

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS

Terence N. Glenn v. Ocean 650/Greystar, et al.

Glenn · No. 26-10252-ADB · Decided January 26, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts denied Terence Glenn’s motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to stay a state-court eviction proceeding and related state-court matters. The court held that the requested relief would improperly interfere with ongoing state litigation under the Anti-Injunction Act and principles of federal-state comity, and stated that no summonses would issue pending review of the complaint and other motions.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Allison D. Burroughs
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
DECIDED	January 26, 2026
DOCKET	26-10252-ADB
DISPOSITION	denied
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Pro se plaintiff filed a federal civil complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order seeking to halt a pending Massachusetts state-court eviction proceeding and related state-court matters. The federal district court denied the TRO.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Not expressly stated; the court applied the Anti-Injunction Act and federal-state comity principles to the request for emergency injunctive relief.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court order; persuasive authority only
PARTIES	Terence N. Glenn v. Ocean 650/Greystar, et al.

TOPICS

- injunctions
- eviction
- landlord tenant
- civil procedure
- federalism

PRACTICE AREAS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the federal district court could issue a temporary restraining order staying the pending state-court eviction proceeding.
2. Whether Glenn established an extraordinary basis for federal interference with the related state-court matter.

HOLDINGS

1. The court denied the TRO because the requested relief would interfere with an ongoing state-court proceeding in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act and principles of federal-state comity.
2. The court denied relief concerning the “Miya” case because Glenn did not establish a basis for federal interference with that state-court matter.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“The Court denies the motion for a TRO because providing the relief Glenn seeks would unnecessarily interfere with a pending state-court action, in contravention of principles of comity between state and federal courts.” (II. Discussion)

“A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” (II. Discussion)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Terence Glenn alleged that his landlord, Ocean 650, initiated a retaliatory eviction after he reported safety-code violations to the City. He also alleged that the landlord failed to provide reasonable security accommodations, including fixing locks, despite knowing that Glenn was disabled, hospitalized, and at risk. Glenn sought to prevent a pending state-court summary-process eviction and to stay a related state-court matter.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Glenn alleged that his landlord retaliated against him after he reported safety-code violations and failed to provide disability-related security accommodations. He sought a TRO staying a summary-process eviction action pending in Chelsea District Court, identified as Case No. 25SP7200, and also sought to stay a related state-court matter. The district court denied the TRO under the Anti-Injunction Act and principles of federal-state comity, while reserving decision on Glenn's other motions and the sufficiency of his complaint.

DISPOSITION

denied

CASES CITED

- Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970)
- In re Justices of Superior Court Department of Massachusetts Trial Court, 218 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000)
- Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 306 (2011)
- Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)
- Mannix v. Machnik, 244 F. App'x 37, 39 (7th Cir. 2007)
- Kucherenko v. Chelsea Housing Authority, No. 22-cv-10955, 2023 WL 12098666, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2023)

OPINION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
 TERENCE N. GLENN, * * Plaintiff, * * v. * Civil Action No. 26-10252-ADB * OCEAN 650/GREYSTAR, et al., * * Defendants. * * * ORDER BURROUGHS, D.J. Pro se plaintiff Terence Glenn has filed a civil complaint, and motions to proceed in forma pauperis, for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), and for appointment of counsel.

As set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court will address the other motions and the sufficiency of the complaint in a separate order. I. Background
 In his complaint, [ECF No. 1], Glenn alleges that his landlord, “Ocean 650” has wrongfully initiated “a retaliatory eviction” against him, “a disabled tenant[,] immediately after he reported safety code violations to the City.” [Id. at 6.].

Glenn also alleges that Ocean 650 “failed to provide reasonable security accommodations (fixing locks)” for him, even though he was “known to be hospitalized and at risk.” [Id.]. Glenn asserts that this action is a federal lawsuit because “[i]t is illegal under US Federal Law to retaliate against a person for exercising their housing rights or to deny safety accommodations based on disability status.” [Id.].

In addition to the separately filed motion for a TRO, within his complaint, Glenn asks for a temporary restraining order “legally staying [pausing] Summary Process Eviction action” against him “currently pending in Chelsea district Court (Case No. 25SP7200).” [Id. at 10.]. Glenn represents that the case is “scheduled for” February 2, 2026. [Id.]. He also asks for TROs (1) “staying all related state court matters, including the pending case involving ‘Miya Glen,’ as these matters are intertwined with the Federal Civil Rights violations alleged herein” and (2) compelling Ocean 650 and two other defendants “to preserve all digital records, video surveillance (hallway cameras) and call logs relevant to this case.” [Id.].

In his separate motion for a TRO, [ECF No. 3], Glenn alleges that, “[u]nless this Court acts immediately, Plaintiff—a disabled man recovering from major surgery—will be physically evicted on February 2, 2026.” [Id.]. Glenn asks this Court “to issue an Order immediately blocking the

February 2nd Eviction Hearing and Staying the ‘Miya’ State Court Case until this Federal Court can review the full evidence.” [Id.].

II. Discussion The Court denies the motion for a TRO because providing the relief Glenn seeks would unnecessarily interfere with a pending state-court action, in contravention of principles of comity between state and federal courts. “Proceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts, with relief from error, if any, through the state appellate courts and ultimately [the United States Supreme] Court.” *Atl.*

Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). “As early as 1793, Congress manifested its understanding and intention that the state courts be allowed to conduct state proceedings free from interference by the federal courts, when it prohibited the federal courts from issuing injunctions to stay proceedings in state court.” *In re Justices of Superior Ct.*

Dep’t of Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2000). “This congressional policy, subject to only a few exceptions, has remained essentially unaltered to this day, and is reflected in the federal courts’ own policies.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

The federal Anti-Injunction Act provides: “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. § 2283.

The statute “is a necessary concomitant of the [decision of the Framers of the Constitution] to authorize, and Congress’ decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts.” *Smith v. Bayer Corp.*, 564 U.S. 299, 306 (2011) (quoting *Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp.*, 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)).

The Anti-Injunction Act’s “core message is one of respect for state courts,” and it “commands that those tribunals ‘shall remain free from interference by federal courts.’” *Id.* (quoting *Atl. Coast Line R. Co.*, 398 U.S. at 282). Put differently, the Anti-Injunction Act “says that federal courts cannot by injunction govern the conduct of state litigation,” and that “federal courts must abstain from disrupting ongoing state litigation in all but the most extraordinary situations.” *Mannix v. Machnik*, 244 F. App’x 37, 39 (7th Cir.

2007). Here, there is no “extraordinary situation[],” *id.*, that would justify a federal court’s interference the proceedings of the state court eviction proceeding. See *Kucherenko v. Chelsea Hous. Auth.*, No. 22-cv-10955, 2023 WL 12098666, at *3 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2023) (“Federal courts have held that the [Anti-Injunction Act] bars the granting of injunctive relief that would stay ongoing state court eviction proceedings or prevent the enforcement of a state court eviction-related order.”).

The state courts—at the trial and appellate level—are competent to consider whether Glenn’s eviction would violate state or federal law. Glenn also does not set forth a basis for interfering in the “Miya” case. III. Conclusion Glenn’s motion for a temporary restraining order, [ECF No. 3], is DENIED. No summonses shall issue pending the Court’s adjudication of the other motions and a review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

IT IS SO ORDERED. January 26, 2026 /s/ Allison D. Burroughs ALLISON D. BURROUGHS
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE