Robinson v. State

368 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) · District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District · March 16, 1979 · No. No. 78-1652

Summary

The Florida Second District Court of Appeal considered whether a conviction for carrying a concealed firearm constituted a felony involving the use of a firearm under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978). The court held that the statute did not authorize retention of jurisdiction over the sentence for that offense because carrying a firearm is distinct from using it, and it struck the retention-of-jurisdiction provision while affirming the judgment. A dissent would have affirmed the trial court in full.

Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District
Writing for the Court
Grimes, Chief Judge; Hobson, J.; Boardman, J.
Jurisdiction
Florida
Decision date
March 16, 1979
Docket number
No. 78-1652
Procedural posture
Defendant appealed his sentence following conviction for carrying a concealed firearm, challenging the trial court's reservation of jurisdiction over part of his sentence under section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978).
Standard of review
The court reviewed the legal interpretation and application of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes, de novo.
Precedential value
Published state intermediate appellate opinion
Parties
Junior Robinson v. State of Florida
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

statutory interpretationsentencingcriminal procedureappellate procedureplain meaning rule

Practice areas

criminal lawsentencingstatutory interpretationappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether carrying a concealed firearm is a felony "involving the use of a firearm" within the meaning of section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978).
  2. Whether the trial court was authorized to retain jurisdiction over part of Robinson's sentence under that statute.

Holdings

  1. Carrying a concealed firearm is not a felony "involving the use of a firearm" for purposes of section 947.16(3), because the statute contemplates that the firearm or deadly weapon must have been employed in some manner in connection with the felony.
  2. The trial court was not authorized to retain jurisdiction over Robinson's sentence under section 947.16(3), so the retention order was stricken.

Key quotations

In the final analysis, a study of the enumerated crimes which bring the statute into play leads us to believe that the legislature contemplated that the firearm or other deadly weapon was to have been employed in some manner in connection with the felony before the court would be authorized to retain jurisdiction over the defendant's sentence. (639)
If, in Section 775.087, the terms "uses" and "carries" have different meanings, then it should follow that the legislature also conceived of those terms as different when it enacted Section 947.16(3), and thus did not intend for that section to apply to a carrying offense. (639)

Factual background

Robinson was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm and received a five-year sentence. At sentencing, the trial judge retained jurisdiction over part of the sentence under section 947.16(3), which authorizes such retention for certain felonies involving the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon.

Procedural history

Robinson was convicted of carrying a concealed firearm and sentenced to five years. The trial court reserved jurisdiction over a portion of the sentence pursuant to section 947.16(3). The District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment but struck the retention of jurisdiction.

Court Document

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