Summary
This Board of Immigration Appeals decision addresses whether two convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude—aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and failure to stop and render aid following a DUI crash—arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board clarifies that while temporal proximity is necessary, it is not sufficient to establish a single scheme; instead, adjudicators must examine whether the acts share a common criminal objective or if one facilitates the other. Finding that the respondent’s offenses had distinct objectives and were not committed in the course of accomplishing one another, the Board reversed the Immigration Judge’s termination of removal proceedings and remanded for further action.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether two crimes involving moral turpitude committed close in time arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii).
- Whether the respondent's aggravated assault and failure to stop and render aid constituted separate schemes because they involved different criminal objectives and the latter was committed to avoid capture for the former.
Holdings
- Proximity in time is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that two crimes arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). A substantial interruption necessarily establishes separate schemes, but the absence of such an interruption does not establish a single scheme.
- Two crimes involving moral turpitude, premised on separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, neither of which was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, constitute separate schemes of criminal misconduct. The respondent was therefore removable under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii).
Key quotations
“In other words, proximity in time is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that two crimes arise from a single scheme of criminal misconduct under section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).” (29 I. & N. Dec. at 3)
“Trying not to be caught for a completed crime is a separate moral wrong with a new criminal objective, not a subordinate act in service of the same criminal objective.” (29 I. & N. Dec. at 5)
“Two crimes involving moral turpitude, premised on separate turpitudinous acts with different objectives, neither of which was committed in the course of accomplishing the other, constitute separate schemes of criminal misconduct.” (29 I. & N. Dec. at 6)
Factual background
The respondent, a lawful permanent resident from Mexico, drove an intoxicated pickup truck into four pedestrians, killing one and injuring three others. He then drove away and was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and failure to stop and render aid. The Immigration Judge found that the convictions involved moral turpitude but arose from a single scheme because the offenses occurred without a significant interruption and the failure to stop followed directly from the assault.
Procedural history
DHS charged the respondent with removability under INA section 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) based on convictions for two crimes involving moral turpitude. The Immigration Judge found that the convictions arose from a single scheme of criminal misconduct and terminated proceedings. The Board reviewed the legal question de novo, reversed, and remanded.
Remand instructions
The record was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion and entry of a new decision.