Cabral Fortes Tomar v. Bondi

Tomar · United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · January 23, 2026 · No. 24-2108

Summary

The First Circuit held that Massachusetts General Laws chapter 272, section 16, prohibiting open and gross lewdness, is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude under federal immigration law. Because the statute does not require proof of lewd or sexually motivated intent, the petitioner's two convictions under the statute did not make him deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The court granted the petition for review, reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals' decision, and remanded for further proceedings.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Writing for the Court
Elliott, District Judge; Rikelman, Circuit Judge; Aframe, Circuit Judge; Elliott, District Judge, sitting by designation
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Decision date
January 23, 2026
Docket number
24-2108
Procedural posture
Petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals order affirming an immigration judge's removal order.
Standard of review
De novo review of the agency's interpretation of Massachusetts law and the legal question whether the state offense categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude. Review focuses on the BIA's decision when the BIA provides its own analysis.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Lucio Ivaldo Cabral Fortes Tomar v. Pamela J. Bondi, Attorney General
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

criminal immigrationremoval proceedingsimmigrationstatutory interpretationappellate procedure

Practice areas

immigrationremoval proceedingscriminal immigrationadministrative lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Massachusetts General Laws chapter 272, section 16, categorically defines a crime involving moral turpitude under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
  2. Whether the First Circuit should reverse the BIA's legal determination rather than vacate and remand for further agency proceedings.

Holdings

  1. Section 16 is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude because a conviction under the statute does not require proof of lewd intent or a sexual purpose.
  2. Reversal rather than remand for further agency consideration was appropriate because the issue was purely legal, subject to de novo review, did not implicate agency expertise, and required no fact-finding.

Key quotations

On petition for review, we hold that § 16 is not a CIMT under the categorical approach. We thus grant the petition and reverse. (3)
Under the “categorical approach,” we determine whether a noncitizen's crime of conviction categorically involves moral turpitude by looking “only to the statutory definition of the offense, and not to the particular facts underlying the conviction.” (4-5)
For all these reasons, we hold that § 16 is not a categorical crime involving moral turpitude because a conviction under the statute does not require proof of lewd intent. (19)

Factual background

Lucio Ivaldo Cabral Fortes Tomar, a citizen of Cape Verde, entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 2003. He was convicted twice under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 272, section 16, which prohibits open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior. Following the second conviction, the government charged him as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), based on two crimes allegedly involving moral turpitude.

Procedural history

The Department of Homeland Security charged Tomar, a lawful permanent resident, as removable after two Massachusetts convictions for open and gross lewdness under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 272, section 16. The immigration judge denied Tomar's motion to terminate the removal proceedings and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed, concluding that section 16 categorically constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude. The First Circuit granted the petition for review, reversed the BIA's order, and remanded for further proceedings.

Remand instructions

The matter is remanded to the agency for further proceedings consistent with the opinion; Tomar's section 16 convictions may not serve as the basis for deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) on the categorical-CIMT theory rejected by the court.

Court Document

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