Summary
The Fourth Circuit held that a supervised-release condition allowing warrantless searches of a supervisee’s property did not authorize officers to search real property owned by the supervisee but leased to a third-party tenant. The court further held that officers needed probable cause to believe the supervisee also resided at the tenant’s home before conducting a probationary search there, and concluded that the search violated the tenant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court reversed, vacated, and remanded with instructions, determining that the seized currency was improperly seized and not subject to forfeiture.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a supervised-release condition authorizing warrantless searches of a supervisee's property permits officers to search real property owned by the supervisee but leased and occupied by a third-party tenant.
- Whether officers must have probable cause to believe that a court-supervised individual resides at a third party's dwelling before initiating a warrantless probationary search there.
- Whether the evidence seized from Teal Drive could be used to sustain the civil forfeiture of the defendant currency.
Holdings
- A supervised-release condition permitting warrantless searches of a supervisee's property does not authorize officers to search real property owned by the supervisee but leased and occupied by a third-party resident. The supervisee's ownership interest alone did not authorize entry into and search of Teal Drive.
- Before initiating a warrantless search of a residence not known to be the home of a court-supervised individual, officers must have probable cause to believe that the individual resides there.
- Because the Teal Drive search was unconstitutional, evidence discovered there must be excluded from the civil forfeiture proceeding, and the currency seized during that search was improperly seized and not subject to forfeiture on the Government's evidence.
Key quotations
“As an initial matter, we conclude that a condition of supervised release that permits a warrantless search of a supervisee’s “property” does not permit the government to search real property owned by him and leased by a third-party resident.” (3)
“We hold that an officer must have probable cause to believe a dwelling is the residence of the court-supervised individual to initiate a warrantless search of a residence not known to be the court-supervised individual’s home.” (19)
“Because the officers did not meet this probable cause standard, the Teal Drive search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.” (22)
Factual background
Augustine Perez was on federal supervised release subject to conditions requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his person and property. After Perez moved from Teal Drive to Lawndale Drive, he retained ownership of Teal Drive and leased it to Deanna Coleman, who lived there with her daughter and transferred the utilities into her name. Based on an inadequately detailed confidential-informant tip and limited investigative information, probation officers searched both residences and entered Teal Drive over Coleman's objection, where they found currency and other items later alleged to be connected to drug trafficking. The Government brought a civil forfeiture action against $25,325, and the district court relied primarily on evidence from the Teal Drive search in granting summary judgment for the Government.
Procedural history
The Government filed a civil forfeiture complaint against $25,325 allegedly related to drug trafficking. Perez and Coleman filed claims to portions of the currency and jointly moved to dismiss the complaint and suppress evidence from searches of their residences. The district court denied the motion to suppress, later granted the Government summary judgment, and ordered the currency seized. The Fourth Circuit reversed the suppression ruling as to Teal Drive, vacated the summary judgment order, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the Government's complaint.
Remand instructions
Vacate the district court's order granting the Government's motion for summary judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the Government's complaint.