Summary
The Eleventh Circuit held that the Armed Career Criminal Act’s definition of a serious drug offense incorporates the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense. Applying that rule, the court addressed Eugene Jackson’s Florida cocaine-related convictions and affirmed their qualification as ACCA predicates.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Which version of the federal controlled-substances schedules does ACCA's definition of a state-law serious drug offense incorporate: the version in effect when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense or the version in effect when he committed the federal firearm offense?
- Do Jackson's 1998 and 2004 Florida Statute § 893.13(1) cocaine convictions qualify as serious drug offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)?
- Were the Eleventh Circuit's prior decisions concerning Florida Statute § 893.13(1) controlling on the historical-schedules question?
Holdings
- ACCA's definition of a state-law serious drug offense incorporates the version of the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect when the defendant was convicted of the prior state drug offense, not the version in effect when the defendant committed the later federal firearm offense.
- Jackson's 1998 and 2004 Florida Statute § 893.13(1) cocaine convictions qualify as serious drug offenses under ACCA because ioflupane was included in the federal controlled-substances schedules when he was convicted, and the Florida statute was not categorically broader than ACCA's definition.
- United States v. Travis Smith, Shular v. United States, and United States v. Xavier Smith did not decide which version of the federal controlled-substances schedules ACCA incorporates and therefore did not foreclose Jackson's argument under the prior-panel-precedent rule.
Key quotations
“In short, we hold that Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the version of the federal drug schedules in effect when a defendant was convicted of his prior state drug offenses.” (29)
“We therefore conclude that Jackson’s 1998 and 2004 Section 893.13(1) cocaine convictions qualify as “serious drug offense[s]” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).” (31)
Factual background
Jackson unlawfully possessed a loaded firearm and ammunition on September 26, 2017, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His presentence report identified two prior Florida convictions under Florida Statute § 893.13(1), entered in 1998 and 2004, as potential ACCA serious drug offenses. Jackson conceded that two other prior convictions qualified as violent felonies but argued that the Florida drug convictions were categorically broader than ACCA because ioflupane was included in Florida's drug schedule when he was convicted but had been removed from the federal schedule by the time of his firearm offense.
Procedural history
The district court overruled Jackson's objection to the use of his 1998 and 2004 Florida Statute § 893.13(1) cocaine convictions as ACCA predicates and sentenced him to the mandatory fifteen-year minimum. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal controlled-substances schedules in effect when the prior state convictions occurred govern the ACCA analysis.