Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Christopher Cutts’s convictions for murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and arson, as well as the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court rejected his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning criminal responsibility, suppression of police statements, voluntariness of civilian statements, evidence of prior incarceration, and admission of a photograph. The court also completed its review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and declined to reduce the murder conviction.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or present a lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense based on cocaine-induced psychosis.
- Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress Cutts's statements to police under Miranda and the Fifth Amendment.
- Whether counsel was ineffective, and whether the judge had a sua sponte duty, to seek voir dire hearings and instructions concerning the voluntariness of Cutts's statements to civilian witnesses.
- Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence concerning the length and nature of Cutts's prior incarceration.
- Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a photograph depicting hemorrhages in the victim's eyes.
- Whether the cumulative effect of counsel's asserted errors created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Whether the court should reduce the first-degree murder conviction or order a new trial under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- Counsel was not ineffective for declining to present an insanity or lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense where counsel investigated Cutts's mental health and drug use, obtained expert evaluation, relied on an expert opinion that Cutts did not meet the insanity criteria, and reasonably pursued diminished capacity instead.
- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a suppression motion where the record showed that Cutts knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights, requested to speak with police, was told he could telephone an attorney or another person, and called a former state trooper instead.
- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to request voir dire hearings, legal rulings, or jury instructions on the voluntariness of Cutts's statements to civilian witnesses, and the trial judge had no duty to act sua sponte because no substantial claim of involuntariness arose.
- Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to evidence concerning Cutts's prior incarceration because some evidence was admissible to show motive or as an admission, and the otherwise irrelevant evidence was not sufficiently prejudicial to create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Even assuming counsel might have successfully objected to the photograph, the failure to object did not result in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- The asserted errors, considered individually or cumulatively, did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, and plenary review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E disclosed no basis to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.
Key quotations
“Under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, we begin our evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “by determining whether there was a serious failure by trial counsel. If so, then we determine whether the failure resulted in a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.”” (444 Mass. at 827)
“Although “[statements that are attributable in large measure to . . . drug abuse ... are involuntary,” Commonwealth v. Allen, supra at 455, and cases cited, “[ijntoxication alone is not sufficient to negate an otherwise voluntary act.”” (444 Mass. at 832)
“On this record, it would have been extraordinary for any fact finder to have concluded that Cutts’s statements were anything other than “the product of a rational intellect and a free will.”” (444 Mass. at 833)
Factual background
John C. Gallina was found dead in his Springfield home after suffering severe blunt-force injuries, including a fractured skull, and the home had been set on fire. Evidence linked Cutts to the scene, including fingerprints and tire impressions, and Cutts made detailed admissions to civilian witnesses and police describing the killing, the attempted arson, and the removal of Gallina's property. At trial, Cutts pursued a diminished-capacity theory based on cocaine use, a prior prison rape, and alleged homosexual panic; defense experts diagnosed personality disorders but did not establish that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct.
Procedural history
A Hampden County jury convicted Cutts in 1998. Cutts filed a motion for a new trial on February 8, 2001. The motion was remanded to the trial judge, who held an evidentiary hearing limited to whether counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense; the judge rejected that claim and the remaining claims. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments and the order denying a new trial after reviewing the entire record under § 33E.