

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST DISTRICT (HOUSTON)

Alexas Faragoza v. The State of Texas

No. 01-24-00522-CR · No. 01-24-00522-CR · Decided April 28, 2026

SUMMARY

The Texas Court of Appeals for the First District affirmed a thirteen-year sentence for recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the appellant used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon, even under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The court also concluded that the appellant’s guilty plea foreclosed arguments disputing the causal connection between her reckless driving and the child’s injuries.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	Texas Court of Appeals, First District (Houston)
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Clint Morgan; Justice Gunn; Justice Caughey; Justice Morgan
JURISDICTION	Texas Court of Appeals, First District
DECIDED	April 28, 2026
DOCKET	01-24-00522-CR
DISPOSITION	affirmed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Faragoza appealed her felony conviction and thirteen-year sentence after pleading guilty before a jury and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the deadly-weapon finding.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determined whether any rational factfinder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Faragoza used a deadly weapon during the commission of the felony. The court deferred to the jury's credibility determinations and weighing of conflicting evidence and limited review to the specific sufficiency arguments raised.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	published
PARTIES	Alexas Faragoza v. The State of Texas

TOPICS

- criminal procedure
- evidence
- standard of review
- appellate procedure
- statutory interpretation

PRACTICE AREAS

Texas criminal law

criminal appellate practice

evidence sufficiency

deadly-weapon findings

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's affirmative finding that Faragoza used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the felony.
2. Whether Faragoza's guilty plea foreclosed her argument that reckless driving before the collision was temporally disconnected from the child's injuries or that some cause other than her reckless driving caused the injuries.

HOLDINGS

1. The evidence was sufficient for a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Faragoza used a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon during the commission of the felony.
2. Because Faragoza pleaded guilty to an indictment alleging that her reckless operation of the vehicle caused the child's injuries, her argument that something other than that conduct caused the injuries was foreclosed.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s finding, we conclude a rational factfinder could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant used a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.” (8)

“We affirm the trial court’s judgment.” (8)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Faragoza drove a truck carrying a thirteen-year-old child and another passenger while fleeing a police officer. During the roughly two-and-a-half-minute pursuit, officers observed speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour; after the truck went slightly airborne and turned sideways, it crashed into an embankment. The child suffered significant injuries requiring months of hospitalization and at least seventeen surgeries.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Faragoza pleaded guilty to recklessly causing serious bodily injury to a child. The jury assessed thirteen years' confinement and made an affirmative finding that she used or exhibited a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. The First District Court of Appeals overruled her sole point of error and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

DISPOSITION

affirmed

CASES CITED

- *Couthren v. State*, 571 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)
- *Polk v. State*, 693 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (Clinton, J., concurring)
- *Ables v. Scott*, 73 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1996)
- *United States v. Watts*, 519 U.S. 148, 156–57 (1997)
- *United States v. Villareal-Amarillas*, 562 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2009)
- *Hill v. State*, 913 S.W.2d 581, 583–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (plurality op.)
- *Gale v. State*, 998 S.W.2d 221, 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
- *Patterson v. State*, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
- *Cates v. State*, 102 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)
- *Tisdale v. State*, 686 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh'g)
- *Brister v. State*, 449 S.W.3d 490, 492–93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
- *Ex parte Doan*, 369 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)
- *Brooks v. State*, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
- *Casanova v. State*, No. 01-24-00308-CR, 2025 WL 1033765, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 8, 2025, pet. ref'd) (mem. op. not designated for publication)
- *Mayweather v. State*, 722 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.)
- *Turnipseed v. State*, 609 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)
- *Keller v. State*, 125 S.W.3d 600, 604 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003), pet. dism'd as improvidently granted, 146 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)