

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Jane Doe (J.R.F.) v. Second Street Investments LLC, doing business as Anchorage Uptown Hotel, doing business as Anchorage Uptown Suites

Doe v. Second Street Investments LLC · No. 3:24-cv-00290-SLG · Decided May 7, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the District of Alaska grants Defendant Second Street Investments LLC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act action. The court holds that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply and concludes that the complaint does not plausibly establish a timely claim based on conduct occurring on or before December 31, 2014, including through equitable tolling or the discovery rule. The court grants Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the District of Alaska
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Sharon L. Gleason
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the District of Alaska
DECIDED	May 7, 2026
DOCKET	3:24-cv-00290-SLG
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Defendant moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff's Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act claims were barred by the statute of limitations and inadequately pleaded. The court granted the motion but allowed plaintiff leave to amend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	A Rule 12(c) motion is evaluated under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; judgment is proper when there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished and nonprecedential district court order

PARTIES

Jane Doe (J.R.F.) v. Second Street Investments LLC, doing business as Anchorage Uptown Hotel, doing business as Anchorage Uptown Suites

TOPICS

motion for judgment on the pleadings

statute of limitations

civil rights

civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

civil rights

statute of limitations

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the plaintiff's TVPRA claims were barred by the ten-year statute of limitations to the extent they were based on conduct occurring before December 31, 2014.
2. Whether the continuing violation or continuing tort doctrine permitted the plaintiff to aggregate earlier trafficking-related acts with later conduct for limitations purposes.
3. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged facts supporting equitable tolling.
4. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged a self-concealing injury sufficient to invoke the discovery rule.
5. Whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend.

HOLDINGS

1. The continuing violation doctrine does not apply to the plaintiff's TVPRA claims. Each alleged act of sex trafficking, harboring, or receipt of a benefit from the trafficking venture is a discrete actionable act subject to its own limitations period.
2. The plaintiff's claims were time-barred to the extent they were based on trafficking-related conduct occurring before December 31, 2014, absent a valid exception to the limitations period.
3. The complaint did not plausibly allege facts showing that the plaintiff pursued her rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances prevented timely filing; equitable tolling therefore could not save the claims as pleaded.
4. The court did not decide whether the discovery rule applies to TVPRA claims, but held that the complaint failed to plausibly allege a self-concealing injury that would trigger the rule.
5. The complaint did not plausibly state a claim for conduct occurring on December 31, 2014 because it did not specifically allege that trafficking occurred at the hotel on that date or identify wrongful conduct by defendant on that particular day.
6. Leave to amend was warranted because amendment was not shown to be futile and plaintiff might be able to plead specific facts concerning conduct on December 31, 2014, her age, the discovery rule, or equitable tolling.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (at 4)

“The continuing violation doctrine does not apply to Plaintiff’s TVPRA claims.” (at 7)

“Rather, each alleged act of sex trafficking at the Anchorage Uptown Suites constitutes a discrete, actionable tort.” (at 8)

“The Court finds that it need not determine whether the discovery rule applies to TVPRA claims because Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plausibly allege that her injury is self-concealing such that the rule would apply here.” (at 13)

“Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at Docket 24 is GRANTED and that Plaintiff is accorded leave to amend.” (at 15)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Jane Doe alleged that she was sex trafficked at various times from 2003 through December 2014 and that her trafficker used coercion and physical violence to force her to engage in commercial sex acts. She alleged that the trafficking occurred at defendant's Anchorage hotel and that hotel personnel ignored observable indicators, including the trafficker's presence, room placement away from other guests, and repeated brief visits by men who were not hotel guests. She asserted TVPRA perpetrator and beneficiary liability, claiming that the defendant facilitated the trafficking and benefited from an unlawful venture.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed the action on December 31, 2024, alleging perpetrator and beneficiary liability under the TVPRA based on sex trafficking at defendant's hotel. Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings at Docket 24; plaintiff opposed and defendant replied. The court granted the motion with leave to amend within 30 days and directed that defendant respond to any amended complaint within 21 days.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009)
- Heliotrope Gen., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 979 (9th Cir. 1999)
- Herrera v. Zumiez, Inc., 953 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2020)
- Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)
- Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989)
- Toma v. Univ. of Haw., Case No. 16-00499 RLP, 2017 WL 4782629, at *5 (D. Haw. Oct. 23, 2017)
- Gregg v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 870 F.3d 883, 889 (9th Cir. 2017)
- Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Team Equip., Inc., 741 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014)

- Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010)
- Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)
- Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)
- Doe v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2025 WL 1167550, at *4-*5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2025)
- Morgan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 536 U.S. 101 (2002)
- Gutowsky v. County of Placer, 108 F.3d 256, 259 (9th Cir. 1997)
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)
- Bird v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 746-748 (9th Cir. 2019)
- Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)
- Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599-600 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc)
- Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 449-450 (2013)
- Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051-1052 (9th Cir. 2003)
- Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)
- Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
- Sonoma Cnty. Ass'n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma County, 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013)
- Sharkey v. O'Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2015)