Summary
This Fourth Circuit opinion addresses whether the government breached a plea agreement by seeking two Sentencing Guidelines enhancements based on facts outside the parties' stipulated relevant conduct. The court held that paragraph nine of the plea agreement constituted a stipulation to the defendant's total relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. Consequently, the government's advocacy for enhancements based on unstipulated facts violated the agreement, warranting vacatur and remand for resentencing before a different district court judge.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the government breached the plea agreement by seeking sentencing‑guideline enhancements based on facts outside the stipulated total relevant conduct
- Whether the government’s duty of candor excuses a breach of the plea agreement
Holdings
- The government breached the plea agreement; the sentence is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing before a different district‑court judge.
Key quotations
“We emphasize that our decision is in no way a reflection on the trial judge.” (at 11)
“The government thus breached the agreement when it sought enhancements based on allegations outside paragraph nine.” (at 8-9)
Factual background
Craig pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and had prior felony convictions. A plea agreement stipulated that paragraph nine set forth the parties' "total relevant conduct" for sentencing. After sentencing, the government sought two guideline enhancements—one for a stolen gun and another for a firearm connected to a felony—based on facts not included in paragraph nine.
Procedural history
The district court accepted Craig's guilty plea to unlawful firearm possession, dropped drug charges, and imposed a sentence after applying two sentencing‑guideline enhancements not contained in the plea‑agreement stipulation. Craig appealed, arguing the government breached the plea agreement. The Fourth Circuit reviewed the issue de novo.
Remand instructions
Resentencing before a different district‑court judge.