Summary
This published Fourth Circuit opinion reviews a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying cancellation of removal to a Mexican national based on a prior Virginia petit larceny conviction. The court determines whether the state offense categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude, analyzing Virginia's specific-intent requirements and claim-of-right defense under the categorical approach. Relying on independent judicial judgment following Loper Bright, the court holds that the statute requires both a culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct, ultimately denying the petition for review.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Virginia petit larceny under Virginia Code § 18.2-96 categorically qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude despite the claim-of-right defense and the absence of a statutory minimum value for the property taken.
- Whether the Board's temporary member had authority to decide Chavez's motion for reconsideration after serving beyond an asserted six-month term.
- Whether Chavez was eligible for cancellation of removal based on her Virginia petit-larceny conviction.
Holdings
- Virginia petit larceny categorically requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of property. The claim-of-right defense is evaluated subjectively: an honest, good-faith belief in a right to take the property negates the requisite intent, while the fact finder may consider the objective reasonableness of the belief in determining whether it was honestly held. The offense therefore is not one that may be committed through criminal negligence.
- Virginia petit larceny categorically involves reprehensible conduct and is a crime involving moral turpitude regardless of the monetary value of the property taken, including property of de minimis value.
- The temporary Board member had authority to decide Chavez's motion for reconsideration, and consecutive appointments of temporary Board members under the challenged regulation are valid.
Key quotations
“to involve moral turpitude, a crime requires two essential elements: a culpable mental state and reprehensible conduct.” (7-8)
“At bottom, the inquiry is a subjective one, even if the trial court may look to the reasonableness of a defendant’s subjective belief to gauge whether that belief was honestly held.” (16-17)
“We’re satisfied, based on precedent from the Board as well as federal and Virginia courts, that larceny crimes constitute reprehensible conduct regardless of the value of the property taken.” (24)
Factual background
Chavez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection in 2000 and lived there with her three children. In 2011, she was convicted of petit larceny under Virginia Code § 18.2-96. During removal proceedings, she conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal, but the Immigration Judge and Board concluded that the conviction categorically constituted a crime involving moral turpitude.
Procedural history
Chavez entered the United States without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings after a 2011 Virginia petit-larceny conviction. She conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal based on hardship to her children. The Immigration Judge pretermitted the application, the Board dismissed her appeal, and a temporary Board member denied reconsideration. The Fourth Circuit denied the petition for review.