Blakesley v. Marcus

Blakesley · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · October 31, 2025 · No. 25-1149

Summary

The First Circuit affirmed the denial of Colleen and Jennifer Marcus's special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that the plaintiffs' defamation and tortious-interference claims were not based solely on petitioning activity because the Marcuses also reported alleged misconduct to private entities, and it declined to extend Massachusetts law to treat those communications as petitioning activity. The court bypassed the difficult question of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Writing for the Court
Rikelman, Circuit Judge; Lynch, Circuit Judge; Aframe, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decision date
October 31, 2025
Docket number
25-1149
Procedural posture
Defendants appealed from the denial of their special motion to dismiss under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute in a diversity action asserting defamation and intentional interference with business relations.
Standard of review
De novo. The court treated both the issue of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and the merits of the anti-SLAPP ruling as questions of law. In predicting Massachusetts law, the court applied Massachusetts substantive law under Erie principles.
Precedential value
Published and precedential
Parties
Jennifer Marcus, Colleen Marcus v. Rebecca Blakesley
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

motions to dismissinterlocutory appealappellate jurisdictionstatutory interpretationtorts

Practice areas

civil procedureappellate proceduretortsconstitutional law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the First Circuit should exercise interlocutory jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine over the denial of the defendants' Massachusetts anti-SLAPP special motion to dismiss.
  2. Whether, under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute and the two-stage framework adopted in Bristol Asphalt Co. v. Rochester Bituminous Products, Inc., the defendants showed at stage one that Blakesley's claims were based solely on their petitioning activity.
  3. Whether the defendants' reports to private healthcare employers and a nursing school were statements made in connection with a governmental proceeding and therefore protected petitioning activity.
  4. Whether Colleen Marcus was entitled to dismissal because she allegedly did not personally contact non-governmental entities.

Holdings

  1. The court assumed, without deciding, that it had statutory appellate jurisdiction because the merits favored the party opposing jurisdiction, making it unnecessary to resolve the difficult collateral-order question.
  2. At stage one of the Bristol framework, the proponent of a special motion to dismiss must show through the pleadings and affidavits that the challenged claims are based solely on the proponent's petitioning activity. If the claims also rest on substantial nonpetitioning conduct, the special motion must be denied.
  3. The defendants' reports to Blakesley's private healthcare employers and nursing school did not qualify, on the arguments presented, as petitioning activity made in connection with a governmental proceeding. Consequently, Blakesley's claims were mixed claims and the defendants failed to satisfy stage one of the Bristol framework.
  4. Colleen Marcus was not entitled to dismissal at the special-motion stage because the pleadings and affidavits plausibly supported coordination between Colleen and Jennifer.

Key quotations

Under the streamlined Bristol framework, the district court was required to evaluate at stage one whether Rebecca's underlying claims were based solely on the Marcuses' petitioning activity. (at 13-14)
Mixed claims, that is, those based on a proponent's petitioning along with substantial conduct other than or in addition to the petitioning activities, . . . [are] best addressed in the course of ordinary litigation, where both sides' claims and defenses can be fully analyzed based on a more complete record, not special motions to dismiss. (at 20-21)

Factual background

Rebecca Blakesley, a nurse evaluator, alleged that Jennifer and Colleen Marcus reported accusations of HIPAA violations, fraudulent billing, cheating, plagiarism, and falsifying a COVID test to governmental agencies, private healthcare employers, and Blakesley's nursing school. The reports followed domestic-abuse allegations against Andrew Blakesley, Colleen's son, and Rebecca's decision to end the relationship and seek protective orders. The private healthcare companies terminated Blakesley's employment, and Massachusetts halted review of her application to become a licensed psychiatric nurse practitioner. Blakesley sued for defamation and intentional interference with business relations.

Procedural history

Rebecca Blakesley filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Jennifer and Colleen Marcus. The defendants moved for early dismissal under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 231, § 59H. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the claims were not based solely on petitioning activity because the defendants had also reported the alleged misconduct to private employers and a nursing school. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal, and the First Circuit affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.

Remand instructions

The district court's order denying the special motion to dismiss is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…