Summary
The Fourth Circuit affirmed Hatchet M. Speed’s convictions for possessing three unregistered silencers in violation of the National Firearms Act. The court held that the statutory definition of a firearm silencer does not require a device to be currently operable and that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Speed’s purported solvent traps qualified as silencers. The court also rejected Speed’s as-applied vagueness and Second Amendment challenges.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court correctly instructed the jury that a device need not be currently operable as a silencer if its objective design and purpose bring it within the statutory definition.
- Whether sufficient evidence supported Speed's convictions for possessing unregistered silencers.
- Whether the National Firearms Act's silencer definition is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Speed.
- Whether possession of silencers is protected by the Second Amendment and renders the NFA's registration requirements unconstitutional.
Holdings
- Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25), incorporated into the NFA by 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), a device need not be currently operable as a silencer to qualify as a firearm silencer. The district court therefore correctly instructed the jury to focus on the device's objective design features and purpose.
- The evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Speed's three devices were silencers within the statutory definition and that he knowingly possessed unregistered devices subject to NFA regulation.
- The NFA's silencer definition is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Speed because the devices he possessed were clearly proscribed by the statutory text.
- The court did not decide whether silencers are bearable arms protected by the Second Amendment. Assuming they are, Speed's challenge still failed because the NFA's objective registration requirements constitute a presumptively constitutional shall-issue permitting regime, and Speed did not show that the regime was abusive.
Key quotations
“Purpose and intended goal suggest that our inquiry is guided by what the device is designed to do—not current functionality.” (13)
“In sum, the NFA’s definition does not require a device to be currently operable as a silencer. In fact, it suggests the opposite.” (15)
“Fortunately, since the HIT devices clearly fall within the NFA’s definition of a silencer, we need not, and do not, define the outer contours of that definition.” (21)
“For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is, AFFIRMED.” (27)
Factual background
Speed purchased three devices marketed as solvent traps, but the devices were expensive black titanium cylinders with threaded attachment points, cone-shaped internal components resembling baffles, and aligned projectile holes. An ATF expert testified that, after a minor modification taking approximately five minutes, one device functioned effectively as a silencer, while the devices were poorly suited for use as solvent traps. Speed discussed with an undercover FBI employee how to drill the devices to convert them into silencers and indicated that they would be useful in carrying out violent plans. The devices were unregistered, and agents seized them from Speed's storage unit.
Procedural history
A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Speed on three counts of possessing unregistered silencers. The district court denied Speed's motion to dismiss based on vagueness and the Second Amendment, overruled his objection to jury instructions concerning operability, and conducted two trials; the first ended in a mistrial and the second resulted in convictions on all three counts. The district court sentenced Speed to 36 months' imprisonment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed.