

MONTANA SUPREME COURT

Russell v. Flathead County

2003 MT 8 (Mont. 2003) · Decided January 23, 2003

SUMMARY

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed a judgment upholding Flathead County's zoning restrictions on Russell's property. The Court held that Russell's challenge to the creation of the zoning district was barred by the five-year statute of limitations, that his property was included within the district, and that his expanded heavy-equipment repair and storage activities were not a permissible continuation of the prior nonconforming use.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	Montana Supreme Court
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Chief Justice Rice
JURISDICTION	Montana
DECIDED	January 23, 2003
DISPOSITION	affirmed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Russell appealed the District Court's judgment affirming county zoning determinations and enjoining his use of the property except as permitted by the applicable zoning regulations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	The Supreme Court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same Rule 56 evaluation as the district court. It reviews the district court's legal determinations for error and upholds factual findings supported by substantial evidence.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	Published Montana Supreme Court opinion; precedential
PARTIES	Russell v. Flathead County, Flathead County Board of Adjustment

TOPICS

- zoning
- statutory interpretation
- real estate
- standard of review
- appellate procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

- real estate law
- zoning law
- municipal law
- appellate procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Russell's challenge to the creation of the zoning district and its subdistrict classifications was barred by the five-year statute of limitations in § 76-2-202(1)(b), MCA.
2. Whether Russell's property was included within the boundaries of the Highway 93 North Zoning District when the district was created.
3. Whether Russell's post-purchase heavy-equipment repair and storage activities constituted an impermissibly expanded nonconforming use rather than a continuation of the prior use.

HOLDINGS

1. Russell's challenge was a challenge to the creation of the zoning district with its distinctive subdistricts and therefore was barred because it was filed more than five years after the district's creation.
2. Russell's property was properly included within the Highway 93 North Zoning District when the district was created.
3. Russell's use was an impermissible expansion and change of the preexisting nonconforming use because it substantially exceeded the prior use in both manner and extent.
4. The district court did not improperly legislate by limiting the type and number of equipment, hours of operation, and visibility of stored equipment; it enforced the requirement that the nonconforming use continue in the same manner and extent as it existed when zoning was adopted.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Thus, Russell's true challenge is to the creation of this zoning district, and because his Complaint was filed more than five years after the creation of the District, his claim is time barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 76-2-202(1)(b), MCA.” (¶ 21)

“The word “continued,” defined as “lasting or extending without interruption,” means simply that a pre-existing use may be maintained.” (¶ 42)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Flathead County created the Highway 93 North Zoning District in May 1991, and Russell's 4.9-acre property was within the district and classified SAG-1. Before Russell purchased the property, the prior owner operated a dairy farm, repaired farm equipment and built trailers in a shop, and occasionally stored one to three pieces of farm equipment. After purchasing the property, Russell operated a substantially larger heavy-equipment repair and storage business, employing another person and storing approximately twenty to thirty logging trucks, semitrailers, buses, and bulldozers. The county determined that Russell's use was nonconforming, and the district court restricted the use to the manner and extent existing when the zoning district was created.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The county zoning administrator determined that Russell's use was nonconforming. The Flathead County Board of Adjustment affirmed. In the ensuing district-court action, the court granted the County summary judgment on

Russell's challenge to the zoning district, then conducted a bench trial on the remaining claims and entered findings, conclusions, and an order in favor of the County. Russell appealed.

DISPOSITION

affirmed

CASES CITED

- Bruner v. Yellowstone County, 272 Mont. 261, 900 P.2d 901 (1995)
- Kersmoe, 156 Mont. 401, 480 P.2d 833

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

W1L L iA\Z RUSSELL FL,ATIIFAD COVNTY, and THE FLATHEAD COBhT Y BOARD OF ADJUS 1MEVT, Defendants and Resportdents r%PPEAIdFROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and for tile County of Flathead, f-tonorable ICatherine R. Curtis: Judge Presiding COUKSEL OF RECORD For AppellatlRi cliard DeJana, Richard DeJana & Associates, PLLC, Kalrspcll. Montana For liespondcnts: Thomas Esch, County Attonic); Jonathan B Sriilth. l)cpu ty County rlito~icq, ICalispcll, llo~itana Sublnittcd on Briefs: September 20, 2001 Decided: January 23,2003 Filed: of J ~ I S I I C CJ!n: Rice iiclivercd ihc Opit~lor! ihc C'ourl, 9,r\ppejjdnl \$Viliiam Rassci'i /Ri:ssei) appe:iis f~.rom;he orJcr.i or'rhi- f<lsreaih.iidiciali ~ ~ District Courtl Flathead County, in favor of Respondent Flathead Coun~y, enjoining R~rsscll's use of his property as violative of the C:ou!it);'s zoning regularions LVc a f t f r n ~ ~ 7l.)

The ibllowing issues are presented on appeal: Y3 I. Eid the District Court err in concluding that Russell's challncgc to ihc zoning district pursuant to 9 75-2-202, MC"2;was barred by thc statute of limitations'? 7j4 2. Did the District Court err in dctel~niningthat Russell's pr-itpcrty \-as inciuded within the boundaries of the zoning district when the district was crcateci"!IJ *!'c?

Did the District Court err in eonc!i~dingthat Russell's tisc ofrile properly was ar: impcnissible nonconforming use'? FA<:TUAJ, AND PKOI:E:DC'RAId BACKC;KOUND 76 The High\way 03 North Zoning District (District) was created on Ma); 7. 100 I, by thc Flat~ead County Board o r Commissioners.

The resolutioi? cstabiishing the ilisrricr established several subdistricts, each ~vith own regulations regarding uses and typcs of its b~iidings within the subdistrict. "7 On March 1, 1907; R~isscllpurchased a 4.9 acrc pa^-cel fioni!Villiam ilcdstrom (1-ledsiromi. which i s the property si~bjcct this dispute. Russcli's propci-ty iics within:1le to 1)istrii.t.

At the time of the creation of thc District, Russell's property, titen olv~ieiiby i-iciisiron, \sas classiiieil as SAG-1 (,Siiburban ~ ~ r i c u l t u r a i)'4' revision ot'thc Fkithcad Reg~ilaiionsin

Scp;cmher -rti93 chai~geii iiesignatio? f~om Cvur;iy Z ~ n i i ~ g #. ihc SAG-] to SAG-LO, but continued the suburban agricultural classification. "i8 For years prior to the adoption of the L3istrict, i;iedstrom operated a dair? farm on tile property. and at the rime the Lhtrict was created, was using approximately two-thirds of the property to support his dairy operation, 'rwhich includecl t3fty to one hundred head of cattle.

"The shop on the property was built in 1973. When thc District was created in iW1; I-iedstrom was wing the shop to repair farm equipment, both his and that owned by others, and to brtild trailers and hitches. Eledstrom testified that he did all the sllop work himself9 thirty-five ihours a u-ckk iri thc shop. Liedstrom's use oftile propety spending ilpproxin~arcly did not include the general storage of hea\y equipment.

1. 1 ~ testified that l'iom one to three pieces of F ~ I -equipment were occasionally stored on the property, but that this equipment ~I was "well-screened from public view by the knoll on the highway side of the property, and by the dairy buildings, grain bins, tinct equipment sl~ed located 011 the property. 9 Prior to purchasing the property; Russell was aware that tledsirom operated a dairy and that the property was classified as agricultural.!iussell ctid noti however, solicit information from the planning office regarding perrriissible uses of thc iiprocrty prior to his 'A "Suburban Agricultural SAC;-I" class~iicat~ondcfii~cd a "~IISI~ICI protect and PI-CSC~VC I.; as to agriciiltural lands ibs thc pel-Sormance of iirnitcd agricultural liinctioiis aiid to pr-i\::~dca huili.r bct\vcrl uhail iir~ciunlimited;rgricultur-a! uses. encoiil-aging conce~~tratiol-i such iiccs in al.eas where potential of iiction of uses ivill be minirriiii'ed.'

Sect~!)n3.02(. Chapter 3; t:latliead ('oi~nty ('om~~rcl?ens!vc Zoning Regulations (1991). ptirchiise. Since his purchase; K~issell has operiied a busincss involi-ing the rc~pair, nriii~izi? ancc.. storage of heavy cyuiprcnt on tlre propcrry, iiusxii employs one pel-con arrd to work at the shop full-time and has stored tir,cnty to thirty pieces of h~cavy ccjuipmcnt. i n various stages of repair, on the property. including logging trucks; s c ~ ~ ~ i - t r ~busses, _ ~ c ' K i iiiiid bulldozers.

Russell admitted in his testimony rhat tbe extent of his use wries fi-orn Hedstrom's use, because no agricultural use of the propcrty has occurred sir~ccRussell purchased the propelt);. 0 SI Tire testimony of several neighbors established that the use ofthe propcny prior to the p~urchase Russell war generally observable as agricultural. Following R~isscll's by purchase of ihe property, ilie g e ~ ~ e r a l obscrvable usc o r thc property lias ltccn industrial.

The equipment repair conducted by ffedstrom prior to Russell's purchase \\\:as conducted inside the sliop. out oftile view of adjoining property owners. Russell's current use is highly visible and occasionally audible to the adjoining neighbors. Russell's use of the property in~olves substantially more equipnicnt than the onc to thrcc pieces that iledstrom had ii the property ii and involves equipment not traditionally considered farm equipment.

It also involves the storage of equipment on the property in a manner that is not screened from a public view, 71 Id. In the fall of 1997, the county zoning administrator received complaints regarding Russell's use of the property. On December 31, 1997, the zoning administrator issued a determination that Russell's use was nonconforming under the zoning regulations.

Russell appealed this decision to the Flathead County Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners affirmed the zoning administrator's decision. On May 6, 1998, Russell appealed the Board of Commissioners' decision to the District Court. His Complaint alleged that the adoption of zoning regulations was illegal (Count 1); that Plaintiff's use of the property was the same as the use before adoption of the District (Count 2), and that Plaintiff's property was excluded from the actual boundaries of the district (Count 3).

Flathead County filed an Answer and Counterclaim claiming Russell's use of the property was not a permitted use or a continuation of a nonconforming use, and filed a motion for summary judgment on Count 1 of Russell's Complaint, contending that Russell violated the zoning ordinance thereunder. The motion was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in § 76-2-202(1)(b), 11 CrZ.

Russell responded by filing an amended Complaint also moving for summary judgment as to Count 1. By Memorandum and Order entered on October 19, 1998, the District Court granted the County's motion for summary judgment and denied Russell's motion for summary judgment as to Counts 2 and 3. 713 issues were tried in a bench trial before the Honorable Katherine R. Curtis, and on November 14,

2000, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order in favor of Flathead County, enjoining Russell from using the property other than as allowed by State and local zoning regulations; except as the property was used prior to the creation of the District. Russell appeals the judgment entered by the District Court.

4;14 Did the District Court err in concluding that Russell's challenge to the District was barred by the statute of limitations? 15 Russell claimed in his Count 1 that the subdistricts created within the District, and the differing regulations for property located within each subdistrict, violated § 76-2-292, which requires that zoning regulations for each class or kind of buildings "throughout a district" be uniform.

The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Flathead County on the grounds that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. [I 6] (ii. We review a district court's order granting summary judgment, applying the same evaluation as the district court does pursuant to Rule 56, M.R.C.P. 11. *Reuner v. O'Leary*, 2014 MT 141, 458 Mont. 261, 264, 458 P.2d 1001, 1003. In this case, we set forth our inquiry: The movant must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist.

Once this has been accomplished, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to prove, by more than mere denial and speculation, that a genuine issue does exist. Having determined that genuine issues of fact do not exist, the court must then determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

We reiterate the legal determinations made by a district court as to whether the court erred. [Citations omitted.] The first part of the issue here is the time limitation provision set forth in I.S. 76-5-202, which provides that actions challenging the creation of a zoning district must be "within 5 years after the date of the order by the board of county commissioners creating the district...."

Section 76-2-2(2)(b), XICA (revised 1988) Commissioners on May 7, 1988. The district was created by resolution of the Board of Commissioners on May 7, 1988 and Russell filed his Complaint on May 6, 1988. Flach (co-plaintiff) filed that Russell's action is a challenge to the creation of the District. Both of these districts, and therefore, is barred by the five-year limitation provision within § 76-2-202(2)(b), XICA.

Russell argues that because he is seeking to invalidate existing regulations within the District, and not the creation of the District, the five-year limitation provision is inapplicable. In support of his position, Russell offers that the zoning statutes generally distinguish between the creation of a district and the establishment of the regulations of the district, and the five-year limitation provision applies only to actions challenging the actual creation of a district.

For the reasons that applying the five-year limitation period here would bar all challenges to illegal regulations if a zoning district had been in existence for more than five years, alternatively, Russell argues that if the five-year provision does apply, then the limitation period began to run on September 27, 1993, when the county commissioners enacted a resolution amending the zoning regulations, and changing the zone designation from SAG-1 to SAG 10, and therefore, his action was timely filed on May 6, 1994.

In 1988, referred to the creation of the MCP, upon which party. The District Court in its decision, which they were relying. However, the 1989 version of the Code which in effect at that time was contains the 5 year limitation provision at issue here. and 13 relied upon herein. A District Code, virtually identical provision remains in effect under the 2001 Code.

Both District Court and Russell's claim that the District Court's decision is based on the creation of the District, stating its basis of Plaintiff's argument that the regulations are invalid is that the multiple districts were created incorrectly and are all one district.

As counsel for Plaintiff stated at oral argument: "'L-ferewe have a district with illegally crcated subdistricts." Therc could nor be a [clearer] challenge to '-the creation of a zoning district." which must he commenced within five years after the creation. Plaintiffs claim is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Section 76-2-202(1)(h). M.C.A. 121 We agree with the District Court's conclusion.

Russell's assertion notwithstanding, he is arguing that the creation of the District with distinctive subdistricts does not comply with §76-2-202. M.C.A. The crux of Russell's argument is that the District is invalid because the County enacted different property classifications and regulations for properties within the subdistricts of a single district.

This differing treatment of property within the subdistricts regulations were amended in September 1991, but, rather, did not occur when the District was created in May 1991. Thus, Russell's true challenge is to the creation of the district, and the five-year limitation provision contained in § 76-2-202(1)(b). of this opinion is a legal conclusion because his complaint was filed more than five years after the creation of the District, claim is barred. Neither law nor by Russell's argument that this conclusion bars; a legal challenge to zoning regulations after a district has been in existence for five years.

We are to not be faced here with the question of whether the five-year limitation provision in § 76-2-202(1)(b), M.C.A., applies to challenges to zoning regulations which are unrelated to a district's creation, and if not, this decision has no bearing on that issue. Kenneth Cross, in this decision should not be interpreted as imposing a blanket prohibition on challenges to zoning as regulations after a district has been in existence for five years. c 42 '3 We conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment to Flathead County on Count 1. 124 Did the District Court err in determining that Russell's property was included within the District when it was created?

725 The perimeter description of the District includes the property owned by Russell, as does the description of the property within the perimeter classified as SAG-1. These facts are not disputed. Russell acknowledges in his brief that "[t]he plaintiff's property is within the first SAC-1 area described." 2 C-However, Russell argues that the area described as SAC-1 is itself excluded from the District.

He asserts that the description clearly excluded certain areas within the District's outer boundary, such as the Prairie View Zoning District and the proposed Schroeder Ridge Zoning District, and that the same kind of exclusion language was used to exclude the area described as SAC-1 which includes his property.

Thus, Russell asks that this Court declare his property, and all other property within the SAG-1 classification, to be outside the District and unaffected by regulations adopted pursuant to the

District's creation. Pursuant to the District's perimeter description, the drafter's first classified the entire difference: classification. Russell asserts that by placing the word "excluding" immediately preceding the land descriptions not classified as AG-40, these properties were removed from the District.

7128 The property description in the resolution approving the District is set forth in the following manner: PERIMETER DESCRIPTION OF THE DISTRICT TO BE ZONED AG-40 EXCLUDING THE PRAIRIE VIEW ZONING DISTRICT DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: [property description] AND EXCLUDING THE PROPOSED SHELBOURN RIDGE ZONING DISTRICT DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: [property description] SAG-1 EXCLUDING A TRACT OF LAND TO BE ZONED AG-40 DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: [property description] "AN 'AGRICULTURAL AREA' (-40) CLASSIFICATION DEFINED AS A 'DISTRICT' TO PROTECT AND PRESERVE THE AGRICULTURAL LAND AND THE PERMANENT AGRICULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS.

It is intended to control the scattered intrusions not compatible with an agricultural environment including but not limited to residential development." 3. Section 3.02, (1) of the Comprehensive Zoning Regulations (1991). Excluding a tract of land may be zoned K-2 described as follows: [property description] Including: tract of land to be, zoned B-1 described as follows: [property description] Excluding a tract of land to be zoned R-1 described as follows: [property description] No. 837, adopted March 5, 1991.

Resolution "2010 repeat. it is undisputed that Russell's property is located within the perimeter property description of the District and within the property described and classified as SAG-1. However, referencing the word "excluding" which precedes the description of the area classified as SAG-1. Russell claims that his property, and all other property, was excluded from the District entirely. The County offers that the language used in describing the properties that were to be classified other than AG-40 could have been clearer, but that it was sufficient to serve the purpose for which it was intended to notify the public and landowners of the zoning which was proposed for their property.

Furthermore, the County argues that the LISC of the word "excluding" to describe property not classified as AG-40 did not exclude the property from the District. but simply excluded the property from the AG-40 classification so that such property could be separated into subdistricts classified differently and (2) Russell's argument is without merit.: plain reading of Resolution 837 demonstrates that the language "excluding" in the AG-40 classification is the sole purpose of classifying the property as SAG-1.

The description states "Excluding a tract of land to be zoned S-1C1-1." The intention to zone the property as SAG-1 was clearly expressed by this language in the property description. Further, it was also expressed in the body of the ORDER. THEREFORE, RESOLVED, that the Board

of Commissioners of Flathead County, Montana... hereby adopts this resolution of intention to create the Highway 03 North Zoning District.

The proposal would result in zoning portions of the area set forth [herein] as A-40, SAC- I, R- 1, R-2, B- I. 232 There can be no confusion about the effect of the Resolution. Further, if Russell's interpretation was adopted, then the Resolution's use of the word "excluding," which was also used to define those areas within the A-40 perimeter description which were zoned as R-1, R-2 and B-1, would likewise exclude these other areas from the District.

We conclude the District Court did not err in determining that Russell's property was properly included within the District when it was created. 733 Did the District Court err in concluding that Russell's use of the property was an impermissible nonconforming use? 734 The District Court found that Russell's use of the property varied substantially from the use at the time the District was created, and therefore, exceeded allowances made in state and county codes for continuation of existing, nonconforming uses. In affirming the decision of the District Court, the District Court imposed conditions which restricted the kind of equipment which could be repaired in Russell's facility and the number of hours of its operation, and also required equipment stored outside of the shop to be screened from public view. 725 Russell challenges the District Court's conclusion that his use of the property was not in existing use.

He asserts that the District Court may have found that his particular manner of use was objectionable, but that, nonetheless, his use was essentially the same as it was prior to zoning: the repair of equipment. He argues, relying on this Court's holding in *L'Esperance* ('& 1', 156 Mont. 401, 480 P.2d 833), that the standard for determining the validity of an existing, nonconforming use under both state statute and city ordinance should be flexible, and that the District Court's consideration was too narrow. He contends that the imposition of restrictions upon his use of the property--restrictions which are not found within the zoning regulations--constitutes judicial legislating, and that the restrictions must be struck.

736 The District Court relied upon § 76-2-208, MCA, which states: Continuation of nonconforming uses. Any lawful use which is made of land use or buildings at the time any zoning resolution is adopted by the board of county commissioners may be continued although such use does not conform to the provisions of such resolution. 737 The District Court also applied a county zoning regulation addressing the continuation of nonconforming uses.

Section 2.07.01 of Flathead County Zoning Regulations; uses states: A lot or building being used in an otherwise lawful manner that does not conform to the use provisions of the Flathead County Zoning Regulations, may continue to be used in the manner and to the extent that it was being used at the time of the adoption of the zoning.

The District Court found Russell's use to be in violation of both of those provisions. 43S In order to resolve this issue, we must examine Hedstrom's use of the property at the time of zoning. The District Court found, and Russell does not challenge on appeal that Russell admitted in his testimony that the extent of his use varies significantly from Hedstrom's use of the property.

739 operated it dairy farm on At the time the property was zoned in May 1991, Hedstrom used the property. Incidental to the dairy operation on the property. Hedstrom also used the shop located on the property to repair farm equipment. Hedstrom used the shop to repair both his own farm equipment and that of others. Hedstrom also built trailers and hitches in the shop.

Hedstrom testified that at the time of zoning he would spend approximately thirty-five hours a week in the shop, and that he did all the shop work himself. At the time of zoning, Hedstrom stated he would store one to three pieces of farm equipment on the property from time-to-time. 140 Since purchasing the property in March 1997, Russell has operated an equipment repair business on the property.

Russell has used the property to repair, maintain, and store heavy equipment. Russell employs one person to assist in the shop. Russell also in the shop stores equipment to be repaired; of equipment in various stages of repair on the property. He has stored equipment including logging trucks, semi-trucks, busses, and bulldozers. No agricultural use has occurred on the property since Russell purchased the property. 4 The District Court concluded that Russell's use was "substantially different" than the pre-existing, nonconforming use of the property, and therefore violated both Section 2.07.010, Flathead County Zoning Regulations, and 8 76-2-208, 11C;I.

We find that the District Court did not err in so concluding. The District Court's finding was supported by substantial evidence that Russell was not using the property in the manner and to the extent that it was being used at the time of adoption of the zoning," as required by the ordinance. 7/42 Further, the District Court's holding is consistent with 5 76-2-208(5) MCA, which provides that "[a]ny lawful use... may be continued."

In his brief, Russell argues that the plain meaning of this statutory language "does not imply a limitation on expansion" of a pre-existing lawful use of the property, and therefore, his activities on the property may be permitted. It contemplates continuation of the status quo. However, we find that the language and the word "continued," defined as "lasting or enduring without interruption." means simply that a pre-existing use may be maintained.

The evidence here establishes that Russell has done more than maintain the existing use. He has expanded the kind, or the nature, of the property's use to include activities which did not exist at the time of zoning (from Farm Vehicle Collegiate Dictionary. Tenth Edition, 1998 (5 equipment repair to heavy commercial equipment repair); and substantially increased the quantity

on the property, the number of vehicles stored on the property, the number of hours operated per week to the manner and extent of that prior use. ii: the property (from one to three vehicles to thirty vehicles at a time).

743 In 1973, the property owner, an uninhabitable trailer home on the subject property, a nonconforming use, was replaced with a newer trailer home. The City of Missoula brought an action to prohibit this perpetuation of the nonconforming use. This Court held in favor of the plaintiff property owner, recognizing, based upon the City's ordinance, that "plaintiff has an existing vested right to a nonconforming, continuous, and unchanging use of the land in question as use a site fit for maintaining one single family residential trailer."

Kerrsmoe. 156 Mont. at 406, 480 P.2d at 838. We concluded that the non-conforming trailer home properly replaced because in accordance with this vested right. Section 70-2-208, MCA, was not violated. "44 Contrary to Russell's argument, this Court's preclusion of the City's effort to restrict the property owner in Kerrsmoe offers no support for Russell's argument here.

The property owner in Kerrsmoe sought to continue the precise pre-existing, nonconforming but not new use, a newer trailer home. She did not seek to expand or change the purposes for which her property was used, the volume of such use. Unlike the property owner in Kerrsmoe, nor Russell has engaged in activities which substantially deviate from the pre-existing uses of her property. 45 Finally; Russell argues on the basis of a legislative function, and that by imposing the time and use restrictions on the property, the Legislature has exceeded its power and is legislating.

Russell contends that the court's distinction between farm equipment and heavy oil and gas equipment is incorrect. The equipment is not from the operation, but from the court's that nothing in the A(-30 or S.A(-1 zoning ordinance prohibits storage of heavy equipment on the property, restricts its use to certain requirements, times of the day, or imposes a screening and therefore, these conditions were impermissibly imposed.

746 We disagree. Russell's use of the property exceeds the pre-existing nonconforming use of the property in both manner and extent of use. From the evidence presented, the District Court determined the use of the property at the time of zoning, and limited Russell's use with respect to the type of equipment repaired, the number of pieces of equipment stored on the property, and number of hours operated per week to the manner and extent of that prior use.

Consistent with the historical storage of vehicles out of public view on the property, the District Court imposed a screening requirement to shield vehicles from public view. In imposing these conditions, the District Court was not legislating limitations on the property. Rather, court was enforcing the ordinance's requirement that nonconforming uses be continued in the same manner as "at the time of the adoption of the zoning." Section 2.05.010, Flathead County Zoning Regulations.

We find no error. 947 The order of the District Court is affirmed. \ b e concur:

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