United States v. Stephenson

924 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1991) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · January 25, 1991

Summary

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the convictions of five defendants for conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The court upheld the denial of motions to suppress evidence from airport encounters, concluding that the encounters were consensual or supported by reasonable suspicion, and rejected challenges involving sentencing history, double jeopardy, severance, the indictment, and evidentiary rulings.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Roy, Senior District Judge; Beam; Fagg; Roy
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
January 25, 1991
Procedural posture
Five defendants convicted jointly by a jury in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base appealed their convictions and sentences, raising individual and collective claims concerning suppression, sentencing, double jeopardy, severance, the indictment, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing-quantity calculations.
Standard of review
Findings of fact on suppression motions are reviewed for clear error; the ultimate Fourth Amendment question is reviewed de novo. Evidentiary rulings and rulings concerning examination of witnesses are reviewed for abuse of discretion. A district court's denial of a motion for severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, requiring a showing of clear prejudice. Sentencing factual findings are accepted unless clearly erroneous.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Oneil Stephenson, Ian Gohagen, Raymond A. Ebanks, Christopher Constantine, Michael Swaby v. United States
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal proceduresearch and seizuresuppression of evidencedouble jeopardysentencing guidelines

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedurefederal sentencingevidenceconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the airport encounter involving Stephenson violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion for an investigative stop or unlawfully seized currency.
  2. Whether the district court improperly calculated Stephenson's criminal-history category by assigning points for a prior sentence and for committing the offense while on probation.
  3. Whether the airport encounter involving Gohagen and Ebanks was custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings and whether the resulting statements and currency evidence were admissible.
  4. Whether Gohagen's prior conviction for distribution of cocaine base barred his subsequent conspiracy prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
  5. Whether Constantine was prejudiced by being tried jointly with the other alleged coconspirators.
  6. Whether the indictment was defective because it did not allege overt acts in furtherance of the drug conspiracy.
  7. Whether Swaby was entitled to a bill of particulars or dismissal because the indictment was vague, and whether evidence concerning conduct in Kansas City, Kansas created an impermissible variance.
  8. Whether evidence of Swaby's related arrest and seized drugs and cash was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
  9. Whether the indictment exposed Swaby to a premature or speculative second prosecution in violation of double jeopardy principles.
  10. Whether evidence concerning the appellants' Jamaican nationality deprived them of a fair trial or was improperly admitted.
  11. Whether physical evidence obtained outside the charged conspiracy period was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) or resulted in a variance.
  12. Whether the district court properly determined that the conspiracy involved more than 500 grams of cocaine base for Sentencing Guidelines purposes.

Holdings

  1. The initial questioning was a consensual public encounter that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment; even assuming the encounter later became a Terry investigative stop, the officers had reasonable and articulable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances.
  2. The district court properly placed Stephenson in Criminal History Category II because the Sentencing Guidelines authorized one point for his prior sentence and two points for committing the instant offense while under probation; the calculation was not unconstitutional double counting.
  3. Miranda did not apply because Gohagen and Ebanks were not in custody; their statements and the evidence obtained through their consensual searches were properly admitted.
  4. Gohagen's prior conviction for distribution of cocaine base did not bar his subsequent conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine base because each offense required proof of a fact that the other did not.
  5. Constantine was not entitled to severance because coconspirators are generally properly tried together and he failed to show clear prejudice or abuse of discretion.
  6. An indictment charging a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 need not allege or prove overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.
  7. The denial of Swaby's request for a bill of particulars was not an abuse of discretion, and evidence concerning conduct in Kansas City, Kansas did not create a fatal variance because the indictment charged the conspiracy in Kansas City, Missouri, and elsewhere.
  8. Evidence of drugs, cash, weapons, and related conduct was properly admitted because it was probative of the charged conspiracy and the defendants' participation in it, rather than solely evidence of unrelated other bad acts under Rule 404(b).
  9. The district court properly determined that the conspiracy involved more than 500 grams of cocaine base and properly applied base offense level 36.

Key quotations

We find that the cumulative effect of the large bundles of cash visible in Smith’s pockets, Stephenson’s and Smith’s noticeable nervousness, the apparent use of fictitious names, the one-way airplane tickets, and the time and manner of the purchase of the tickets was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that these two individuals either had committed, or were committing, a crime. (924 F.2d at 759)
Although the question presented here is somewhat closer than that raised by Stephenson, we are nonetheless convinced that this encounter amounted to something less than the “custodial interrogation” to which Miranda applies. (924 F.2d at 760)
A defendant may be cumulatively punished if conviction on each offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other. (924 F.2d at 761)
Evidence of a conspirator’s post conspiracy activity is admissible if probative of the existence of a conspiracy or the participation of an alleged conspirator, ‘even though they might have occurred after the conspiracy ended.’ (924 F.2d at 764)

Factual background

The appellants were members of a cocaine-base distribution conspiracy operating in Kansas City, Missouri, and surrounding areas from approximately May 1987 through August 1988. The operation involved multiple crack houses, coordinated drug deliveries, substantial cash proceeds, firearms, and numerous cooperating witnesses and undercover purchases. Law enforcement seized drugs, cash, weapons, and records during searches and airport encounters, and the evidence supported the conclusion that each appellant was deeply involved in the conspiracy.

Procedural history

An indictment charged the appellants with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. After a ten-day joint jury trial, all five defendants were convicted on March 3, 1989, and received sentences ranging from 22 to 33 years. The Eighth Circuit rejected all asserted grounds for reversal and affirmed each judgment of conviction.

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