

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION**

Mingyuan Yu v. Kristi Noem et al.

Yu · No. 1:26-cv-292 · Decided March 4, 2026

OPINION

Yu

PER CURIAM.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MINGYUAN YU,

Petitioner, Case No. 1:26-cv-292 v. Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou KRISTI NOEM et al., Respondents.

OPINION

Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Discussion I. Procedural History In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.19.) In an order entered on January 30, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on February 4, 2026, (ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 13, 2026, (ECF No. 10). II. Factual Background Petitioner is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.10; Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 5-1, PageID.112.) Petitioner entered the United States on an F-1 student visa during December of 2016. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.14; Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.76.) Petitioner applied for asylum based on religious prosecution as a Christian in China. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.14.) Immigration officials encountered Petitioner on May 29, 2025, and charged him as properly admitted, but removable, because he did not attend school from 2017 to the date of his detention and, thus, exceeded the duration of his F-1 status.

(Id., NTA, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.112.) On June 18, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner release on bond because “Under Q. Li, [Petitioner’s] detention i[s] under INA 235(b) and he is not eligible for bond under INA 236(a).” (Order, ECF No. 1-3, PageID.23.) In other words, the Immigration Judge concluded that Petitioner was an “arriving alien” under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) and subject to mandatory detention based on the decision in *Matter of Q. Li*, 29 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 2025). Petitioner sought a custody determination again during July 2025 based on a change in circumstances. By order entered July 13, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied bond because “there is no material change in the circumstances making the Respondent eligible for a change in bond.” (Order, ECF No. 1-5, PageID.37.) On September 30, 2025, an Immigration Judge found that Petitioner was removable, denied asylum, denied withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) and under the Convention Against Torture, and granted Petitioner’s application for post-conclusion voluntary departure under INA § 240B(b). (Order, ECF No. 5-2, PageID.117–120.) Petitioner appealed the removal order. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.77.) That appeal is pending. (Id.) Petitioner remains detained at the North Lake Processing Center.

III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States.” *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration- related matters. See *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also *A. A. R. P. v. Trump*, 145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).

IV. Exhaustion Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: *Antele Cobix v. Raycraft*, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Candela Bastidas v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv- 1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Acuna Sanchez v. Noem*, No. 1:25- cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.

V. Merits Discussion A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation. Respondents’ argument is particularly baffling in

that Respondents have argued countless times that § 1226(a) is properly applied to noncitizens who are admitted on a visa but then overstay that visa. The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the following cases: *Antele Cobix v. Raycraft*, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Candela Bastidas v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Acuna Sanchez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).¹

B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice ¹ The Court is aware of *Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi*, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At this time, this non-binding case does not change the Court’s analysis. Additionally, even in *Buenrostro-Mendez*, the court concluded that “1226(a) applies to admitted aliens who overstay their visas.” *Id.*, at 505. of the removal charges, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge, may request bond, and has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: *Antele Cobix v. Raycraft*, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Candela Bastidas v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Acuna Sanchez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).

VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.

VII. Proper Respondents Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: *Antele Cobix v. Raycraft*, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Candela Bastidas v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Acuna Sanchez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); *Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one Respondent with authority to

act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the Attorney General of the United States and the acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement as Respondents. Conclusion For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days of the date of this Court's opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody.² The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court's opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will 2 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days, even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release. dismiss the Attorney General of the United States and the acting Director of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement as Respondents. Dated: March 4, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou

HALA Y. JARBOU

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE