Summary
A Florida conviction for principal to armed robbery under Fla. Stat. §§ 777.011 and 812.13 categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)). Because Florida law punishes aiders and abettors as principals, an aider and abettor necessarily commits all elements of the underlying robbery, which has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The Eleventh Circuit also held that prior convictions labeled "principal to robbery with a firearm" but citing only the robbery statute are substantive armed robbery convictions. The court affirmed denial of a second or successive § 2255 motion, applying its precedent in *In re Colon*, 826 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2016).
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether two prior Florida convictions for principal to armed robbery, for which the charging documents and judgments cited only Fla. Stat. Ann. § 812.13, were convictions for substantive Florida armed robbery, such that they categorically qualify as violent felonies under the ACCA elements clause.
- Whether a Florida conviction for principal to armed robbery, in violation of Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.011 and § 812.13, constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA elements clause.
Holdings
- A Florida conviction for principal to armed robbery qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
Key quotations
“Because an aider and abettor is responsible for the acts of the principal as a matter of law, an aider and abettor of a Hobbs Act robbery necessarily commits all the elements of a principal Hobbs Act robbery.” (at 8)
“Like the federal statute in Colon, the Florida statute punishes aiders and abettors the same as principal offenders.” (at 9)
“Under Florida law, one who commits, aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures an armed robbery necessarily is a principal to armed robbery.” (at 10)
“In a section 2255 proceeding, we review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” (at 7)
Factual background
In 2006, Jimmy Lee Boston was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. His prior convictions included two armed robberies and seven convictions as a principal to robbery with a firearm (aiding and abetting) under Florida law. He was convicted and sentenced to 262 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act. After the Supreme Court struck down the residual clause in Johnson, Boston filed a successive § 2255 motion arguing that his principal-to-robbery convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies. The district court denied the motion, finding that even his principal-to-robbery convictions counted as violent felonies because an aider and abettor is liable for all acts of the principal.
Procedural history
Boston was convicted in 2007 of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 262 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act based on prior convictions including two armed robberies and seven principal-to-robbery-with-a-firearm convictions. After the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States (2015) voiding the residual clause, Boston filed a second or successive § 2255 motion arguing his principal-to-robbery convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies. The district court denied the motion, and Boston appealed. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether two of his principal-to-robbery convictions that cited only the robbery statute were substantive armed robberies; (2) whether a Florida principal-to-robbery conviction under §§ 777.011 and 812.13 constitutes a violent felony under the elements clause.