Deepali Tukaye v. Matt Troup, Individually and in His Official Capacity as CEO of Conway Regional Medical Center; City of Conway; Health Facilities Board (of Conway Regional Medical Center); John Doe #1

Deepali Tukaye v. Matt Troup, No. 24-1934 (8th Cir. Nov. 4, 2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · November 4, 2025 · No. 24-1934

Summary

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal with prejudice of Deepali Tukaye’s claims against Matt Troup and other defendants. The court held that Tukaye’s amended complaint did not plausibly allege that Troup proximately caused her damages for purposes of an Arkansas tortious-interference claim, because her notice to leave was properly treated as a voluntary resignation. The court also affirmed denial of Tukaye’s Rule 59(e) motion seeking to amend the complaint after judgment.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Erickson, Circuit Judge; Loken, Circuit Judge; Kelly, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Decision date
November 4, 2025
Docket number
24-1934
Procedural posture
Tukaye appealed the dismissal with prejudice of her amended complaint for failure to state a claim and the denial of her Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion seeking to alter or amend the judgment and file a second amended complaint.
Standard of review
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Parties
Deepali Tukaye v. Matt Troup, individually and in his official capacity as CEO of Conway Regional Medical Center, City of Conway, Health Facilities Board of Conway Regional Medical Center, John Doe #1
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

intentional interference with contractmotions to dismissmotion for reconsiderationappellate procedurecivil procedure

Practice areas

civil procedureemployment lawtortscontractscivil rights

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the amended complaint plausibly alleged that Troup proximately caused Tukaye's damages for purposes of an Arkansas tortious-interference-with-contract claim.
  2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Tukaye's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and seek leave to file a second amended complaint.

Holdings

  1. The amended complaint failed to state a plausible tortious-interference-with-contract claim because Tukaye's own voluntary departure, described as providing notice to leave, defeated the required element of proximate cause.
  2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Tukaye's Rule 59(e) motion because she identified neither a manifest error of law or fact nor newly discovered evidence, and her proposed amendment merely added allegations that could have been presented before judgment.

Key quotations

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ (at 3)
Rule 59 motions are disfavored and “serve the limited function of correcting manifest errors of law or fact or [presenting] newly discovered evidence.” (at 5)

Factual background

Deepali Tukaye, an Indian cardiologist, was employed by Jack Stephens Heart Institute, which contracted with Conway Regional Medical Center to provide cardiologists. After Tukaye complained about the quality of care provided by a white cardiologist, Conway Regional CEO Matt Troup allegedly threatened to terminate Conway Regional's contract with Jack Stephens unless Tukaye was reassigned. Jack Stephens did not reassign Tukaye, and Tukaye then gave Jack Stephens notice of her intention to leave her employment; Troup subsequently renewed Conway Regional's contract with Jack Stephens. Tukaye alleged tortious interference with contract, due process violations, and employment discrimination.

Procedural history

Tukaye sued Troup, the City of Conway, the Health Facilities Board, and John Doe #1 for tortious interference with contract, due process violations, and employment discrimination. After defendants moved to dismiss, the district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice. The court also denied Tukaye's Rule 59(e) motion seeking post-judgment relief and leave to file a second amended complaint. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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