of cases on their merits;  
and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.

See *In re 4 Phenylpropanolamine Prod. Liab. Litig.*, 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting  
*Malone*, 5 833 F.2d at 130). 6 The first two factors, the public’s interest in expeditiously resolving  
this litigation and the 7 court’s interest in managing its docket, weigh in favor of dismissal of  
Miller’s claims.

The third 8 factor, risk of prejudice to defendants, also weighs in favor of dismissal because a  
presumption 9 of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in filing a pleading

ordered by the 10 court or prosecuting an action. See *Anderson v. Air West*, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976).

The 11 fourth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—is greatly 12 outweighed by the factors favoring dismissal. 13 The fifth factor requires me to consider whether less drastic alternatives can be used to 14 correct the party’s failure that brought about the court’s need to consider dismissal. See *Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier*, 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir.

1999) (explaining that considering less drastic 16 alternatives before the party has disobeyed a court order does not satisfy this factor); accord 17 *Pagtalunan v. Galaza*, 291 F.3d 639, 643 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts “need not exhaust every 18 sanction short of dismissal before finally dismissing a case, but must explore possible and 19 meaningful alternatives.” *Henderson v. Duncan*, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir.

1986). Because 20 this action cannot realistically proceed until and unless Miller either pays the \$405 filing fee or 21 files a complete IFP application, the only alternative is to enter a second order setting another 22 deadline. But the reality of repeating an ignored order is that it often only delays the inevitable 23 and squanders the court’s finite resources.

The circumstances here do not indicate that this case will be an exception. Setting a second deadline is not a meaningful alternative given these circumstances. So the fifth factor favors dismissal. 3 Having thoroughly considered these dismissal factors, I find that they weigh in favor of 4|| dismissal. 5 I THEREFORE ORDER that this action is dismissed without prejudice based on Miller’s 6|| failure to pay the \$405 filing fee or file a complete IFP application in compliance with the 7|| magistrate judge’s October 27, 2025, order.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment 8|| accordingly and close this case. If Miller wishes to pursue his claims, he must file a complaint 9) and address the matter of the filing fee in a new case. 10 I FURTHER ORDER that Miller’s motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF No. 1-2) denied as moot. 12 Dated: January 5, 2026 Chief United States District Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23