Lee Van Brown v. City of Dermott Arkansas; Cobe Heard; Eric Evans

No. 23-3073 (8th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · August 20, 2025 · No. No. 23-3073

Summary

This Eighth Circuit opinion reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of police officials and a city in a § 1983 lawsuit brought by a former police officer. The plaintiff alleged that his resignation was retaliated against for reporting excessive force under the First Amendment and that he was subjected to malicious prosecution without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, alongside several state law claims. The appellate court affirmed, holding that a voluntary resignation does not constitute an adverse employment action for First Amendment retaliation purposes, and that a mere summons does not amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Consequently, the federal and supplemental state law claims failed as a matter of law.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Kobes, Circuit Judge; Smith, Circuit Judge; Shepherd, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Decision date
August 20, 2025
Docket number
No. 23-3073
Procedural posture
Appeal from the Eastern District of Arkansas's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and related Arkansas state-law claims.
Standard of review
De novo review of the grant of summary judgment; summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Precedential value
Published opinion
Parties
Lee Van Brown, originally named as Levan Brown v. City of Dermott Arkansas, Cobe Heard, individually, Eric Evans, in his individual and official capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Dermott
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

section 1983retaliationmalicious prosecutioncivil rightsappellate procedure

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil rightsemployment lawtortsappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Brown established a First Amendment retaliation claim when he voluntarily resigned and did not allege constructive discharge.
  2. Whether Brown established a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim when he was summoned to court but was not arrested or subjected to other pretrial restraints.
  3. Whether the City of Dermott could be liable under § 1983 when Brown failed to establish an underlying First or Fourth Amendment violation.
  4. Whether the district court properly exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Brown's Arkansas state-law claims after resolving the federal claims.
  5. Whether Brown's Arkansas Whistle Blower Act, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation claims survived summary judgment.

Holdings

  1. A voluntary resignation is not an adverse employment action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation claim absent circumstances establishing constructive discharge. A cat's-paw theory likewise does not eliminate the requirement of an adverse employment action.
  2. A plaintiff asserting Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution must show a seizure, and a summons alone does not constitute a seizure when the plaintiff is not arrested or subjected to pretrial restrictions.
  3. A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 when the plaintiff has not established an underlying constitutional violation.
  4. The district court acted within its discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims after resolving the federal claims because the claims shared a common nucleus of operative fact and were not novel or unsettled.
  5. Brown's Arkansas Whistle Blower Act claim failed for lack of an adverse employment action; his malicious prosecution claim failed because probable cause existed; his abuse of process claim failed because he did not allege misuse of process after issuance; and his defamation claim failed because the challenged statements were undisputedly truthful.

Key quotations

a plaintiff cannot state an adverse employment action if he voluntarily resigned (at -3)
No court has held that a summons alone constitutes a seizure. (at -4)

Factual background

Brown, a Dermott police employee, witnessed Officer Heard grab an arrestee by the neck while the arrestee was chained to a pole, and the incident was reported to Police Chief Evans. Heard later accused Brown of taking money from a parolee and attempting to bribe Heard, leading Evans to refer the matter for investigation by the Arkansas State Police. Brown was told by a supervising sergeant that he was fired for being a no-call, no-show, but no authorized department official formally fired him; Brown resigned shortly thereafter after another police department rescinded a job offer because of the investigation. Brown was later charged with abuse of office and witness bribery, but the charges were dismissed when the prosecutor could not locate the parolee.

Procedural history

Brown sued the City of Dermott, Police Chief Eric Evans, and Officer Cobe Heard, alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations under § 1983 and state-law claims arising from his alleged retaliation, criminal investigation, and employment consequences. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the judgment de novo and affirmed.

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