Summary
The First Circuit reviewed appeals arising from an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on the FBI's suppression of exculpatory information in the prosecution of four men for the 1965 murder of Edward Deegan. The court rejected liability based on malicious prosecution but affirmed the government's liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and upheld damages exceeding $100 million. It also addressed the FTCA's discretionary-function exception and the retroactive application of the law-enforcement proviso.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the United States could be liable under the FTCA for malicious prosecution when FBI personnel did not institute the state criminal proceedings.
- Whether the plaintiffs' intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims were barred because they arose out of malicious prosecution under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
- Whether the evidence established the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law.
- Whether the FTCA discretionary-function exception barred claims based on the FBI's participation in framing the plaintiffs and withholding exculpatory information.
- Whether the district court's non-economic damage awards were grossly disproportionate or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Edward Greco's motion to increase his damages award.
Holdings
- The United States was not liable for malicious prosecution because the FBI did not institute the criminal proceedings against the plaintiffs. Under Massachusetts law, merely providing false information during an ongoing investigation, without taking the requisite initiative to cause the prosecution, does not satisfy the institution element.
- The plaintiffs' intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims were not barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Intentional infliction of emotional distress is not itself an enumerated excluded tort, and the claims did not arise out of malicious prosecution because they rested on broader conduct, including post-conviction concealment, and required proof of extreme and outrageous conduct and severe emotional distress.
- The plaintiffs proved intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law. The FBI knowingly or deliberately disregarded the plaintiffs' innocence, assisted in presenting and maintaining a false account, covered up its misconduct, and thereby foreseeably caused severe emotional distress.
- The discretionary-function exception did not bar the claims because the specific conduct at issue—helping frame innocent persons and covering up the frame-up by withholding exculpatory information—violated constitutional requirements and therefore was outside the exception.
- The district court's $101,750,000 damages award was affirmed. Although the awards were exceptionally high and near the outer boundary of permissible awards, they were not grossly disproportionate to the injuries and did not shock the conscience or constitute a miscarriage of justice.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edward Greco's motion to alter the judgment. The evidence supported the finding that much of his special hardship resulted from preexisting family dysfunction rather than the government's misconduct.
Key quotations
“substance trumps form; an inquiring court must look past the nomenclature employed by the plaintiff and focus on the actual nature of the plaintiff's grievance.” (Part II(B)(1))
“Viewed from 50,000 feet, virtually any action can be characterized as discretionary. But the discretionary function exception requires that an inquiring court focus on the specific conduct at issue.” (Part II(C))
“there is no scientific formula or measuring device which can be applied to place a precise dollar value on matters such as restraint of freedom, fright, anxiety, loss of face, or emotional scarring.” (Part II(D)(1))
Factual background
In 1967, FBI agents cultivated organized-crime informant Joseph Barboza, whose account led to the indictment and conviction of Peter Limone, Enrico Tameleo, Louis Greco, and Joseph Salvati for the 1965 murder of Edward Deegan. The FBI possessed substantial intelligence indicating that Barboza and other organized-crime figures, not the convicted men, were involved, but failed to disclose that information and helped sustain Barboza's false account. After the convictions, FBI personnel continued withholding exculpatory information and took steps that impeded post-conviction relief. The convictions were eventually vacated, and the plaintiffs brought FTCA claims for the resulting wrongful incarceration and emotional injuries.
Procedural history
The plaintiffs sued the United States under the FTCA and initially also asserted Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against individual federal and state actors. The cases were consolidated; the individual-defendant claims were later abandoned. After a bench trial, the district court found liability on theories including malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy, negligence, negligent supervision, and loss of consortium, and awarded $101,750,000. The First Circuit rejected liability for malicious prosecution but affirmed the alternative intentional-infliction theory, rejected the discretionary-function defense, and affirmed the damages and denial of Greco's motion to alter the judgment.