Summary
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the City of Clewiston in a suit arising from a police officer's shooting of an unarmed fleeing burglary suspect. The court held that the record did not establish an unconstitutional municipal policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and did not present a genuine issue of material fact supporting the plaintiff's Florida negligence, assault, or battery claims. A dissent argued that the evidence created a factual dispute regarding which deadly-force policy the City followed.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Brown presented sufficient evidence that the shooting resulted from an official City policy or custom authorizing constitutionally unreasonable deadly force, thereby supporting municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- Whether genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on Brown's Florida negligence and assault-and-battery claims against the City.
- Whether Tennessee v. Garner altered the Florida state-law standard governing the use of deadly force in this action arising from a 1979 shooting.
- Whether the 1987 amendment to Florida Statutes § 776.05 applied retroactively to the 1979 shooting.
Holdings
- A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Liability requires proof that the constitutional injury resulted from an official municipal policy, custom, or decision officially sanctioned or ordered by authorized municipal policymakers. Brown produced no significantly probative evidence that the City officially sanctioned constitutionally unreasonable deadly force.
- Summary judgment was proper because Brown failed to identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the City maintained an unconstitutional policy or custom causing his injury.
- The City was entitled to summary judgment on Brown's Florida negligence and assault-and-battery claims because, under the Florida law governing the 1979 shooting, Brown presented no evidence supporting liability.
- Tennessee v. Garner did not establish a new standard governing state tort liability and did not convert conduct that was not previously tortious under Florida law into a Florida tort.
- The 1987 amendment to § 776.05 applied prospectively and did not govern Brown's action arising from the 1979 shooting.
Key quotations
“It is nonetheless axiomatic that "a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under sec. 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."” (848 F.2d at 1538)
“Because "reasonable jurors could [not] find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict", Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, there is no basis for municipal liability under section 1983 in this case.” (848 F.2d at 1541)
“The Garner decision did not purport to establish a new standard applicable in state tort law actions.” (848 F.2d at 1542)
“Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.” (848 F.2d at 1543)
Factual background
On June 18, 1979, Officer Luis Perez observed Brown break into an apartment and steal property. When Perez attempted to arrest Brown as he fled, Perez shot Brown in the leg to prevent his escape. Brown was apparently unarmed, posed no threat of death or bodily harm, and was known to Perez as a juvenile whose address Perez knew. The City's police manual authorized deadly force only as a last resort in specified circumstances and required officers to follow the manual.
Procedural history
Brown sued the City after Officer Luis Perez shot him in the leg while Brown fled from an attempted arrest following a burglary. The district court granted summary judgment to the City and separately to Perez; this appeal concerned only the judgment in favor of the City. The Eleventh Circuit held that Brown failed to produce significantly probative evidence of an unconstitutional municipal policy or a basis for the state-law claims and affirmed.