Wadsworth v. MSAD 40/RSU 40

129 F.4th 38 (1st Cir. 2025) · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · February 19, 2025 · No. 23-1463

Summary

This First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion reviews a district court's decisions granting summary judgment and dismissing claims brought by a high school student against her school principal, a school social worker, and the school district. The plaintiff alleged violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including substantive due process and equal protection claims based on the principal's inappropriate relationship and text messages, as well as a Title IX claim against the district. The appellate court affirms the dismissal of claims against the social worker and the district, partially reverses the grant of summary judgment regarding the principal's equal protection claim, and affirms the summary judgment on his substantive due process claim.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Writing for the Court
Montecalvo, Circuit Judge; Lynch, Circuit Judge; Rikelman, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decision date
February 19, 2025
Docket number
23-1463
Procedural posture
Appeal from decisions of the United States District Court for the District of Maine granting a motion to dismiss and three motions for summary judgment in an action alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Title IX violation.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences for the plaintiff. It reviewed summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Qualified immunity was evaluated under the two-step inquiry of whether the facts could show a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established.
Precedential value
Published and precedential First Circuit opinion
Parties
Adrianna Wadsworth v. Chuck Nguyen, MSAD 40/RSU 40, Andrew Cavanaugh, Medomak Valley High School
Disposition
other

Topics

civil rightsequal protectionfourteenth amendmentsection 1983appellate procedure

Practice areas

civil rightsconstitutional laweducation lawemployment and school sexual harassmentappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Wadsworth stated a viable supervisor-liability claim under § 1983 against school social worker Nguyen.
  2. Whether Wadsworth stated a viable equal-protection claim against Nguyen.
  3. Whether Cavanaugh's nonphysical sexual harassment could support a substantive-due-process claim based on bodily integrity.
  4. Whether Cavanaugh's conduct could support an equal-protection hostile educational environment claim based on sex discrimination.
  5. Whether Cavanaugh was entitled to qualified immunity on the equal-protection claim.
  6. Whether Nguyen was entitled to summary judgment on Wadsworth's state-created-danger substantive-due-process claim.
  7. Whether MSAD could be liable under § 1983 for an insufficient harassment policy or failure to train.
  8. Whether MSAD was entitled to summary judgment on Wadsworth's Title IX claim because school officials lacked actual notice of the alleged harassment.

Holdings

  1. The claim failed because Wadsworth did not establish that the nonphysical harassment deprived her of the constitutional right to bodily integrity; the court therefore affirmed summary judgment for Cavanaugh without reaching the alternative qualified-immunity ground.
  2. A plaintiff asserting an equal-protection claim based on sexual harassment in an educational setting need not establish a similarly situated comparator. The claim may proceed under a hostile-environment framework requiring proof of unwelcome harassment based on sex that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive educational environment, viewed under the totality of the circumstances.
  3. Cavanaugh was not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage because, at the time of the alleged conduct, the right to be free from nonphysical sexual harassment by a government educator was clearly established by First Circuit precedent and a robust consensus of persuasive authority.
  4. The supervisor-liability claim against Nguyen was properly dismissed because the allegations did not establish that Nguyen had the requisite degree of control over Cavanaugh.
  5. The equal-protection claim against Nguyen was properly dismissed because the complaint did not allege facts showing that Nguyen acted with sex-based discriminatory intent or treated Wadsworth differently from other students.
  6. Summary judgment for Nguyen was affirmed because Wadsworth waived appellate review of the district court's conclusion that the evidence did not show conscience-shocking conduct and did not overcome qualified immunity.
  7. MSAD was entitled to summary judgment on the insufficient-policy and failure-to-train theories because the record did not show a policy gap, a causal connection between the policy or training and the constitutional violation, or deliberate indifference by municipal decisionmakers.
  8. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to MSAD on the Title IX claim. A reasonable jury could find that Assistant Principals Pease and Philbrook were appropriate persons with authority to take corrective action and had actual notice of a substantial risk that Cavanaugh was sexually harassing Wadsworth.

Key quotations

Where a plaintiff alleges that the perpetrator created a hostile environment by "forc[ing] a [student] [to] run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to [go to school]," (at 28-29)
Clearly established means that, at the time of the [official's] conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what they are doing is unlawful. (at 37-38)
It is enough if a reasonable jury could conclude that a school "ought to" know that harassment is occurring -- if MSAD had information that conveyed a substantial risk of ongoing harassment, that is enough regardless of whether the relevant school officials excused the conduct. (at 68)

Factual background

Adrianna Wadsworth was a high-school student who developed an unusually close relationship with Medomak Valley High School principal Andrew Cavanaugh while experiencing serious family difficulties. Cavanaugh provided money, transportation, employment, and other assistance, repeatedly met with Wadsworth during school hours, encouraged her to live with him, and sent thousands of text messages containing sexual comments, inquiries about her sex life and body, sexualized nicknames, innuendo, and threats of violence. Assistant principals knew of several boundary-crossing aspects of the relationship, including the frequent meetings, Cavanaugh's interest in having Wadsworth live with him, his financial involvement, and their communications. The conduct ended after a police investigation and the superintendent's decision to place Cavanaugh on leave and begin dismissal proceedings.

Procedural history

Wadsworth sued a school principal, school social worker, and school district after alleging prolonged sexual harassment by the principal and failures by school officials and the district to intervene. The district court dismissed the supervisor-liability and equal-protection claims against Nguyen, granted summary judgment to Cavanaugh on substantive-due-process and equal-protection claims, granted summary judgment to Nguyen on a state-created-danger claim, and granted summary judgment to MSAD on municipal-liability and Title IX claims. The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal and most summary-judgment rulings, reversed summary judgment for Cavanaugh on the equal-protection claim and for MSAD on the Title IX claim, and remanded.

Remand instructions

Remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion on Wadsworth's equal-protection claim against Cavanaugh and Title IX claim against MSAD. The dismissal of the supervisor-liability and equal-protection claims against Nguyen and the summary judgments for Cavanaugh on substantive due process, Nguyen on the state-created-danger claim, and MSAD on municipal liability remain affirmed. Costs were awarded to Wadsworth.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…