Summary
The Eleventh Circuit granted Michael Bowe’s application for authorization to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision abrogating the Eleventh Circuit’s prior interpretation of the same-claim bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), the court held that Bowe made a prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2) based on Davis, Taylor, and Brown. The court left timeliness and ultimate entitlement to relief for the district court to decide.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Bowe's successive § 2255 application could be considered notwithstanding his prior presentation of related claims after the Supreme Court abrogated the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of § 2244(b)(1).
- Whether Bowe made a prima facie showing under § 2255(h)(2) that his application relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.
- Whether Bowe's § 924(c) conviction was prima facie predicated on offenses that do not qualify as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)'s residual or elements clause.
- Whether the Eleventh Circuit should address the timeliness of Bowe's successive claims at the authorization stage.
Holdings
- Section 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar does not apply to federal prisoners seeking authorization to file successive motions under § 2255; the Supreme Court's contrary Eleventh Circuit precedent, In re Baptiste, was abrogated.
- Bowe made a prima facie showing that his application relies on Davis, a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.
- Potential untimeliness under § 2255(f) is not relevant to the Eleventh Circuit's threshold determination whether an applicant has made the prima facie showing required for authorization under § 2255(h).
Key quotations
“The Baptiste interpretation of § 2244(b)(1) is no more.” (at 8)
“But a prima facie showing case is not a final showing entitling an applicant to relief. A prima facie showing is only the necessary first step.” (at 12)
“Because Bowe has made a prima facie showing of the existence of one of the grounds set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), his application for leave to file a second or successive motion is hereby GRANTED.” (at 13)
Factual background
Bowe pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and discharging an assault rifle during the attempted robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He admitted during the plea colloquy that he shot an armed security guard while attempting to rob a bank's automated teller machine. His § 924(c) conviction carried a mandatory consecutive 120-month sentence. He later argued that, in light of Davis, Taylor, and Brown, neither conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery nor attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a crime of violence supporting his § 924(c) conviction.
Procedural history
Bowe pleaded guilty in 2008 to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and using, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. He was sentenced in 2009 to 288 months' imprisonment and did not appeal. After several unsuccessful initial and successive collateral applications based on Johnson, Davis, and Taylor, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed his May 2024 successive application under In re Baptiste. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, held that § 2244(b)(1)'s old-claim bar does not apply to federal prisoners, abrogated Baptiste, vacated the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal, and remanded for consideration under the correct standard. The Eleventh Circuit held that Bowe made the required prima facie showing and granted authorization.
Remand instructions
The district court must determine de novo whether Bowe's successive § 2255 motion actually satisfies the statutory requirements and whether he is entitled to relief. The Eleventh Circuit expressed no view on the timeliness of Bowe's claims under § 2255(f).