Commonwealth v. Reese

Summary

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed a finding of no probable cause to believe that Christopher J. Reese was a sexually dangerous person under G. L. c. 123A. The court held that the hearing judge applied the probable-cause standard incorrectly, improperly admitted hearsay articles concerning sexual recidivism, and misinterpreted the statutory meaning of "likely to engage in sexual offenses." The court vacated the finding of no probable cause and remanded for a new hearing.

Holdings

1. A probable cause hearing under G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (c), is governed by a directed-verdict-type standard. The judge must determine first whether the Commonwealth's admissible evidence, if believed, satisfies every element necessary to prove that the respondent is sexually dangerous, and second whether the evidence is not so incredible, insubstantial, or otherwise deficient that no reasonable person could rely on it.
2. The Superior Court judge erred by rejecting the Commonwealth expert's diagnosis and opinion as incredible based on the judge's own interpretation of the DSM-IV and the difference between the expert's testimony and the diagnostic text.
3. Articles concerning sexual-offender recidivism were inadmissible hearsay at the § 12 (c) probable cause hearing because they were not established as reliable authorities, did not qualify for the learned-treatise exception, and did not fall within the statutory provision governing evidence at a commitment trial.
4. The statutory term 'likely to engage in sexual offenses' does not require the Commonwealth to prove that it is more likely than not that the respondent will commit another sexual offense within the immediate future or within a particular five-year period.

Questions Presented

1. What standard governs a judge's determination of probable cause at a hearing under G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (c)?
2. Whether the Superior Court judge improperly assessed the credibility of the Commonwealth's expert testimony concerning Reese's mental abnormality or personality disorder.
3. Whether articles concerning sexual-offender recidivism were admissible at the probable cause hearing.
4. Whether the statutory requirement that a person be 'likely to engage in sexual offenses if not confined to a secure facility' requires proof that a new sexual offense is more likely than not to occur within an immediate or specified future period.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded