

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

Daevon J. Taylor v. Los Angeles County Superior Court

Taylor v. Los Angeles County Superior Court · No. 2:25-cv-03147-TJH (DTB) · Decided January 8, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Central District of California issued an order to show cause why Daevon J. Taylor’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 should not be dismissed. The court identified the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Younger abstention, and the apparent absence of a custody requirement as grounds supporting dismissal. Taylor was ordered to respond or request voluntary dismissal by February 6, 2026.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Central District of California
WRITING FOR THE COURT	David T. Bristow
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Central District of California
DECIDED	January 8, 2026
DOCKET	2:25-cv-03147-TJH (DTB)
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Petitioner filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking federal intervention in pending California criminal proceedings. The magistrate judge screened the petition and issued an order to show cause why it should not be dismissed, allowing petitioner until February 6, 2026, to respond.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Preliminary habeas screening under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, as applied to a § 2241 petition through Habeas Rule 1(b).
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	Unknown; district-court order to show cause and not a final merits judgment.
PARTIES	Daevon J. Taylor v. Los Angeles County Superior Court

TOPICS

- federal habeas corpus
- habeas corpus
- subject matter jurisdiction
- criminal procedure
- civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

federal habeas corpus

criminal procedure

federal jurisdiction

civil procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the federal district court may exercise jurisdiction over a habeas petition seeking review of or intervention in pending state criminal proceedings.
2. Whether Younger abstention bars federal habeas intervention in the pending state criminal proceedings.
3. Whether the petition satisfies the custody requirement for federal habeas jurisdiction when petitioner alleges that he has been released on bond and does not challenge the legality of existing custody.

HOLDINGS

1. The petition appears subject to dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because the relief sought would require the federal district court to review and invalidate decisions and actions taken in the ongoing state criminal proceedings.
2. Younger abstention appears to require the federal court to refrain from intervening in Taylor's ongoing state criminal proceedings because the proceeding is ongoing, implicates important state interests, provides an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims, and the requested relief would substantially interfere with the proceeding.
3. The petition appears jurisdictionally deficient because Taylor alleges that he was released on bond and does not claim that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in state custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." (Analysis, Section III)

"Younger . . . reaffirmed the long-standing principle that federal courts sitting in equity cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, enjoin pending state criminal proceedings." (Analysis, Section III)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Taylor was the subject of pending criminal proceedings in Los Angeles County Superior Court and alleged that his arrest and related search warrants were facially defective. He also challenged charges including felon in possession, alleged denial of discovery, and reliance on a previously vacated restraining order. Taylor stated that he had been released on bond and sought federal declarations that the state arrest and prosecution were unconstitutional, dismissal of the state charges, and other emergency relief.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Taylor filed the petition on April 6, 2025. The action was dismissed without prejudice on August 8, 2025, after Taylor failed to submit a complete in forma pauperis request, but the court vacated the dismissal and reopened the action on October 29, 2025. The court later granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, after screening the petition and related motions, issued this order to show cause rather than entering a final dismissal.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Baily v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 979-82 (9th Cir. 2010)
- Bennet v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (as amended)
- Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (9th Cir. 1989)
- Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005)
- D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-86 (1983)
- Dubinka v. Judges of Sup. Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994)
- Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986)
- Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989)
- Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)
- Race v. Salmonsens, 131 F.4th 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2025)
- ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014)
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)
- Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)
- Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018)