Summary
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Myles Billups's convictions for Hobbs Act and Travel Act violations and two Taft-Hartley Act offenses arising from alleged extortionate payments and unlawful labor-related gratuities. The court rejected challenges concerning juror bias, alleged withholding of exculpatory evidence, judicial comments, admission of prior-acts evidence, consciousness-of-guilt instructions, venue, and sufficiency of the evidence regarding fear under the Hobbs Act.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court properly denied a new trial after a juror failed to disclose that her son was an inactive ILA member and allegedly harbored hostility toward Billups.
- Whether the government's failure to produce post-trial-discovered Prudential investigation materials and related documents violated Brady and required a new trial.
- Whether comments and questioning by the trial judge in the jury's presence deprived Billups of a fair trial.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the Travel Act conviction.
- Whether prior-act evidence and rebuttal testimony concerning alleged payoffs were admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404.
- Whether the evidence supported a consciousness-of-guilt instruction.
- Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the Hobbs Act's fear element and effect on commerce.
- Whether venue for a Taft-Hartley Act violation under 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) was proper in the district where the affected commerce was located even though the payment occurred elsewhere.
Holdings
- A post-trial hearing providing the defendant an opportunity to prove actual juror bias satisfies due process; the district court properly found no actual bias and did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.
- The nondisclosure of the post-trial-discovered Prudential-related materials did not constitute a constitutional Brady violation because the materials did not create a reasonable doubt that otherwise did not exist.
- Any objection to the trial judge's questioning was waived because counsel failed to object at the next available opportunity outside the jury's presence; in any event, the comments did not deprive Billups of a fair trial.
- The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that Billups traveled from Virginia to New York intending to receive an illegal payment and therefore supported the Travel Act conviction.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of prior payments and Stokes's testimony concerning other alleged payoffs because the evidence was relevant to a common plan or scheme and rebutted the defense's affirmative character evidence and testimony.
- The evidence supported an instruction allowing the jury to consider attempts to influence a witness as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
- The evidence was sufficient to establish the Hobbs Act's fear element and effect on commerce, even though the victim initiated the dealings and characterized his concern as economic rather than personal fear.
- Venue for a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 186(b)(1) is proper either where the proscribed payment or acceptance occurred or where commerce was affected by the transaction.
Key quotations
“The Supreme Court recently examined the problem of alleged juror misconduct discovered after conviction, and declined to hold that any "implied bias" automatically requires a new trial.” (¶ 15)
“if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.” (¶ 19)
“Venue lies either wherever commerce is affected or wherever the proscribed act occurs.” (¶ 76)
Factual background
Billups was an International Longshoremen's Association vice-president who exercised influence over waterfront labor matters in the Norfolk and Hampton Roads area. The government's evidence showed that he sought or accepted payments from maritime employers in connection with the Lash Pacifico dispute and Quin Marine's efforts to obtain ILA work gangs and resolve labor problems. The evidence included testimony from cooperating witnesses, recorded conversations, cash payments, and testimony concerning efforts to influence witnesses. The Taft-Hartley count at issue involved a payment accepted in New York in connection with commerce focused in the Hampton Roads area.
Procedural history
Billups was tried before a jury on a ten-count indictment alleging Hobbs Act, Travel Act, and Taft-Hartley Act violations. Two Taft-Hartley counts were dismissed, the jury returned not-guilty verdicts on other counts, and it convicted Billups on one Hobbs Act count, one Travel Act count, and two Taft-Hartley counts. The district court denied post-trial relief, including a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct and alleged Brady violations. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.