Sara Dobbins v. Brooke L. Rollins

Dobbins v. Rollins, No. 25-1465 (8th Cir. June 24, 2026) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · June 24, 2026 · No. 25-1465

Summary

The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the U.S. Department of Agriculture in an employee’s claims involving sex and disability discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, failure to accommodate, and wrongful discharge. The court held that the employee lacked sufficient direct or indirect evidence of disability discrimination, failed to show a sufficiently severe or pervasive hostile work environment, forfeited certain claims by not opposing summary judgment below, and failed to exhaust her failure-to-accommodate claim before the EEOC. The court also rejected the asserted wrongful-discharge claim.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Kobes, Circuit Judge; Kelly, Circuit Judge; Arnold, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Decision date
June 24, 2026
Docket number
25-1465
Procedural posture
Appeal from the Western District of Missouri's grant of summary judgment to the United States Department of Agriculture on federal sex-discrimination, disability-discrimination, hostile-work-environment, retaliation, failure-to-accommodate, and wrongful-discharge claims.
Standard of review
De novo review of an order granting summary judgment; the court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and may affirm on any ground supported by the record.
Precedential value
Published opinion
Parties
Sara Dobbins v. Brooke L. Rollins, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

disability discriminationada / disabilityemployment discriminationappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

employment lawfederal employment lawcivil rightsdisability discriminationappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether summary judgment was proper on Dobbins's disability-discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act.
  2. Whether Dobbins presented direct or indirect evidence that USDA's stated attendance-based reason for termination was pretextual.
  3. Whether Dobbins established a disability-based hostile work environment.
  4. Whether Dobbins waived or forfeited her sex-discrimination and disability-retaliation claims by failing to oppose summary judgment in the district court.
  5. Whether Dobbins exhausted her administrative remedies for her Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claim.
  6. Whether Dobbins asserted a viable wrongful-discharge or constructive-discharge claim.

Holdings

  1. Dobbins did not present direct evidence of disability discrimination because the comments and conduct she identified did not clearly link discriminatory animus to USDA's disciplinary or termination decisions.
  2. Summary judgment was proper because, even assuming Dobbins established a prima facie case, she did not show that USDA's legitimate reason for terminating her—repeated and unexcused absences—was pretext for disability discrimination.
  3. Dobbins failed to establish a disability-based hostile work environment because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive and was not shown to be directed at her because of her disability.
  4. Dobbins waived or forfeited her sex-discrimination and disability-retaliation claims by failing to oppose USDA's motion for summary judgment on those claims and could not raise the merits for the first time on appeal.
  5. Dobbins's Rehabilitation Act failure-to-accommodate claim was barred because she did not exhaust that claim with the EEOC.
  6. The court affirmed summary judgment on Dobbins's wrongful-discharge claim because she pleaded only federal claims, and constructive discharge is not an independent cause of action.

Key quotations

Proving discrimination via direct evidence is “rare” since “the evidence ‘must be strong and clearly point to an illegal motive.’” (at 3)
To show pretext, Dobbins must cite evidence showing a genuine dispute that “discrimination was the real reason” for her termination. (at 4)
Dobbins’s hostile work environment claim fails too because she does not have evidence that any harassment based on her disability was “sufficiently ‘severe or pervasive’ to affect a term, condition, or privilege of [her] employment.” (at 5)
The ‘failure to oppose a basis for summary judgment constitutes waiver,’ because the non-moving party is responsible for demonstrating any genuine dispute of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. (at 6)
Failure to accommodate under the Rehabilitation Act “is a separate form of prohibited discrimination,” distinct from disparate-treatment discrimination (at 7)
If she is referring to constructive discharge, that “is not a free-standing cause of action.” (at 7)

Factual background

Dobbins worked for USDA beginning in 2006 and developed depression, anxiety, and PTSD after experiencing domestic abuse. USDA initially permitted flexible leave, flexible start times, and ad hoc telework, but later required advance scheduling requests after a change in supervisors. Her subsequent supervisor documented more than thirty absent-without-leave infractions over four months, and USDA suspended her, proposed her removal, placed her on paid administrative investigative leave, and terminated her. Dobbins alleged sex and disability discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, and failure to accommodate, but her EEOC charge identified only two disparate-treatment incidents and did not allege failure to accommodate.

Procedural history

Dobbins sued the United States Department of Agriculture under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act after disciplinary actions, administrative leave, and termination. The district court granted USDA's motion for summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Dobbins failed to establish direct or indirect disability discrimination, failed to show a sufficiently severe or pervasive disability-based hostile work environment, waived or forfeited unopposed claims, failed to exhaust her failure-to-accommodate claim, and had no viable independent wrongful-discharge or constructive-discharge claim.

Court Document

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