Watkins v. Davis

Watkins v. Davis · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · September 25, 2025 · No. 23-13616

Summary

This Eleventh Circuit opinion addresses a plaintiff's § 1983 claims against two police officers who shot at her vehicle during a nighttime encounter. The court analyzes whether the officers' actions constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure and excessive force, ultimately concluding that genuine questions of fact preclude qualified immunity. The district court's denial of summary judgment on the officers' motion is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Writing for the Court
Rosenbaum; Lagoa; Wilson
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Decision date
September 25, 2025
Docket number
23-13616
Procedural posture
Appeal from an interlocutory order denying police officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity on three 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims.
Standard of review
De novo review of the denial of summary judgment on qualified-immunity grounds. The court resolves disputed issues of material fact in the plaintiff's favor and then determines the legal question whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.
Precedential value
precedential
Parties
Officer Lawrence Davis, Officer Joshua Faulkner v. Tammy Watkins
Disposition
affirmed_and_remanded

Topics

qualified immunitysection 1983police misconductappellate procedure

Practice areas

civil rightsconstitutional lawqualified immunitypolice misconductappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the officers seized Watkins under the Fourth Amendment when they shot and hit the vehicle she was driving, even though no bullet struck her body.
  2. Whether the officers also seized Watkins by a show of authority when their shooting caused her to stop and submit after she recognized them as police.
  3. Whether the officers had arguable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify Watkins's detention and arrest.
  4. Whether the officers' shooting at Watkins's vehicle constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
  5. Whether the officers unlawfully seized Watkins's vehicle without a warrant or applicable exception to the warrant requirement.
  6. Whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on any of the three § 1983 claims.

Holdings

  1. Officers seize the driver of a vehicle by intentionally shooting and hitting the vehicle when the shooting both applies physical force and objectively manifests an intent to restrain the driver, even if no bullet hits the driver's body and the shooting does not immediately stop the vehicle.
  2. On the extraordinary facts presented, Watkins was seized by a show of authority because the officers' shooting caused her to stop and submit as soon as she reasonably recognized that the persons shooting at her were police officers.
  3. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on Watkins's unlawful-detention claim because, viewing the facts in Watkins's favor, no reasonable officer could have had even arguable reasonable suspicion that she was engaged in criminal activity, and the detention matured into an arrest requiring probable cause.
  4. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on Watkins's excessive-force claim because, under the facts viewed in Watkins's favor, no reasonable officer could have believed that she posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm or that deadly force was necessary.
  5. The officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on Watkins's property claim because they seized her vehicle by separating her from it and taking possession of it, without a warrant or applicable exception to the warrant requirement.

Key quotations

Rather, two things are necessary for a Fourth Amendment seizure: (1) “the use of force with [(2)] intent to restrain.” (at 18-19)
So if touching a carriage or the horse drawing it counted as the “force” necessary to effect a seizure of the rider inside the carriage, then touching a car with a driver inside it also amounts to the “force” necessary to effect a seizure of the driver. (at 23-24)
But we have never suggested that an officer may discharge their weapon and still be engaged in simply an investigatory stop. Nor could we. (at 34-35)
A reasonable person, especially a 47-year-old woman alone in a desolate place at night, would worry she was being attacked and flee that scene. That’s not suspicious behavior; it’s survival instincts. (at 39)
A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead. (at 44)
Without identifying themselves as officers or warning they would use deadly force, they approached a person who was alone in a dark and desolate place and started shooting when she fled. That’s not a poor strategic decision in the heat of confronting a threat. Rather, it’s reckless and unreasonable. (at 49)

Factual background

Police officers responded after dark to a report of two people breaking into a truck at 11 Bellamy Place, but approached Watkins at a different property, 30 Bellamy Place, where she was alone in a hatchback. The officers approached stealthily, did not identify themselves as police, and fired several shots at Watkins's SUV as she drove toward the only exit from the property; the vehicle was struck four times, but Watkins was not physically injured. After she encountered marked police vehicles, Watkins stopped, submitted to the officers, and was handcuffed and detained for three to four hours before release without being charged. The officers were separated from the investigation about four minutes after the shooting, and Watkins's vehicle was later taken into custody and declared a total loss.

Procedural history

Watkins sued Officers Davis and Faulkner under § 1983, alleging an unlawful seizure and detention, excessive force, and unlawful seizure and damage to her vehicle. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on Watkins's state-law claims based on Georgia official immunity but denied qualified immunity on all three federal claims. The officers appealed the denial of qualified immunity.

Remand instructions

Remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion after affirming the district court's denial of qualified immunity on all three § 1983 claims.

Court Document

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