Summary
The Massachusetts Superior Court allowed Defendant Brian Biggs's motion requiring the plaintiff to proceed under her true name rather than the pseudonym Jane Doe. The court held that Massachusetts law strongly disfavors anonymous civil litigation and that the plaintiff's privacy concerns, including allegations of sexual assault, reputational harm, and employment consequences, did not overcome the presumption of openness. The court noted that targeted protective orders or impoundment could provide confidentiality protections without permitting pseudonymous litigation.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment and sexual assault in a civil action had shown a substantial privacy right sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that civil litigants proceed under their real names.
- Whether the plaintiff's prior public use of her true name in related G.L. c. 209A proceedings and the availability of narrower confidentiality measures defeated or diminished her request to proceed pseudonymously.
Holdings
- A civil plaintiff does not have a statutory or rule-based right to litigate under a pseudonym and must demonstrate a substantial privacy right that outweighs the strong, constitutionally informed presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. Allegations of sexual harassment or sexual assault, standing alone, do not establish the exceptional circumstances necessary for anonymity.
- A plaintiff's prior public disclosure of her identity in related proceedings, without seeking sealing or impoundment, substantially diminishes the privacy interest supporting a request to litigate anonymously.
- The denial of pseudonymous litigation does not preclude the court from protecting sensitive information through narrower measures such as a Rule 26(c) protective order or tailored impoundment.
Key quotations
“We join these courts in recognizing the strong presumption against the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation.” (at 3)
“In the civil context, the plaintiff instigates the action, and, except in the most exceptional cases, must be prepared to proceed on the public record.” (at 4)
“Given the strong countervailing presumption against anonymity in civil litigation, and the availability of alternate means of protecting the Plaintiff's privacy interests under the distinctive circumstances of the present case, the Court concludes that permitting Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously would be unfair and improper.” (at 9)
Factual background
The plaintiff sued DLA Piper LLP (US), her former law firm employer, and Brian Biggs, a former partner, alleging sexual harassment, coercion, and sexual assault and battery under G.L. c. 151B. She initially obtained an ex parte order allowing her to proceed as Jane Doe based on concerns about disclosure of sexual-trauma allegations, mental-health treatment, reputational stigma, and employment consequences. Before filing this action, however, she had brought a related G.L. c. 209A action against Biggs, testified in open court under her real name, introduced identifying evidence, and did not seek to seal or impound the proceedings. The present action had also received national media attention.
Procedural history
The plaintiff commenced an action against her former employer and a former partner alleging violations of G.L. c. 151B, including sexual harassment, coercion, and sexual assault and battery. At commencement, the court entered an ex parte order permitting her to proceed anonymously. After learning that the plaintiff had previously used her real name in related publicly accessible G.L. c. 209A proceedings, Biggs moved to require her to proceed under her true name. Following a hearing, the Superior Court allowed the motion.