Roy Stewart Moore v. Senate Majority PAC

No. 23-13531 (11th Cir. Apr. 24, 2026) · United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · April 24, 2026 · No. 23-13531

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a jury verdict awarding Roy Moore $8.2 million against Senate Majority PAC for defamation and false-light invasion of privacy under Alabama law. The court held that Moore, a public figure, failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the PAC published the challenged defamatory implication with actual malice. It reversed the denial of judgment as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for Senate Majority PAC.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Writing for the Court
Branch, Circuit Judge; Jill Pryor; Branch; Hull
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Decision date
April 24, 2026
Docket number
23-13531
Procedural posture
Appeal from the denial of a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and an alternative motion for a new trial following a jury verdict awarding Moore $8.2 million on Alabama defamation and false-light invasion-of-privacy claims.
Standard of review
The denial of judgment as a matter of law is ordinarily reviewed de novo, drawing reasonable evidentiary inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. In a public-figure defamation case, the appellate court must independently examine the whole record and determine as a matter of law whether the evidence establishes actual malice with convincing clarity, while giving deference to jury credibility determinations.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Senate Majority PAC v. Roy Stewart Moore
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

defamationinvasion of privacyfirst amendmentappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

defamationfalse-light invasion of privacyconstitutional lawappellate procedureelection law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Moore, a public figure, presented clear and convincing evidence that SMP acted with actual malice in publishing the alleged defamatory implication.
  2. Whether, in a defamation-by-implication case, actual malice requires proof not only that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the implied statement, but also that the defendant intended or recklessly disregarded the defamatory implication.
  3. Whether the record, independently reviewed on appeal, contained sufficient evidence to support the jury's actual-malice finding.

Holdings

  1. In a defamation-by-implication case involving a public figure, the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence both that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the implied defamatory statement and that the defendant intended to communicate the defamatory meaning or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the publication would convey that meaning.
  2. Moore failed to present clear and convincing evidence that SMP intended or recklessly disregarded the implication that he solicited sex from Miller when she was fourteen; therefore, the jury's actual-malice finding could not stand.
  3. Because the evidence was insufficient to establish the intent component of actual malice, Moore's defamation and false-light invasion-of-privacy claims failed as a matter of law.

Key quotations

Accordingly, in a defamation-by-implication case, to show the necessary intent to defame inherent in the actual malice standard, the “plaintiff[] must show something that establishes [the] defendant[’s] intent to communicate the defamatory [implied] meaning” or that the defendant acted with “reckless disregard for the defamatory [implied] meaning.” (at 34)
Consequently, in a defamation-by-implication case, the plaintiff must show by clear and convincing evidence not only (1) that the defendant knew of or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the implied defamatory statement, but also (2) that the defendant “inten[ded] to communicate the defamatory meaning” or recklessly disregarded the defamatory meaning—i.e., “the defendant[] knew that the defamatory meaning was not just possible, but likely, and still made the statement despite their knowledge of that likelihood.” (at 35)
Because the evidence discussed above is inadequate to support a finding of the necessary intent to defame for purposes of actual malice in a defamation-by-implication case, Moore’s defamation and false-light claims necessarily fail. (at 44)

Factual background

In 2017, Roy Moore was the Republican nominee for an open Alabama Senate seat and was the subject of news reports alleging inappropriate conduct with young women. Senate Majority PAC ran a political advertisement approximately 533 times that juxtaposed a quotation stating that Moore had been banned from the Gadsden Mall for soliciting sex from young girls with another quotation stating that one girl he approached was fourteen and working as Santa's helper. Moore alleged that the juxtaposition falsely implied that he solicited sex from Wendy Miller when she was fourteen. A jury found SMP liable for defamation and false-light invasion of privacy and awarded Moore $8.2 million.

Procedural history

Moore sued Senate Majority PAC under Alabama law, alleging that two juxtaposed statements in a political advertisement falsely implied that he solicited sex from Wendy Miller when she was fourteen and working as Santa's helper. The district court denied SMP's motion to dismiss and later denied summary judgment, allowing the defamation and false-light claims to proceed to trial. The jury found for Moore and awarded $8.2 million in compensatory damages. The district court denied SMP's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for a new trial, and SMP appealed.

Remand instructions

The district court must enter judgment in favor of Senate Majority PAC.

Court Document

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