

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

Janessica Pimentel Sanchez v. Commissioner of Social Security

Sanchez · No. 1:21-cv-01177-SAB · Decided July 30, 2025

OPINION

(SS) Sanchez v. Commissioner of Social Security

PER CURIAM.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

10 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 JANESSICA PIMENTEL SANCHEZ, Case No. 1:21-cv-01177-SAB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER
GRANTING PETITIONER’S

13 MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES

v. PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

14

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, DENYING PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO
15 REIMBURSE PARTIAL EAJA FEES

Defendant. 16 (ECF Nos. 23, 24) 17 18 Petitioner Laura E. Krank (“Petitioner”), attorney for
Janessica Pimentel Sanchez 19 (“Plaintiff”), filed the instant motion for attorney fees on May 14,
2025. (ECF No. 23.) 20 Petitioner requests fees in the amount of \$11,200.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 406(b)(1). 21 Petitioner also requests she be directed to reimburse Plaintiff only a portion of the
\$6,800 Equal 22 Access Justice Act (“EAJA”) fee previously awarded. 23 Plaintiff did not file an
opposition, or otherwise respond to the motion for attorney fees, 24 and the time to do so has
passed. 25 On May 29, 2025, Defendant Social Security Commissioner, as a de facto trustee for
26 Plaintiff, filed a response to Petitioner’s motion, in which he asserts he neither supports nor 27
opposes Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees, but requests that the Court direct Plaintiff’s
counsel to reimburse Plaintiff any fees she previously received under the EAJA. 1 I.

2 BACKGROUND

3 On December 3, 2020, Plaintiff entered into a contingent fee agreement with the Law 4 Offices
of Rohlfing & Kalagian, LLP. (ECF No. 23-1.) The agreement entitled counsel to an 5 award of
25% of the past due benefits awarded if judicial review of an administrative decision 6 was
required and the adverse decision of an ALJ was reversed. (Id.) 7 On August 4, 2021, Plaintiff
filed a complaint challenging the denial of social security 8 benefits. (ECF No. 1.) 9 On December
23, 2021, prior to Defendant lodging the administrative record, the parties 10 filed a stipulation for

voluntary remand for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence Six of 42 11 U.S.C. 405(g) due to an inaudible hearing recording. (ECF Nos. 9, 23-2 at 4.) On December 29, 12 2021, the Court remanded the action. (ECF No. 10.) 13 Following remand, on January 19, 2024, an administrative law judge issued a fully 14 favorable decision, finding Plaintiff had been disabled since March 22, 2017. (ECF No. 23-2.) 15 On June 11, 2024, a stipulation to reopen the case upon completion of Sentence Six 16 remand proceedings and request for entry of final judgment was filed. (ECF No. 14.) On July 1, 17 2024, the Court entered the stipulation and judgment in favor of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 18.) On

18 August 16, 2024, Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA in the amount of 19 \$6,800 at the stipulation of the parties. (ECF No. 22.) 20 A “Notice of Award” was issued to Plaintiff on April 23, 2025. (ECF No. 23-3 at 2.) 21 The Social Security Administration determined Plaintiff was “entitled to monthly benefits from 22 Social Security beginning September 2017.” (Id.) The Social Security Administration also 23 determined that Plaintiff was entitled to \$137,514.00 in past-due benefits from September 2017 24 through March 2025. (Id. at 5.) From this, the Commissioner withheld 25% for payment of fees, 25 or \$34,378.50. (Id.) 26 In the instant motion, Petitioner seeks an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of 27 \$11,200.00 and an order to reimburse Plaintiff only \$1,100.00 out of the \$6,800.00 previously 1 II.

2 LEGAL STANDARD

3 In relevant part, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that when a federal court “renders a 4 judgment favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney,” the 5 court may allow reasonable attorney fees “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due 6 benefits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” The payment of such 7 award comes directly from the claimant’s benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). 8 The Supreme Court has explained that a district court reviews a petition for section 9 406(b) fees “as an independent check” to assure that the contingency fee agreements between the 10 claimant and the attorney will “yield reasonable results in particular cases.” *Gisbrecht v. 11 Barnhart*, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). The district court must respect “the primacy of lawful 12 attorney-client fee agreements,” and is to look first at the contingent-fee agreement, and then test 13 it for reasonableness.” *Crawford v. Astrue*, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009). The twenty- 14 five percent maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts are required to ensure that 15 the requested fee is reasonable. *Gisbrecht*, 535 U.S. at 808–09. The attorney has the burden of 16 demonstrating that the fees requested are reasonable. *Id.* at 808; *Crawford*, 586 F.3d at 1148. 17 In determining the reasonableness of an award, the district court should consider the 18 character of the representation and the results achieved. *Gisbrecht*, 535 U.S. at 800. Ultimately, 19 an award of section 406(b) fees is offset by an award of attorney fees granted under the EAJA.

20 *Id.* at 796. The Ninth Circuit has identified several factors that a district court can examine under

21 *Gisbrecht* in determining whether the fee was reasonable. In determining whether counsel met

22 his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are reasonable, the court may consider (1) the
23 standard of performance of the attorney in representing the claimant; (2) whether the attorney
24 exhibited dilatory conduct or caused excessive delay which resulted in an undue accumulation
of 25 past-due benefits; and (3) whether the requested fees are excessively large in relation to the
26 benefits achieved when taking into consideration the risk assumed in these cases. Crawford,
586 27 F.3d at 1151. 1 III.

2 DISCUSSION

3 A. Attorney Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) 4 The Court begins, as it must, with Plaintiff's
agreement to "25% of the past-due benefits 5 awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ
decision for work before the Social Security 6 Administration" at the outset of the representation.
(ECF No. 23-1.) The Court recognizes the 7 contingent nature of this case and Counsel's
assumption of the risk of going uncompensated. 8 *Hearn v. Barnhart*, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037
(N.D. Cal. 2003). Plaintiff has been awarded 9 benefits from September 2017 through March 2025
in the amount of \$137,514.00. (ECF No. 23- 10 3 at 2, 5.) Petitioner now seeks \$11,200.00, which
is approximately eight percent of the backpay 11 award. From a broad lens, the \$11,200.00 fee is
not excessively large in relation to the past-due 12 award of \$137,514.00 and is over two-thirds
lower than the fee bargained for in the contingent 13 fee agreement. 14 There is no indication that
a reduction of fees is warranted for substandard performance. 15 See *Crawford*, 586 F.3d at 1151.
Indeed, this action was so briefly in this Court before the 16 parties stipulated to remand due to
technical difficulties experienced at the administrative level 17 that there is little substantive
record to even evaluate performance. No briefs were filed nor was 18 an administrative record
lodged to review. By all accounts, however, Petitioner is an 19 experienced, competent attorney
who ultimately secured a successful result for Plaintiff. 20 Further, although this action does
involve over seven years of backpay, there is no 21 indication that Petitioner was responsible for
the delay in the court proceedings to indicate any 22 undue accumulation of past-due benefits. 23
Gisbrecht also instructs that where "the benefits are large in comparison to the amount of 24 time
counsel spent on the case," a downward adjustment in the requested fee award may be "in 25
order." *Gisbrecht*, 535 U.S. at 808 (noting a district court "may require the claimant's attorney to
26 submit, not as a basis for satellite litigation, but as an aid to the court's assessment of the 27
reasonableness of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, a record of the hours spent representing 1
cases") (emphasis added)). The attorney has the burden of demonstrating that the fees requested 2
are reasonable. *Id.*; *Crawford*, 586 F.3d at 1148. 3 In support of the instant motion, Petitioner
submits a log of the time spent prosecuting 4 this action in district court and a separate log of time
detailing the many more hours spent at the 5 administrative level. (ECF No. 23-4.) The log
demonstrates that Petitioner spent 3.6 hours 6 before this Court (2.3 hours in 2021 and 1.3 hours
when the case was returned to this Court in 7 2024). (*Id.* at 1.) The hours include reviewing
documents and preparing the standard complaint, 8 correspondence, and the stipulation for EAJA
fees. (*Id.*) Counsel's 3.6 hours of primarily 9 routine tasks in this action yields a de facto hourly

rate of approximately \$3,111.11 (\$11,200 10 requested fee divided by 3.6 hours). Counsel's standard hourly rate in 2021 was \$217.54 and her 11 standard hourly rate in 2024 was \$243. (Id.) Petitioner also requests, however, that the Court 12 factor in two hours of paralegal time, the bulk of which is related to filing, reviewing, and 13 discussing Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Id.) Petitioner's standard 14 hourly paralegal rate in 2021 was \$143. (Id.) If the Court factors in the two hours of routine 15 paralegal time, the de facto hourly rate for combined counsel and paralegal time is \$2,000 16 (\$11,200 requested fee divided by 3.6 hours of Petitioner's time and 2 hours of paralegal time). 17 Petitioner points the Court to numerous cases—none from this District—purporting to 18 find an effective hourly rate of \$2,000 reasonable. (See ECF No. 23 at 9-10 (citing *Bolla v. 19 King*, No. 2:20-CV-06792-KES, 2025 WL 864642, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2025) (finding an 20 hourly rate of approximately \$1,843.83 per hour (\$47,755.25 divided by 25.9 hours) reasonable); 21 *Joanne F. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, No. 3:20-CV-01040-AA, 2023 WL 7127663, at *2 (D. Or.

22 Oct. 30, 2023) (noting that although the requested hourly fee in the amount of \$1,780.65 is 23 higher than what is commonly seen, it was within the bound of rates that had been awarded by 24 courts in the District of Oregon.) 25 Notably, Plaintiff also points to *Steven M. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, No. 3:18-CV- 26 00459-HZ, 2020 WL 249990 (D. Or. Jan. 16, 2020). There, however, the plaintiff's counsel 27 requested the same \$2,000 effective hourly fee, which would amount to 19.37% of the award. 1 opening brief and other time was spent filing, downloading, docketing, reviewing, and preparing 2 documents. Id. The Court found an effective hourly rate of \$2,000 for 6.9 hours of work was 3 “not proportional to the time spent on the case,” and, in light of the record, “the requested fee 4 would result in a windfall to counsel.” Id. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the Court reduced the fee to 5 an amount consistent with other fees in the District of Oregon. Id. 6 Petitioner also relies on *Brazile v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, No. C18-5914JLR, 2022 WL 7 503779 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2022) as support for a de facto \$2,000 hourly rate, which would 8 amount to 17.24% of the award. As Counsel notes, that court in that case indeed found a \$2,000 9 hourly rate to be reasonable. Id. at *2. However, the district court emphasized that the 9.8 hours 10 of billing entries submitted by the Brazile counsel were primarily related to narrowly tailored 11 opening and reply briefs on one issue that was ultimately remanded to the ALJ. Id. at *4. The 12 court emphasized that the high \$2,000 rate was reasonable because counsel “did not bill for 13 paralegal time, nor did he bill for every email sent or received, for every review of an entry into 14 the court's docket, or for other administrative tasks.” Id. The court noted that “the omission of 15 such clerical entries is in line with the type of efficient billing practice that judges in this district 16 and elsewhere in the Ninth Circuit have encouraged attorneys to follow.” Id. (collecting cases). 17 Unlike counsel in *Brazile*, Petitioner's requested effective \$2,000 hourly rate is reduced 18 from a \$3,111.11 hourly rate because it includes paralegal time. Further, other than 1.6 hours 19 Petitioner spent reviewing the file, preparing the standard social security complaint, and 20 preparing the EAJA stipulation, Petitioner and her paralegal's hours are primarily

reviewing 21 docket entries and performing other administrative tasks. Such billing is not analogous to the 22 efficient billing practices endorsed in *Brazile*. Still, the Court does not find the requested 23 benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case. A combined 24 effectively hourly fee of \$2,000 certainly teeters on the high end in this district but it is not an 25 anomaly. See, e.g., *Garcia v. O'Malley*, No. 1:20-CV-01366-SKO, 2024 WL 1118782, at *1 26 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024) (granting counsel's motion for only 13.6% of back benefits for 6.5 27 hours of work, which amounted to an effective hourly rate of \$2,307.69 per hour); *Jacomet v. 1* counsel's motion for only 21% of back benefits for 15.1 hours of work, which amounted to an 2 effective hourly rate of \$2,005.06 per hour). In granting Petitioner's motion, the Court focuses 3 on Petitioner's request for 8% of back benefits, which is less than one-third of the bargained for 4 fee in the contingent fee agreement. See *Crawford*, 586 F.3d at 1149 (noting that performance 5 of the court's affirmative duty to assure the reasonableness of the fee "must begin, under 6 *Gisbrecht*, with the fee agreement, and the question is whether the amount need be reduced, not 7 whether the loadstar amount should be enhanced.") 8 In short, the Court recognizes that the requested attorney fees in the amount of \$11,200 is 9 significantly less than 25% of the past-due benefits awarded and is not excessive in relation to 10 the past-due award. The Court is cognizant that Plaintiff nor the Defendant oppose the award of 11 fees as unreasonable. Petitioner also assumed the risk of receiving no compensation, as 12 Plaintiff's application was denied more than once at the administrative level. (See ECF No. 23-1 13 at 4-5.) The Court finds the fee amount requested is reasonable in light of the several years of 14 litigation and the result achieved, as well as the lack of any evidence suggesting either dilatory 15 conduct or a windfall to Petitioner. Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of fees counsel 16 seeks under § 406(b) is reasonable. 17 B. EAJA Refund 18 "[A]n award of attorney's fees under § 406(b) does 'not prevent an award of fees and 19 other expenses under' the EAJA, but 'where the claimant's attorney receives fees for the same 20 work under both' § 406(b) and the EAJA, then 'the claimant's attorney refunds to the claimant 21 the amount of the smaller fee.'" *Castillo v. Kijakazi*, No. 5:20-CV-02347-KES, 2023 WL 22 12090215, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2023) (quoting Public Law No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (1985))1 23 (emphasis in original). 24 Petitioner requests partial reimbursement of the EAJA fee awarded upon stipulation of 25 1 Adding the Savings Provision to 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which states in pertinent part that: "Section 206(b) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 406(b)(1)) shall not prevent an award of fees and other expenses under section 2412(d) of 26 title 28, United States Code. Section 206(b)(2) of the Social Security Act [§ 406(b)(2)] shall not apply with respect to any such award but only if, where the claimant's attorney receives fees for the same work under both section 27 206(b) of that Act and section 2412(d) of title 28, United States Code, the claimant's attorney refunds to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee." PL 99-80 (HR 2378), PL 99-80, 99 Stat 183 (1985). 1 the parties on August 16, 2024, because the EAJA fee in the amount of \$6,800 was based on the 2 total hours Petitioner spent in the representation of Plaintiff in this matter at both this court and at 3 the agency level. Specifically, Petitioner's firm expended

35.41 hours of attorney and paralegal 4 time in the representation of Plaintiff in this matter: 5.6 hours at the district court level and 29.81 5 hours at the administrative level. (ECF No. 23-4 at 1-3.) Thus, Petitioner requests only 6 reimbursing Plaintiff \$1,100 of the \$6,800 as that is the amount of fees offset based on the same 7 work before this Court. (ECF No. 23 at 16.) In support of her request, Plaintiff relies on *Chapa 8 v. Astrue*, 814 F.Supp.2d 957 (C.D. Cal. 2011), whereby the Court ordered reimbursement of 9 only the portion of the EAJA that was based on the work in the district court following a 10 Sentence Six remand. 11 Defendant requests that the Court direct Petitioner to reimburse Plaintiff the entirety of 12 fees she previously received under the EAJA. (ECF No. 24 at 2-3 n.1.) Defendant points out 13 that subsequent cases have observed that *Chapa* may no longer be good law after the Ninth 14 Circuit's decision in *Parrish v. Commissioner*, 698 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2012). Specifically, the 15 same court that decided *Chapa* noted that "the breadth of the language in the *Parrish* decision 16 calls into serious question whether a court in this circuit properly may deem any component of 17 an EAJA fee award to have been other than 'for the same work' comprehended by the section 18 406(b) award". *Morales v. Colvin*, No. CV 12-2189-E, 2015 WL 276682, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19 22, 2015). 20 While it does not appear any court in this District has had occasion to address this issue, 21 it is not one of first impression. In *Castillo v. Kijakazi*, 2023 WL 12090215, the Central District 22 addressed a substantially similar argument by Petitioner's firm. The district found ultimately 23 found Petitioner's reliance on *Chapa*, 814 F.Supp.2d 957 unpersuasive for three reasons: 24 First, as Judge Eick admitted in the *Chapa* decision, it is the general practice of courts in this district to require counsel to 25 refund the entire EAJA fee to the plaintiff. *Chapa*, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (collecting cases and noting, "The Court acknowledges that 26 the present decision finds little or no support in case law. Most if not all other courts awarding 406(b) fees and lesser EAJA fees 27 following sentence six remands ordered the refund of the entire EAJA fee, but those courts did so without specifically 1 as Judge Eick noted in [*Morales v. Colvin*, No. CV 12-2189-E, 2015 WL 276682, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2015)]: 2 "A subsequent Ninth Circuit decision casts some doubt on the 3 continuing validity of the *Chapa* holding....In *Parrish v. Commissioner*, 698 F.3d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012) ("*Parrish*"), 4 the Ninth Circuit stated: 5 We therefore hold that if a court awards attorney fees under § 2412(d) [EAJA] for the representation of a Social Security 6 claimant on an action for past-due benefits, and also awards attorney fees under § 406(b)(1) for representation of the same 7 claimant in connection with the same claim, the claimant's attorney 'receives fees for the same work' under both § 2412(d) and § 8 406(b)(1) for purposes of the EAJA savings provision. 9 The *Parrish* case did not involve any section six remand and did not specifically discuss the *Chapa* holding. Nevertheless, the 10 breadth of the language in the *Parrish* decision calls into serious question whether a court in this circuit properly may deem any 11 component of an EAJA fee award to have been other than 'for the same work' comprehended by the section 406(b) award.' 12 [*Morales*, 2015 WL 276682, at *3.] 13 Third, unlike counsel in the *Chapa* case, Ms. Haley here states that she "will seek fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)" for work at the 14 administrative level.

(Dkt. 26 at 10.) In Chapa, Judge Eick noted that his interpretation of the “same work” language in Public Law

15 No. 99-80 “threatens to enable attorneys less scrupulous than present counsel to recover and retain duplicative fees for the same 16 administrative work,” because an “attorney theoretically could recover section 406(a) fees and EAJA fees for the same post- 17 sentence six remand administrative work, and Public Law No. 99- 80 would have nothing to say about the matter.” *Id.* at 966. In fact, 18 in a subsequent case, Judge Eick required counsel to refund the entire EAJA fee, in part because counsel had “not eschewed the 19 intent to seek additional fees from the Administration under section 406(a).” *Morales*, 2015 WL 276682, at *3. 20 21 *Castillo*, 2023 WL 12090215, at *5. The *Castillo* Court therefore required counsel to refund the 22 plaintiff the entire amount of the EAJA fee awarded. 23 This Court finds *Castillo* persuasive and shall order the same result. First, it is the 24 general practice of courts in this district to require counsel to refund the entire EAJA fee 25 following a Sentence Six remand. See, e.g., *Lang v. O'Malley*, No. 1:18-CV-01605-SKO, 2024 26 WL 1575475, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2024) (granting motion under Section 406(b) following 27 Sentence Six remand and ordering full refund of previously awarded EAJA fees); *Hoover v. Saul*, No. 1:13-CV-0333- JLT, 2020 WL 528848, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2020) (granting motion 1 under Section 406(b) following Sentence Six remand and ordering full refund of previously 2 awarded EAJA fees); *Madrid v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, No. 2:19-CV-1421-KJM-KJN, 2022 WL 3 1499303, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:19-CV- 4 1421 KJM KJN, 2022 WL 2757624 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2022) (granting motion under Section 5 406(b) following Sentence Six remand and ordering full refund of previously awarded EAJA 6 fees); *Gutierrez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, No. 2:14-CV-1968-KJN, 2018 WL 4090598, at *3 (E.D. 7 Cal. Aug. 27, 2018) (granting motion under Section 406(b) following Sentence Six remand and 8 ordering full refund of previously awarded EAJA fees). The Court acknowledges that it does not 9 appear counsel in these cases requested partial reimbursement. 10 Further, although Petitioner does provide a separate itemization of the time spent on work 11 at the administrative level, see *Morales*, 2015 WL 276682, at *3, she has stated that she will seek 12 additional fees for the work performed at the administrative level under 42 U.S.C. 406(a). (See 13 ECF No. 23 at 16-17 (“the fee that [Petitioner] will seek under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) for the work 14 before the agency...”); see also *id.* at 11, 19). The fee agreement has certainly arranged for 15 Petitioner’s intent as the agreement states Petitioner would receive a separate fee of 25% of the 16 past due benefits awarded if and only if Plaintiff received benefits by a decision of the Social 17 Security Administration or judgment for benefits by this Court. (ECF No. 23-1.) In other words, 18 the fee agreement calls for two awards representing 25% of past due benefits each. (*Id.*; see also 19 ECF No. 23 at 8 (describing that the fee agreement in this matter calls for a separate calculation 20 of fees under § 406(a) and § 406(b)).). The Court is not persuaded that the Petitioner’s refund of 21 the full EAJA award, which is the general practice in this District, would lead to an unfair result. 22 Petitioner

also argues *Rice v. Astrue*, 609 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 2010) is persuasive. (ECF No. 23 at 18.) Where the Fifth Circuit stated that “[a]s long as the EAJA award is not given for work done at the administrative level, no savings clause is needed for § 406(a),” Petitioner contends it should also mean as long as the EAJA is not given for work done at the federal court level, no savings clause is needed for § 406(b). As explained by the Chapa Court, “[t]he *Rice* decision is not particularly instructive on the issue before this Court, i.e., how a court should handle administrative work, when granting section 406(b) fees,” given the issue in *Rice* was whether a district court may condition the granting of an EAJA award following a sentence four remand on counsel offsetting any future section 406(a) award the claimant might receive. Chapa, 814 F.3d Supp. 2d at 964 n.10. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit explicitly noted that it “expresses no opinion about attorney’s fees in sentence six remands under § 405(g).” *Rice v. Astrue*, 609 F.3d 831, 833 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010). The Court does not agree *Rice* is persuasive authority to order less than a full EAJA offset in the instant action. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Defendant and shall require Plaintiff to refund the entire amount of the EAJA fees previously awarded. 9 VI.

10 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

11 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the fees sought by Petitioner pursuant to Section 406(b) are reasonable. However, an award of Section 406(b) fees must be offset by any prior award of fees granted under the EAJA. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Petitioner’s motion for an award of attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of \$11,200 (ECF No. 23) is GRANTED; 2. The funds SHALL be paid to Petitioner out of the funds withheld by the Social Security Administration; 3. Petitioner’s request to partially refund EAJA fees (ECF No. 23) is DENIED; and 4. Petitioner is ordered to refund \$6,800 to Plaintiff Janessica Pimentel Sanchez as an offset for EAJA fees previously awarded pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). IT IS SO ORDERED. OF. nf ee 23 | Dated: _July 30, 2025 _ OO

STANLEY A. BOONE

24 United States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28