United States v. Gregory Gentner and Richard Brasser

United States v. Gregory Gentner and Richard Brasser · United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · May 28, 2026 · No. Nos. 25-4140 and 25-4165

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Gregory Gentner and Richard Brasser for willfully failing to pay over employee trust-fund taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7202. The court rejected challenges concerning the jury’s access to the indictment, the jury instructions relating to the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program and willfulness, and the denial of a motion for a new trial.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Judge King; King; Wynn; Rushing
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decision date
May 28, 2026
Docket number
Nos. 25-4140 and 25-4165
Procedural posture
Consolidated appeals from criminal judgments entered after a jury convicted each defendant of five felony violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7202 and the district court denied their Rule 29 and Rule 33 post-trial motions.
Standard of review
Jury-instruction decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, while whether an instruction correctly stated the law is reviewed de novo. The adequacy of instructions is assessed as a whole and in light of the entire record; an erroneous instruction warrants reversal only if it seriously prejudiced the defendant. Submission of an indictment to the jury is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and new trials are granted sparingly.
Precedential value
Published and precedential
Parties
Gregory Gentner, Richard Brasser v. United States of America
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

payroll taxemployment taxjury instructionsstandard of reviewappellate procedure

Practice areas

Federal criminal tax offensesEmployment-tax withholdingAppellate procedureJury instructionsPost-trial motions

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court abused its discretion by permitting the jury to review the indictment during deliberations.
  2. Whether the jury instructions were inconsistent with the IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program or improperly failed to account for rFactr's ability to pay its trust-fund taxes.
  3. Whether the jury instructions concerning willfulness, good faith, discretionary expenditures, and preferences for other creditors were confusing, misleading, or prejudicial.
  4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying the defendants' Rule 33 motion for a new trial based on the alleged failure to weigh their cooperation with the IRS and the weight of the evidence.

Holdings

  1. A district court may allow the jury to review an indictment during deliberations when the jury is unequivocally instructed that the indictment is not evidence and is provided only to aid the jury in following the court's instructions and counsel's arguments. The district court satisfied that standard, so permitting the indictment to go to the jury was not an abuse of discretion.
  2. The challenged instructions were not an abuse of discretion because they accurately permitted the jury to consider the defendants' ability to pay and an intentional preference for other creditors over the United States as evidence of willfulness, and the defendants were charged only for tax quarters after their Disclosure Program application.
  3. The jury instructions adequately and fairly stated the controlling law concerning willfulness and good faith and were not confusing, misleading, or prejudicial. A good-faith belief may negate willfulness, and the supplemental instruction made clear that the good-faith defense applied to all charges.
  4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial because the evidence of willfulness was overwhelming and the court adequately addressed the evidence and applied the proper Rule 33 standard.

Key quotations

And those instructions conform to the law in this Circuit. See Turpin v. United States, 970 F.2d 1344, 1347 (4th Cir. 1992) (explaining that an “intentional preference of other creditors over the United States is sufficient to establish the element of willfulness” with respect to failure to pay required taxes (citation modified)). (17)
To sustain their five felony convictions thereunder, the prosecution was obliged to demonstrate (1) that the defendants had a duty to withhold and pay over trust- fund taxes; and (2) that the defendants “willfully failed to perform [those] tax-related duties.” (20)
Put simply, the mandate established by § 7202, and the authorities developed thereunder, are clear: If a taxpayer has intentionally funded other expenditures instead of his known tax obligations — even if he claims those expenditures were necessary for the survival of the business — he has acted willfully. (20-21)

Factual background

Gentner and Brasser were the primary executives of rFactr, Inc., a Charlotte software company, and were responsible for filing employment-tax returns and paying over taxes withheld from employees' wages. Despite repeated IRS warnings, tax levies, and advice from company personnel, rFactr failed to pay over trust-fund taxes for multiple quarters, while receiving substantial revenue and paying the defendants large salaries and funding other expenditures. The defendants applied to and were accepted into an IRS Voluntary Disclosure Program, but the five quarters underlying their convictions post-dated that application, and they continued failing to pay current trust-fund taxes. The company later ceased operations, and the defendants ultimately paid the taxes, penalties, and interest before indictment, but were nevertheless prosecuted and convicted under § 7202.

Procedural history

A federal grand jury indicted Gentner and Brasser in January 2023 for offenses including willful failure to pay over employee trust-fund taxes. After a joint jury trial in March 2024, each defendant was convicted on five § 7202 counts and acquitted on the remaining false-return and tax-evasion charges. The district court denied their post-trial motions, sentenced each defendant to twelve months and one day in prison followed by supervised release, and the defendants appealed. The Fourth Circuit consolidated the appeals and affirmed.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…