

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75

365 S.E.2d 111 (1988) · No. 44863 · Decided March 2, 1988

SUMMARY

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Aldridge's convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The court held that the evidence supported the convictions, that the defendant was not entitled to a voluntary manslaughter instruction because the three-and-a-half-day interval negated sufficient provocation as a matter of law, and that his custodial statements were admissible despite his refusal to sign a waiver form. The court also held that the record did not establish a prima facie Batson violation based on the State's peremptory strikes.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	Supreme Court of Georgia
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Clarke, Presiding Justice; All other Justices
JURISDICTION	Georgia
DECIDED	March 2, 1988
DOCKET	44863
DISPOSITION	affirmed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Aldridge appealed his convictions for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, refusal to charge voluntary manslaughter, admission of custodial statements, and the State's use of peremptory strikes under Batson.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	The sufficiency of the evidence was reviewed under Jackson v. Virginia. The refusal to give a requested lesser-included-offense charge was reviewed by determining whether the evidence warranted the charge, including whether there was at least slight evidence of provocation. The Batson issue was reviewed to determine whether the record established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	Published precedential opinion of the Supreme Court of Georgia
PARTIES	Aldridge v. The State

TOPICS

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PRACTICE AREAS

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Aldridge's malice-murder conviction under *Jackson v. Virginia*.
2. Whether the evidence supported a voluntary-manslaughter jury instruction based on the victim's prior assault of Aldridge.
3. Whether custodial statements were involuntary and inadmissible because Aldridge refused to sign a Miranda waiver form.
4. Whether the State's use of peremptory strikes established a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination under *Batson v. Kentucky*.

HOLDINGS

1. The evidence was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of *Jackson v. Virginia* and support the convictions.
2. A defendant is not entitled to a voluntary-manslaughter charge when the evidence does not provide at least slight evidence that the killing resulted from sudden, violent, and irresistible passion caused by serious provocation. As a matter of law, a three-and-a-half-day interval between the alleged provocation and the killing was too long to constitute even slight evidence of the required provocation.
3. A suspect's refusal to sign a Miranda waiver form does not, by itself, invoke the rights to remain silent or to counsel or render subsequent statements involuntary and inadmissible when the suspect received Miranda warnings, made a statement, and did not request an attorney or invoke silence.
4. The record did not establish a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in the State's use of peremptory strikes, despite the State's striking seven of ten prospective black jurors for the regular jury and both prospective black alternate jurors.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"The refusal to sign a waiver of rights form before speaking to police does not render the statements involuntary and inadmissible." (at 76)

"We hold that in the future the defendant in Batson type cases has burden to complete the record with information revealing the racial composition of the panel from which the jury was selected, the racial breakdown of the strikes of both parties, and the racial composition of the resulting jury." (at 77)

"We agree with the trial court that no discrimination occurred." (at 79)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

During an altercation, the victim struck Aldridge in the head with a beer bottle. Three and a half days later, while Aldridge was sitting on his porch smoking marijuana laced with cocaine, the victim passed by. Aldridge chased the unarmed victim into a grocery store, cornered him behind the meat counter, and shot him. Aldridge had received Miranda warnings, did not request an attorney, and made statements to police without signing a waiver form.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Aldridge was convicted in the trial court of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. The trial court denied his request for a voluntary-manslaughter charge, admitted statements made during custodial interrogation, and rejected his Batson challenge after finding no racial discrimination. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.

DISPOSITION

affirmed

CASES CITED

- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
- State v. Stonaker, 236 Ga. 1, 2, 222 S.E.2d 354 (1976)
- Bowen v. State, 241 Ga. 492, 246 S.E.2d 322 (1978)
- Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975)
- Baker v. State, 238 Ga. 389, 233 S.E.2d 347, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977)
- Mitchell v. State, 254 Ga. 353, 329 S.E.2d 481 (1985)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986)