Summary
This Fourth Circuit opinion addresses whether the Federal Tort Claims Act’s judgment bar precludes a plaintiff from pursuing a Bivens action against federal employees after obtaining a judgment on an FTCA claim arising from the same conduct. The court holds that because a final judgment was entered on the plaintiff’s FTCA claim, the subsequent appeal of his Bivens claim is barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2676. Consequently, the court dismisses the appeal.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the FTCA judgment bar under 28 U.S.C. § 2676 bars a Bivens claim on appeal.
Holdings
- The FTCA judgment bar precludes the Bivens claim because the FTCA judgment is a final judgment on the merits concerning the same conduct.
Key quotations
“The FTCA judgment bar “preclude[s] a Bivens claim against a government employee when a judgment has been entered on an FTCA claim arising out of the same actions, transactions, or occurrences as the Bivens claim.”” (8)
“There is nothing “retroactive” about application of the FTCA judgment bar here.” (8)
Factual background
Justin Longworth, an inmate at FCI Butner, alleged repeated sexual harassment and assault by correctional officer Sherry M. Beck and negligent supervision by prison officials. He filed a Bivens action alleging Fourth and Eighth Amendment violations and a separate FTCA action against the United States.
Procedural history
The district court dismissed Longworth's Bivens claims and later dismissed his FTCA claim for lack of jurisdiction. Longworth appealed only the Bivens dismissal. The appellate court considered whether the FTCA judgment bar precludes the Bivens appeal.