Summary
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Brad Bradford’s second application for authorization to file a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court held that Bradford’s Johnson-based challenge to his career-offender sentence had been presented in a prior application and that the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Beckles did not justify a stay or establish a prima facie basis for authorization. The court stated that a future Supreme Court decision concerning the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause could support a new Beckles-based application.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Beckles could establish a prima facie case under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) or justify holding Bradford's successive-motion application in abeyance.
- Whether the Eleventh Circuit had jurisdiction to consider Bradford's second application when it raised the same Johnson claim presented in his prior application for authorization.
- Whether Bradford could file a future successive application based on a new Supreme Court decision concerning the constitutionality or retroactivity of the Guidelines residual clause.
Holdings
- The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Beckles did not change existing law, could not itself establish a prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2), and could not justify holding Bradford's application in abeyance.
- Section 2244(b)(1), as incorporated into § 2255(h), barred the Eleventh Circuit from considering Bradford's second application because it presented the same Johnson claim previously presented in his earlier application.
- The dismissal was with prejudice as to Bradford's repeated Johnson claim, but without prejudice to a future application based on a new Supreme Court decision, such as a Beckles decision establishing a new retroactive constitutional rule concerning the Guidelines residual clause.
Key quotations
“"grants of certiorari do not themselves change the law," and "must not be used by courts" as a basis to grant relief that would otherwise be denied.” (830 F.3d at 1275)
“Because § 2244(b)(1) is jurisdictional, we necessarily lack jurisdiction to hear a second or successive habeas petition premised exclusively on a claim that was presented in a prior application.” (830 F.3d at 1281)
“Accordingly, Bradford’s application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction, and his motion to hold the application in abeyance is DENIED.” (830 F.3d at 1284)
Factual background
Bradford was serving a 180-month federal sentence for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. In 2008, the district court classified him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on prior Florida convictions for burglary and cocaine trafficking. He sought successive § 2255 authorization on the theory that Johnson v. United States invalidated the residual clause used in his Guidelines career-offender enhancement, while Beckles was pending before the Supreme Court.
Procedural history
Bradford was sentenced in 2008 to 180 months as a career offender under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. His direct appeal challenged only his conviction, which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in 2009. The district court denied his original § 2255 motion, which challenged his career-offender designation, and Bradford did not appeal. The Eleventh Circuit denied an initial application for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion on July 1, 2016, and dismissed this second application because it repeated the previously presented Johnson claim.