Summary
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Jddarrian Irons's prison sentence for possessing a firearm as a felon, including the calculation of his base offense level and a four-level enhancement for possessing the firearm in connection with a Florida concealed-carry felony. The court held that attempted Florida carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence and that the concealed-carry offense was distinct from the federal felon-in-possession offense. The court vacated discretionary supervised-release conditions requiring Irons to obtain a GED and submit to computer searches because those conditions were not pronounced at sentencing, and remanded for resentencing.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court plainly erred by treating Irons's prior Florida attempted-carjacking conviction as a crime of violence supporting a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
- Whether Irons's Florida felony concealed-carry offense was another felony offense and whether his firearm possession was in connection with that offense for purposes of the four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
- Whether the district court could impose a GED requirement and a computer-search condition in the written judgment when it had not pronounced those discretionary conditions at sentencing.
- Whether Irons's challenge to the conditional GED requirement was ripe for review.
Holdings
- The district court did not plainly err in treating Irons's prior attempted-carjacking conviction as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A).
- Irons's Florida felony concealed-carry violation was another felony offense distinct from his federal felon-in-possession offense.
- Irons possessed the firearm in connection with the Florida concealed-carry felony because the firearm facilitated, and was essential to, that offense.
- The district court erred by including the GED requirement and computer-search condition in the written judgment without pronouncing them at the sentencing hearing.
- Irons's challenge to the GED condition was ripe because the district court had already imposed the defective condition in the judgment and Irons sought to vindicate his right to be present and represented by counsel when sentenced.
Key quotations
“But they “must pronounce” those conditions “at the defendant’s sentencing hearing,” and they “cannot add to the defendant’s sentence in a written judgment entered after the sentencing hearing.”” (14)
“Because “the district court include[d] discretionary conditions in the written judgment” that it did not pronounce “at the sentencing hearing,” we “vacate th[ose] conditions and remand for resentencing.”” (16)
Factual background
During undercover surveillance, officers observed Irons enter a vehicle wearing a distinctive fanny pack. After the vehicle was stopped for a seatbelt violation, officers smelled burnt marijuana, ordered the occupants out, and found a handgun in Irons's fanny pack. Irons had a prior felony conviction for attempted carjacking, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, and received a 46-month sentence with three years of supervised release.
Procedural history
A grand jury indicted Irons under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty. The district court imposed a 46-month prison sentence and three years of supervised release, including a GED requirement and a computer-search condition in the written judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the imprisonment sentence, vacated the two unpronounced supervised-release conditions, and remanded for resentencing on those conditions.
Remand instructions
Vacate the GED and computer-search conditions of supervised release and remand for resentencing. On remand, the district court may, after giving Irons an opportunity to be heard, reconsider whether to impose each discretionary condition.