

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
MISSISSIPPI, EASTERN DIVISION

Sabien Ruffin v. Charlie Turner et al.

Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-169-TBM-RPM · No. Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-169-TBM-RPM · Decided June 8,
2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi denied pro se plaintiff Sabien Ruffin’s motion for a preliminary injunction in an action arising from an attempted eviction from government-subsidized housing. The court held that Ruffin failed to establish the required elements for preliminary injunctive relief and had not provided notice of the motion or prior order to the defendants as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a).

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Taylor B. McNeel
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Eastern Division
DECIDED	June 8, 2026
DOCKET	Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-169-TBM-RPM
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Pro se plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction after the court denied his request for an ex parte temporary restraining order and instructed him to provide the defendants with a copy of the order. The district court denied the preliminary-injunction motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	A district court's decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion on appeal.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court order

TOPICS

- injunctions
- civil procedure
- landlord tenant
- government liability
- equitable relief

PRACTICE AREAS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Ruffin established the four elements required for a preliminary injunction.
2. Whether the court could issue a preliminary injunction when Ruffin had not provided notice to the defendants as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a).

HOLDINGS

1. Ruffin was not entitled to a preliminary injunction because he failed to clearly establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a substantial threat of irreparable injury, that the balance of harms favored him, and that the injunction would not disserve the public interest.
2. The court could not enter a preliminary injunction because Ruffin had not notified the defendants or provided them with the court's prior order.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” (Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a))

“Ruffin’s failure to satisfy any of the four required elements requires a denial.” (Order)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After Ruffin smoked marijuana in his government-subsidized residence, the Laurel Housing Authority attempted to evict him. Ruffin alleged constitutional violations and sought injunctive relief. When he moved for a preliminary injunction, he had not provided the defendants with the court's prior order or otherwise notified them of the action. The record indicated that he appeared to remain in the residence after the stated eviction date and did not show that he faced irreparable harm.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ruffin sued the Laurel Housing Authority and its employees on November 15, 2025, alleging constitutional violations arising from attempted eviction from his government-subsidized residence. On January 26, 2026, he sought an ex parte temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The court denied the temporary restraining order, took the preliminary-injunction request under advisement, and directed Ruffin to provide the defendants with a copy of the order. Ruffin did not notify the defendants or provide them with the order. The court denied the preliminary injunction because Ruffin failed to satisfy the four injunction factors and failed to provide notice required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a).

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Ruffin v. Turner, No. 2:25-CV-169-TBM-RPM, 2026 WL 220912, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2026)

- *Richland Equip. Co., Inc. v. Deere & Co.*, No. 5:17-CV-88-KS-MTP, 2017 WL 7037742, at *1 (S.D. Miss. July 18, 2017)
- *Anibowei v. Morgan*, 70 F.4th 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2023)
- *Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway*, 489 F.2d 567, 572–53 (5th Cir. 1974)
- *Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard*, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984)

OPINION

Ruffin

PER CURIAM.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI
EASTERN DIVISION

SABIEN RUFFIN PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:25-cv-169-TBM-RPM

CHARLIE TURNER et al. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Sabien Ruffin’s [5] Motion for Preliminary Injunction. After smoking marijuana in his government-subsidized residence, the Laurel Housing Authority attempted to evict Ruffin. In response, Ruffin sued the Laurel Housing Authority and its employees on November 15, 2025, for alleged constitutional violations. On January 26, 2026, more than two months later, Ruffin moved for an ex parte temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The next day, the Court denied the temporary restraining order and took the preliminary injunction under advisement. [6]; see *Ruffin v. Turner*, No. 2:25-CV-169-TBM-RPM, 2026 WL 220912, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 27, 2026). In doing so, the Court acknowledged that it was “prepared to set a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction” and instructed Ruffin to provide the Defendants with a copy of the order. *Id.* To date, Ruffin has not provided the order to the Defendants or otherwise notified them of this action. The Court will now consider the preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must prove the same four elements required for a temporary restraining order. *Richland Equip. Co., Inc. v. Deere & Co.*, No. 5:17-CV-88-KS-MTP, 2017 WL 7037742, at *1 (S.D. Miss. July 18, 2017). The movant must “clearly” establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood that they will prevail on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that they will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) their substantial injury outweighs the threatened harm to the party whom they seek to enjoin, and (4) granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.” *Anibowei v. Morgan*, 70 F.4th 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting *Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway*, 489 F.2d 567, 572–53 (5th Cir. 1974)). “The court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to the adverse party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a) (emphasis added). “The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the discretion of the district court and may be reversed on appeal

only by a showing of abuse of discretion.” Anibowei, 70 F.4th at 902 (quoting *Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard*, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Court denied Ruffin’s request for a temporary restraining order more than four months ago. Because of Ruffin’s failure to comply with the Court’s directive to provide the Defendants with the order, the record remains largely the same. Accordingly, the Court denies his request for a preliminary injunction for the same reasons set forth in its prior order. [6]. Ruffin has not established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. First, his motion does not provide any case law or evidence to support his assertions. *Id.* at pps. 8–11. Second, Ruffin does not face a substantial threat of irreparable injury because he can obtain a preliminary injunction from a Mississippi circuit court. *Id.* at pps. 11–12. Third, if the Court denied the preliminary injunction, it is not apparent that Ruffin will suffer any harm. At the time Ruffin filed his motion, he appeared to still live at the residence, nearly two months after the eviction date. *Id.* at p. 12. Nothing in the record suggests that Ruffin has left the residence. Fourth, granting the preliminary injunction would disserve the public interest by effectively overriding the state court judicial process and could take at least one low-income housing opportunity off the market that a law-abiding citizen may need. *Id.* at pps. 12–13. Ruffin’s failure to satisfy any of the four required elements requires a denial. But even if Ruffin had satisfied his burden on the merits, the Court cannot enter a preliminary injunction because Ruffin has not notified the Defendants, despite the Court’s instruction to do so. See *Richland Equip. Co., Inc. v. Deere & Co.*, 2017 WL 7037742, at *1 (“Defendant has not been served, and the record does not demonstrate that any notice has been provided to it. Therefore, the Court must deny Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction.”). IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the portion of Ruffin’s motion

[5] for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

This, the 8th day of June, 2026. _____

TAYLOR B. McNEEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE